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Many-Sided Lives argues that nineteenth-century novels by Jane Austen, George Eliot 
and others train readers in the liberal habit of appreciating thoughtful opposition. 
Through the systematic juxtaposition of characters who express conflicting attitudes, 
such novels invite readers to adopt the stance J.S. Mill describes as “many-sidedness.” 
While recent scholarship has brought welcome attention to exemplary characters in 
realist fiction who display liberal habits of mind—including disinterestedness and critical 
distance—this work has said little about the formal techniques used to cultivate such 
habits. Many-Sided Lives by contrast, argues that formal features of the Victorian novel—
and especially its ample character-system—was essential to its promotion of liberal 
thought. Building on Alex Woloch’s study of major and minor characters in realism, 
Many-Sided Lives examines Victorian novels that use secondary characters as dialectical 
interlocutors for protagonists. Four chapters examine conflicting expressions of sincere 
and theatrical communication in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park; spontaneous and 
disciplined responses to moral life in George Eliot’s Middlemarch; committed and ironic 
relations to society in George Gissing’s The Odd Women; and imaginative and rational 
judgments of behavior in Henry James’s The Ambassadors. Among the surprising 
conclusions I draw from my close reading of these texts is that the realist novel promotes 
a distinct sort of liberalism, defined less by its inclusive representation of social voices 
than by its comparative assessment of their merits. The liberalism of the Victorian novel 
was at once brave and unorthodox, inviting readers to embrace the challenge of 
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Introduction: Liberal Reading and the Aesthetic 
 
If literary criticism is ever to conceptualize a new disciplinary domain, it will 
have to undertake first a much more thorough reflection on the historical 
category of literature; otherwise I suggest that new critical movements will 
continue to register their agendas symptomatically, by ritually overthrowing a 




I. Victorian Liberalism: Moral Intelligence and Literary Study 
 
In mid-19th century England, the citizens of the world’s most powerful democracy 
and imperial power struggled to find common ground over polarizing issues. The 
influence of Puritanism and the emergence of partisan presses enhanced English 
tendencies to adopt convictions that were sincere but also self-righteous.1 Public life had 
become a tribal affair as citizens formed rigid opinions in lockstep with powerful 
institutions: scientific and religious, Tory and democrat, Tractarian and Catholic. 
To alleviate this groupthink, Victorian liberals thought that citizens needed to 
become morally intelligent: or, thoughtful about their own convictions and charitable to 
the convictions of others.2 J.S. Mill’s word for moral intelligence was many-sidedness, 
and he adopted the concept from Aristotle’s conception of practical reason.3 In Aristotle’s 
model of reasoning, disputes occur due to the partial knowledge of individual 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of rigidity and partisanship in Victorian culture see Houghton 161-76.  
2 I adopt the term “moral intelligence” from Lionel Trilling. 
3 Mill’s 1840 essay on Coledridge criticizes "the noisy conflict of half-truths, angrily denying one 
another," and argues that "in almost every one of the leading controversies, past or present, in social 
philosophy, both sides were in the right in what they affirmed, though wrong in what they denied; and that 
if either could have been made to take the other's views in addition to its own, little more would have been 
needed to make its doctrine correct" (qtd in Houghton 178). Houghton suggests that the intellectual lineage 
of Mill’s interest in Aristotle’s dialectical conception of practical reason owes primarily to his reading of 
Coleridge, who had acquired the concept from German philosophy, especially Hegel, who had in turn 
acquired it from Aristotle (178). Mill was also familiar with the work of Goethe and of Carlyle, which had 





perspectives. While an individual alone perceives “little or nothing” of the truth, he may 
nevertheless validate his view through its capacity to account for the views that oppose it 
(Aristotle, qtd in McCumber 164). The full truth only emerges from a “clash of 
standpoints,” in which conflicting opinions are harmonized as far as this is possible 
(McCumber 164). Because individual knowledge is always partial, this dialectical model 
of reason not only requires individuals to be informed about the content of competing 
viewpoints but willing to accommodate them in their own view. Mill describes the 
process of this kind of practical reasoning in “On Liberty”: “In the case of any person 
whose judgment is really deserving confidence, how has it become so? Because he has 
kept his mind open to criticism on his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his 
practice to listen to all that could be said against him …hearing what can be said about it 
by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked 
at by every character of mind” (39). For Aristotle as well as Mill, sound practical 
judgment requires interlocutors to adopt an accommodating approach to discussion: 
competing and superficial views are not errors to be overthrown, but necessary to deepen 
one’s own partial or superficial understanding. The judgments of the kind of morally 
intelligent citizen Mill describes would not be one-sided but many-sided: or 
accommodating, informed, and impartial in their approach to competing views. 
But how could citizens acquire a taste for morally intelligent judgment and 
perception? Matthew Arnold suggested that reading literature could help citizens practice 
accommodating different viewpoints. If citizens studied “the best which has been thought 
and said,” they could free themselves from blind reliance on the “watchwords and ready-





great works of literature in the right way, John Ruskin argued, these citizens would 
develop powers of sensitivity, curiosity, and humility.4 This reading practice, in turn, 
could be applied to life in civil society, as citizens trained in the habits of charitable 
reading could more easily see the appeal of each other’s ideas. In the process of 
becoming skilled readers of literature, citizens would learn to relish the challenge of 
understanding opposing views. 
II. Leavisism and New Criticism: Liberal Reading 
 
The liberal ideal of literary education that Arnold envisioned would be most fully 
realized in the middle years of the 20th century. As Leavisism gained traction in England 
and the New Criticism in America, English departments trained students in habits of 
reading designed to cultivate moral intelligence. The influence of T.S. Eliot and I.A. 
Richards on both these schools created a common focus on the practice of reading as the 
cultivation of judgment. To read and reflect on literature, in T.S. Eliot’s words, was to 
“compose …differences with as many of [one’s] fellows as possible in the common 
pursuit of true judgment” (“The Function of Criticism” 69). For I.A. Richards as well, the 
discipline of close-reading was designed help individuals acquire powers of perception 
necessary for morally intelligent judgment in society: or the capacity to stand back from 
“views that seem to conflict with our own prepossessions …to investigate them” rather 
than seeking to “refute” or “combat” them (Practical Criticism 7). 
Richards’s Practical Criticism lays out requirements for the kind of cultivated 
reading practice he imagined. Three were especially relevant to the liberal conception of 
                                                          
4 See Ruskin’s “Of King’s Treasuries” in Sesame and Lilies. David Wayne Thomas precedes me in 






reading inherited from Arnold and Ruskin. First, close-reading requires sensitivity rather 
than “inhibition,” or what Richards relates to “hardness of heart” (14). That is to say, 
successful reading depends foremost on an ability to respond, to have one’s feelings 
played upon by the object of inquiry. Second, successful reading depends upon curiosity 
rather than close-mindedness: it requires enough cognitive flexibility to make out 
“complex and unfamiliar meanings” made present in the text (295). This work of 
“making out the plain sense” quickly misfires if uncurious readers fail to attend to what 
the poem is actually doing, and instead respond with “stock responses,” or “views 
…already fully prepared in the reader’s mind” (12, 14). Third, the practice of reading 
requires humility rather than “narcissism” or complacency. Richards discerns this kind of 
failure in one student’s surprisingly candid response to a Longfellow poem that mentions 
“Christian charity”—a subject the student deemed to be “not worth much effort on the 
part of the reader because the underlying emotion is not of sufficient value” (15, 160). 
The skills of sensitivity, curiosity, and humility cultivated by Richards and his 
successors gave English departments a broad social mission. In democratic societies 
where groups depend upon the ability to persuade each other without resorting to 
violence, citizens need the capacity to be moved by worthy appeals. Unless citizens 
possess emotional sensitivity to the feelings of others, curiosity to attend to the reasoning 
and intuitions behind unfamiliar perspectives, and humility to respect the opinions of 
credible sources, persuasive appeals based on pathos, logos, and ethos would be unlikely 
to succeed. Arnold saw that democratic societies in which powerful groups fail to 
persuade each other of the legitimacy of their interests would be vulnerable to dissolution 





English departments in the 20th century ensured the discipline had a broad and coherent 
social mission. 
III. Leavisism and New Criticism: Liberal Aesthetics 
 
To work to its full potential, the discipline institutionalized by Richards and his 
successors required more than a set of skills acquired through reading, however. It also 
required literature. If the discipline of reading were to give students practice changing 
their opinions, it was essential that the works they studied meet certain qualitative 
requirements. To varying degrees and with varying degrees of explicitness, critics in 
these years thus believed that the works of art most deserving of study were those that 
made especially compelling or deserving appeals to the judgment of readers. For these 
appeals to be successful, literary works needed to present experience in especially 
affecting, illuminating, and impersonal ways. That is, literature needed to appeal to the 
emotions of readers, to show them something new, and to convey judgments in a credible 
way.  
While similar criteria had been essential to Matthew Arnold’s aesthetics, T.S. 
Eliot’s critical essays adapted liberal aesthetic standards for a new generation of critics.5 
In his essay on the metaphysical poets, Eliot suggests that great poets should convey their 
intelligence through the interests developed in their works, implicitly suggesting that 
works of art should appeal to the minds of readers.6 More memorably, Eliot also 
emphasizes the necessity for a great poet’s intelligence to be supplemented by and 
combined with feeling. On Eliot’s view, great poetry should not just convey thought as 
                                                          
5 See Arnold’s “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time” and “Literature and Science.” 
6 “The possible interests of a poet are unlimited; the more intelligent he is the better; the more 
intelligent he is the more likely that he will have interests: our only condition is that he turn them into 





lucidly as a Samuel Johnson or Alexander Pope, but should also “feel … thought as 
immediately as the odour of a rose” (64). In addition to earning status through thought-
provoking and emotionally arresting presentations of experience, literary works in Eliot’s 
view also aim to present experience in an impersonal register. As Eliot saw it, a poem’s 
thought and emotion cannot depend upon the merely private experience of the artist, 
which “may be simple, or crude, or flat” (“Tradition and the Individual Talent,” 43). The 
fully realized work of art instead depends upon the artist’s “surrender of himself” to 
“something which is more valuable”: that is, “a new art emotion,” realized in a 
presentation of experience purged of bias, exaggeration, and idiosyncrasy (40, 43). 
For Eliot and the critics he influenced, the set of works that met these aesthetic 
criteria were actively debated. The canon was the provisional (and largely imagined) 
consensus around these debates. Critics who made aesthetic arguments about the canon 
took it upon themselves to discriminate between works of art deserving and undeserving 
of inclusion. According to Eliot, poets as diverse as Tennyson, Browning, and Milton 
suffered by contrast with metaphysical poets like Donne due to their perceived failure to 
translate thought into feeling. For F.R. Leavis, most Dickens novels suffered by contrast 
to those by Austen, Eliot, Conrad, and James for their comparative deficiency in making 
“connexions and significances” of life in Victorian society visible to readers.7 Leavis was 
similarly exacting in the requirement great art be impersonal and purged of idiosyncrasy. 
For example, he thought that George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss suffered by contrast to 
                                                          
7 Leavis claims that Dickens possesses the “genius …of a great entertainer,” and that his works do not 
challenge the adult mind to the same degree as other novelists he discusses. Leavis exempts Hard Times 
from this indictment, suggesting that in that novel, “certain key characteristics of Victorian civilization had 
clearly come home to him with overwhelming force, embodied in concrete manifestations that suggested to 





Austen’s novels for its comparatively indulgent presentation of her protagonist, tinged 
with “an element of self-idealization” and “self-pity.” 
As these examples likely suggest, Eliot and Leavis’s aesthetic judgments about 
the canon were often conducted at a level of abstraction more likely to be suggestive than 
convincing to critics with dissenting opinions. But by conceiving of reading practice and 
aesthetic evaluation alike as “the common pursuit of true judgment,” the middle years of 
the 20th century made literary study coherent as a discipline. Under the influence of Eliot, 
Richards, and Leavis, the method and objects of literary study cultivated a mutually 






Simply put, under Leavisism and the New Criticism, reading literature gave people 
practice changing their minds. The institutionalized setting of the English department 
directed students to develop attitudes of sensitivity, curiosity, and humility necessary to 
interpret opposing views of others with charity rather than hostility. And canonical works 
of literature familiarized students with the affecting, illuminating, and impersonal 
presentations of experience necessary to develop more thoughtful views themselves. To 
the degree that these liberal ideals could be institutionally realized and made available to 
the public, the result would be a morally intelligent society: a society whose citizens were 
trained to be accommodating rather than self-righteous, informed rather than ignorant, 
and disinterested rather than venal or partisan. 
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IV. Critique and Suspicious Reading 
 
The landscape of literary studies would change dramatically from its liberal 
humanist foundations in the 1960s. As the United States found itself embroiled in an 
unjust war abroad and racial discrimination at home, a new generation of professors 
found little appeal in the liberal ideals of disinterestedness and accommodation.8 By the 
time that Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, Roland Barthes, Jean Hyppolite and Jacques 
Lacan were invited to visit Johns Hopkins for a conference in 1966, American English 
professors were ready to embrace a radically new conception of their discipline. 
Consciously aligned against the liberal humanism of Leavis and the New Critics, this 
conference was the starting point for the theory revolution that would transform the study 
of English over the next two decades and beyond.9  
Structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and 
New Historicism named sometimes conflicting and incompatible currents of the theory 
years. But these schools also had common features and attitudes that allowed them to 
speak in a powerful and unified way to the sensibilities of left-leaning American 
professors during an age animated by protest against injustice. Ronan McDonald 
summarizes the shared methods that united literary critics in these decades: “During the 
years of high theory from the 1970s to the early 1990s, academic criticism became 
strongly inflected with an ethos of textual “critique,” a skeptical questioning of socially 
                                                          
8 Lionel Trilling offers a more historically contemporaneous take on the shift in the ideals of education 
that appealed to faculty during the 60s: “By the Sixties, something had happened to reduce the zeal for … 
an ideal of general education …which insisted in the traditional humanistic way that the best citizen is the 
person who has learned from the great minds and souls of the past. …The urgency of the problems, the 
sordidnesss of the problems , which pressed in upon us from the surrounding world made speculation on 
education theory seem almost frivolous” (The Last Decade 166, 165, 166-7). 






received values and the discursive operations of power and hegemony in literary and 
cultural texts” (237). The influence of critique would shift the desired attitude cultivated 
by trained reading from charity to suspicion.10 To critique a text, one had to learn to be 
guarded rather than open, focused rather than distracted, and knowing rather than 
mystified.11 
Although critique never fully displaced the older liberal attitudes of reading in the 
humanities, especially in the classroom, the attitudes required by suspicious reading were 
directly antithetical to those required by liberal reading. It was not easy to be stoically 
resistant to the wiles of a text yet also sensitive to its appeals; nor was it a simple matter 
to focus on a single governing theory while also displaying curiosity toward a text’s 
ideas. Sacrificing the old liberal ideals of sensitivity, curiosity, and humility in favor of 
new ones meant that suspicious reading could no longer serve the liberal mission of 
enabling charity and understanding between disparate social groups.  
By training students to read suspiciously, practitioners of critique equipped 
students for a different social mission, however. As students learned to unmask the 
authority in linguistic objects, they learned to perceive forms of domination, repression, 
and exploitation in society. Although many of the methods that critics used to challenge 
textual authority were ostensibly relativistic and anti-humanist, they all expressed the 
underlying faith of their historical moment: a faith that structures of power (imperial, 
racial, and sexual) were currently blocking the path to a more just society, and that those 
structures could be effectively challenged. After the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights 
                                                          
10 As late as 2002, Eve Sedgwick would adopt Ricoeur’s phrase, “the hermeneutics of suspicion” to 
describe “the mainstream of New Historicist, deconstructive, feminist, queer, and psychoanalytic criticism” 
that currently governed reading practices in English departments (Touching Feeling 125). 





Movement ended, English departments continued to cultivate attitudes that harmonized 
with reforms championed by the political left. The new, if partly unacknowledged, social 
mission of English departments during the critique years cohered beautifully with what 
Christian Smith has called the “liberal progress narrative” embraced by the Democratic 
party in the United States after the Vietnam War and by the liberal party in Britain.12 By 
directing practitioners to challenge arbitrary authority, the skills of critique 
complemented struggles of identity politics against the oppressive effects of unjust social 
customs and institutions. 
In the years of critique’s inception, the social mission of English departments had 
become more relevant to the zeitgeist. Practitioners of critique were not watching history 
unfold with fastidious disinterest in an ivory tower; critique made its participants feel 
instead like they were participating in historical change. But this new relevance came at a 
cost. For better or worse, the new social mission of English departments was more 
partisan than its older liberal mission had been. The values activated by the liberal 
progress narrative clashed directly with those activated by a countervailing “Reagan 
narrative,” which valued authority and sanctity and was thus suspicious of the drive 
toward unfettered liberty.13 Just as party realignments after the Vietnam War began to 
                                                          
12 “Once upon a time, the vast majority of human persons suffered in societies and social institutions 
that were unjust, unhealthy, repressive, and oppressive. These traditional societies were reprehensible 
because of their deep-rooted inequality, exploitation, and irrational traditionalism.…But the noble human 
aspiration for autonomy, equality, and prosperity struggled mightily against the forces of misery and 
oppression, and eventually succeeded in establishing modern, liberal, democratic, capitalist, welfare 
societies. While modern social conditions hold the potential to maximize the individual freedom and 
pleasure of all, there is much work to be done to dismantle the powerful vestiges of inequality, exploitation, 
and repression. This struggle for the good society in which individuals are equal and free to pursue their 
self-defined happiness is the one mission truly worth dedicating one’s life to achieving” (qtd in Haidt 331). 
13 “Once upon a time, America was a shining beacon. Then liberals came along and erected an 
enormous federal bureaucracy that handcuffed the invisible hand of the free market. They subverted our 
traditional American values and opposed God and faith at every step of the way.…Instead of requiring that 
people work for a living, they siphoned money from hardworking Americans and gave it to Cadillac-





make American society more partisan and divided, the rise of critique dictated that the 
humanities had chosen a side. Beginning in 1970 political diversity in the academy would 
decrease dramatically and continue thereafter, culminating in the lowest recorded level in 
2016.14 
V. Critique and the Aesthetic 
 
Perhaps the most surprising development of the critique decades was not that its 
social mission became increasingly partisan but that its mission no longer required 
literature. If one wanted to look for ways that linguistic signs undermined themselves or 
promoted forms of domination or exclusion, it was not essential to study formally 
sophisticated works of art. The tools of suspicious reading could be applied just as easily 
to works of mass culture as they could to the canon. Beginning in the 1960s, Cultural 
Studies departments accepted this logic and began applying techniques associated with 
critique to non-literary works. The rise of New Historicism in the 1990s later followed 
the lead of Cultural Studies in refusing to give literary objects special status. 
The new irrelevance of literature to methods of critique—openly acknowledged 
by Cultural Studies and more begrudgingly so by New Historicism—put professors of 
literature in a strange position. On the one hand, professors practiced and taught a mode 
of reading and analysis that didn’t require literature to work. On the other hand, 
                                                          
Instead of worrying about the victims of crime, they worried about the rights of criminals.…Instead of 
adhering to traditional American values of family, fidelity, and personal responsibility, they preached 
promiscuity, premarital sex, and the gay lifestyle…and they encouraged a feminist agenda that undermined 
traditional family roles.…Instead of projecting strength to those who would do evil around the world, they 
cut military budgets, disrespected our soldiers in uniform, burned our flag, and chose negotiation and 
multilateralism.…Then Americans decided to take their country back from those who sought to undermine 
it” (qtd in Haidt 332). 
14 Klein and Stern estimate the overall Democrat to Republican ratio in the humanities and social 
sciences “somewhere between 3.5 and 4” to 1 in 1970, and around “7:1 or 8:1” by 2009 (20, 32). In a 2016 
review, Langbert et al. note that the ratio “has gone up markedly over the past ten years,” and estimate the 





professors were still attached to the aesthetic. Symptoms of this unresolved contradiction 
between the method and object of literary studies abounded during the critique decades. 
Perhaps the most telling sign of this contradiction was that some of the most influential 
practitioners of critique displayed precisely the kind of dazzling attentiveness to the 
formal complexity of literary works emphasized by the New Critics (see Fessenbecker 
2015). In addition to privileging aesthetic complexity at the level of practice, practitioners 
of critique also privileged the aesthetic at the level of theory, making and accepting 
questionable arguments for the necessity of formally complex works to critique’s social 
mission. (Was it really true that advancing the Marxist dream of a classless society 
depended upon close analysis of fissures in the “expressive totalities” created by works of 
art? [Jameson, The Political Unconscious 56] Or that overcoming cultural imperialism 
depended on the study of canonical novels whose “formal inclusiveness, historical 
honesty, and prophetic suggestiveness” betrayed symptoms of exclusion and domination? 
[Said 92]). Perhaps the strangest and most contradictory attempt to link the social mission 
of critique with conceptions of the aesthetic was the attempt to “open the canon” to 
minority authors in the 1980s and 90s. Instead of making a case for the study of minority 
works based on their aesthetic merit, advocates for a more inclusive canon sought to 
debunk the very idea of aesthetic value as a hegemonic construct.15 Practitioners of 
critique thus recovered a social urgency for aesthetic debates at the expense of the 
theoretical ground that gave those debates coherence.  
In the same years that saw literary studies become more partisan in its social 
mission and less coherent in its aesthetics, the popularity of English and other humanistic 
                                                          





disciplines began to diminish. At the height of the New Criticism in the United States, 
degrees awarded in the humanities—the most popular of which was English—
represented 17.2% of all bachelor’s degrees. During the years in which critique rose to 
prominence in the 1970s and early 80s, though, “the humanities experienced a substantial 
decline in their share of all bachelor’s degrees,” plummeting to the lowest recorded level 
of 9.9% in 2014. 16  
A major factor in the declining appeal of the humanities over these decades was 
almost certainly the rising cost of college education which began in 1975 to increase 
significantly above the rate of inflation. But it was also possible that English departments 
owed their declining prestige to more than the prudence of undergraduates seeking 
financially lucrative careers. Under critique, the mission of literature departments had 
become narrower. The idea of reading books to challenge values of authority and sanctity 
rather than to justify or preserve those values had made the practice of critique anathema 
to the moral attitudes of conservatives.17 By contrast, the emphasis common to Leavis 
and the New Critics on attitudes of reverence for the canon, on moral seriousness, and on 
criticism as a discipline had given English a broader appeal to conservatives as well as 
liberals. 
The decline of English during the critique years may have owed not only to 
critique’s more partisan social mission but to the diminished status it gave to literature. If 
the public was willing to buy that great books exhibited linguistic and cultural skills 
important to human civilization, perhaps they were less willing to buy that the methods of 
English professors in the academy exhibited skills of comparable value to society. By 
                                                          
16 <http://www.humanitiesindicators.org/content/indicatordoc.aspx?i=34> 





downplaying its historical commitments to a great literary tradition, English departments 
stopped advertising their primary competitive advantage over other cultivating 
disciplines. 
VI. Postcritical Reading and the Phenomenological Turn 
 
Critique’s dominance in the humanities did not go unchallenged forever. 
Dissatisfaction with the practice and vocabulary of suspicious reading began to take hold 
in the late 1980s. Scandals such as the revelation of Paul de Man’s Nazi sympathies and 
the “Sokal Hoax” tarnished the prestige of critique in English departments, as did various 
satirical jabs at the style of theory-inflected writing from journals such 
as Dissent or Philosophy and Literature.18 In addition to facing challenges from scandal 
and satire, the practice and vocabulary of suspicious reading also received resistance 
from voices who had become critique’s most influential proponents. Although critics 
including Eve Sedgwick, Judith Butler, and Terry Eagleton were instrumental in bringing 
vocabularies and practices of theory to a new generation of literary critics, these and 
others—including Christopher Norris, Harold Bloom, and Frank Lentricchia—all shifted 
emphasis later in their careers, exploring practices of reading and analysis antithetical to 
their previous work.19 The changed emphasis of former proponents of critique helped 
inspire a growing body of meta-criticism over the next two decades that directly 
confronts the ethical and methodological limitations of suspicious reading and poses 
alternatives to it. Rita Felski associates these attempts to move beyond critique while also 
                                                          
18 The physicist Alan Sokal managed to publish a bogus essay "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward 
a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity" in a 1996 issue of Social Text, while Brian Morton 
wrote a satirical essay “How Not to Write for Dissent” for a 1990 issue of Dissent, and Denis Dutton ran 
the “Bad Writing Contests” of Philosophy and Literature from 1995-1998. 
19 See Eve Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling (2003), Terry Eagleton’s After Theory (2004), and Judith 





incorporating its insights with an aspiration to become “postcritical.” For Felski, 
postcritical readers explore alternatives to suspicious reading while also remaining wary 
of tendencies to lapse into uncritical or merely impressionistic modes of judgment. 
One significant current in these postcritical conversations is an ongoing turn to 
phenomenology. Inspired by the philosophical tradition of Hegel, Heidegger, and 
especially Paul Riceour, literary critics including Wayne Booth, Richard Rorty, Charles 
Altieri, Eve Sedgwick, Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, Timothy Bewes, Graham 
Harman, Bruno Latour, Heather Love, and Rita Felski have helped bring ideals 
associated with charitable reading back into prominence. Often explicitly aligned against 
the theoretical assumptions of critique, these phenomenological defenses of reading prize 
the liberal ideals of sensitivity, curiosity, and humility essential to the cultivating mission 
that English departments inherited from Matthew Arnold.  
Much of this work has drawn on phenomenology to associate reading with ideals 
of affective sensitivity. Eve Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling draws on Paul Ricoeur’s work 
to contrast a “reparative” stance toward reading with the “paranoid” stance of suspicious 
reading. Her work inspired its own affective turn in literary studies which has contributed 
to “an intellectual climate notably more receptive to thick descriptions of experiential 
states” (Felski Uses of Literature 19). Also inspired by Riceour, Rita Felski’s defense of 
“neophenomenology” advocates an approach to interpretation that “pivots on our first-
person implication and involvement in what we read” (“After Suspicion” 31). Rather than 
adopting an impersonal focus “on transpersonal and usually linguistic structures of 
determination,” this approach to reading strives for “a greater receptivity to the 





12). Along with Felski, other scholars including Yves Citton, Marielle Macé, Nikolas 
Kompridis, Richard Kearney, and Michel Chaouli have drawn on phenomenological and 
hermeneutic traditions to recover modes of reading that attend to the “immersive and 
affective dimensions” of literary experience (“Critique and the Hermeneutics”).20 
Recent recoveries of phenomenological reading do not only privilege attitudes of 
affective sensitivity but of analytical curiosity. Instead of treating texts as occasions for 
the illustration of predetermined truths about the nature of capital, textuality, or desire, 
these approaches to reading make use of categories of thought immanent to their object of 
study. Timothy Bewes quotes the advice Deleuze once gave to students in a seminar to 
describe this posture: “You must let [the author] speak for himself, analyze the frequency 
of his words, the style of his own obsessions. His thought invents its own coordinates and 
develops along its own axes” (qtd. in Bewes 25). Rather than anticipating what to expect 
from a text before one encounters it, this openness to the thought of individual texts 
bespeaks a willingness to experience the flashes of insight Ricoeur describes as 
“revelation” (8). Bewes’s “reading with the grain” coheres closely with Charles Altieri’s 
Hegelian defense of the sensuousness of literary experience against the utopian political 
pieties of New Materialism,21 and also with Steven Connor’s privileging of “cultural 
phenomenology” against what he calls “the machine of critical theory” (24). Resembling 
ethnography more than theory, Connor’s cultural phenomenology avoids reducing “the 
plurality and analytic nonsaturability of cultural experience to common currencies and 
finalising formulae of all kinds” (24). In lieu of focus on “abstract structures, functions 
and dynamics,” such reading employs a patient and curious attention to the concrete 
                                                          
20 See Felski’s The Limits of Critique: 175-185 for a summary of this work. 





specificity of cultural objects (18). Along with Graham Harman’s “object-oriented 
criticism,” and Heather Love’s “close but not deep reading,” these phenomenological 
modes of reading resist imposing terms of analysis on objects of study and instead 
acknowledge the capacity of texts to do their own thinking. 
Phenomenological reading in the tradition of Riceour depends not only on 
sensitivity and curiosity, but humility. Rather than placing confidence in one’s ability to 
master language, or to subordinate it to one’s uses, this approach to reading places 
confidence in language’s capacity to shape one’s own being in the world: it exchanges a 
“willingness to suspect,” for a “willingness to listen” (Ricoeur 27). As Timothy Bewes 
puts it, this posture approaches the text with “the absolute confidence of being spoken to” 
(28). In a similar vein, Altieri suggests that attention to the internal dynamics of texts is 
“capable of affecting our sense of possible actions and possible ways of caring for others” 
(“Sensuous Dimension” 79); Felski champions literature for its capacity to “shake up and 
reconfigure” the preferences of students while inviting “new attachments, affinities, [and] 
interpretative repertoires” (“After Suspicion” 33, 32); Richard Rorty defends 
engagements with literature that “instill doubts” into students’ self-images and that 
“expand” their “moral imaginations” (Social Hope 127); and Wayne Booth defends 
literary encounters that change what readers “desire to desire” (Company 271). This 
emphasis on the potential of reading to affect the “ways of caring,” “attachments,” 
“imaginations,” and “desire[s],” bespeaks an interest in shifting authority away from 
critics and towards texts. This open and humble stance toward texts contrasts sharply 
with the “knowingness” required by suspicious reading—or forms of reading that 





related to truth” (Rorty Achieving 126; Best and Marcus 15). Instead of assuming the 
reader’s role is to pass judgment on texts, these approaches allow for texts to pass 
judgment on readers.22 
In sum, many critics have turned to phenomenology to theorize modes of reading 
that refuse the protocols of suspicious hermeneutics. Critics in these conversations 
privilege stances of subjective investment above scientistic detachment, flexible 
recollection above rigid abstraction, and humble accommodation above arrogant 
dismissiveness. By privileging ideals of emotional sensitivity, analytical curiosity, and 
humble receptivity, this phenomenological turn in literary studies has recovered liberal 
ideals of charitable reading once central to the discipline. By consciously displaying 
sensitivity, curiosity, and receptivity to texts, the phenomenological reader treats the text 
like a liberal is expected to treat the views of fellow interlocutors. The postcritical reader 
and liberal citizen alike assume that exposure to new views is necessary to refine their 
own partial and incomplete perspectives.  
In 1989, Wayne Booth introduced the term “coduction” to describe a method of 
reading inspired by phenomenology and governed by the protocols of Aristotelian 
practical reasoning.23 For Booth, coduction begins with the experience of intuitive 
judgment elicited in the reading experience: “a direct sense that something now before us 
has yielded an experience that we find comparatively desirable, admirable, lovable, or, on 
the other hand, comparatively repugnant, contemptible or hateful” (The Company 71). As 
                                                          
22 A renewed interest in stances of humility is also shared by Michael Warner, who advocates for 
renewed attention to complex traditions of “uncritical” reading inspired by biblical hermeneutics as a rival 
framework to critical reading. 
23 In addition to using coduction to refer to the experience of comparative judgment between reader 
and text, Booth also uses the term to describe the experience of comparative judgment between fellow 





works of art elicit these new experiences and judgments, readers can compare them 
against their own “untraceably complex experiences of other stories and persons” (71). 
To the degree that these past views now seem limited or misguided in comparison to 
those newly elicited by the work of art, readers can choose to form a new view that 
corrects for past limitations and misconceptions. Readers “try out each new pattern of 
desire against those that [they] have found surviving past reflections, and …then decide 
…that this new pattern is or is not an improvement over what [they] have previously 
desired to desire” (272). Of a piece with other modes of reading inspired by 
phenomenology and hermeneutics, Booth’s method of “coduction” is one of many 
methodological interventions that aim to recover the liberal and humanist ideal of reading 
as “the common pursuit of true judgment” (Eliot “The Function of Criticism” 69). 
VII. Postcritical Aesthetics? 
 
While the ongoing turn to phenomenology has recovered ideals associated with 
charitable reading, these conversations have had much less to say about the objects that 
support the reading practices they recommend. Intuitively, it would seem that a humble 
attitude to one’s object makes more sense if one is reading a classic than a work of pulp 
fiction; so too, a receptive attitude to ideas would seem to make more sense with a 
philosophical treatise than with “a wordless melody” (Booth, The Company 17). 
Qualitative and formal differences in one’s objects of study play a significant role in 
determining the utility of one’s chosen approach to reading. Yet advocates of postcritical 
reading methods have done surprisingly little to articulate qualities of literary objects that 





postcritical reading are suggesting that the profession take up chisels rather than drills 
without telling us anything about the objects to which our tools will be applied.24  
Marjorie Levinson’s summary of essays defending new formalist methods of 
reading speaks to the state of the turn away from critique more generally: “Because new 
formalism’s argument is with prestige and praxis, one finds in the literature …no efforts 
to re-theorize art, …or even—and this is a surprise—form. …Despite the proliferation in 
these essays of synonyms for form (e.g., genre, style, reading, literature, 'significant 
literature,' the aesthetic, coherence, autonomy) none of the essays puts redefinition front 
and center” (561).25 As Levinson’s comments suggest, the aesthetic has remained a 
largely implicit and unacknowledged precondition of postcritical reading practices rather 
than an explicitly defined pillar of them. Even after the turn from critique, ideas of the 
aesthetic, the literary, and the canonical once central to the discipline of literary studies 
persist today in the discipline as  something like apologetic afterthoughts. For most of us, 
conceptions of the literary and the canonical are evoked only implicitly in criticism and 
explicitly perhaps only in the classroom, if even there. To the extent that we hesitate to 
make aesthetic judgments about the objects most useful to our reading practices, though, 
new theorizations about disciplinary methods are doomed to remain partial and question-
begging. Until we self-consciously address the aesthetic criteria on which our reading 
practices depend, “resurgent conceptions of literariness and the canon” will continue to 
                                                          
24 For example, Wayne Booth allows the possibility that coduction might be applied to any 
communication that “re-orders, enhances, or interprets unnarrated life,” from “novels” to a “wordless 
melody” (The Company 17); and Rita Felski allows that postcritical attitudes to reading could apply just as 
easily to pop songs and horror movies as to novels (“Context Stinks!” 586). 
25 Levinson cites Jonathan Loesberg’s A Return to Aesthetics; and Isobal Armstrong’s The Radical 





arise as symptoms, attesting to the unresolved dissonance between our theories and 
practice (Guillory 265). 
This book is animated by the desire to recover an aesthetic for the liberal reading 
practice on which our discipline was founded.26 I’ve argued that English departments 
abandoned this aesthetic in the turn to critique only to find it returning as an unspoken 
element in recent postcritical defenses of reading. The task of this book is to bring the 
liberal aesthetic on which charitable reading depends into the light of day. What works of 
art most effectively model the liberal skills of accommodating judgment that still govern 
much of our research and teaching? What formal and qualitative criteria allow texts to 
reward stances of sensitivity, curiosity, and humility? What books should we read if we 
want to cultivate moral intelligence?  
VIII. In Search of a Liberal Aesthetic 
 
Matthew Arnold and T.S. Eliot had supplied me with qualitative criteria for this 
liberal aesthetic: I knew I was looking for works that present experience in especially 
affecting, illuminating, and impersonal ways.27 While I accepted these qualitative 
standards as regulating ideals, Eliot and Arnold’s applications of these standards seemed 
narrower and more ad hoc than I wanted. For instance, it seemed more than coincidental 
that two celebrated poets happened to focus primarily on poetry in their canonizing 
efforts. Although I agreed with I.A. Richards that poetry was an invaluable pedagogical 
                                                          
26 By way of brief qualification, I would note that there are many kinds of non-liberal reading practices 
worthy of formalized study that would entail different aesthetic criteria than those I advocate here. An 
aesthetics for Marxist or postcolonial reading might be best repaid by works with especially insightful 
depictions of class and power, for example, while a canon for psychoanalytic or queer reading might be 
best rewarded by works with especially complex and rich depictions of desire. 
27 According to Eliot’s aesthetics, for example, one should prefer Donne’s poetry to Milton’s for its 
affecting power (“The Metaphysical Poets” 64). And according to Arnold’s aesthetics, one should prefer 
Goethe’s poetry over Byron’s for its comparatively illuminating and disinterested presentation of 





tool, I wondered if other genres might make equally or more compelling appeals to the 
practical judgments of readers. Was impersonality, for example, an aesthetic standard that 
the genre of poetry was especially well-suited to achieve? My sense was that poetry 
inclines more to lyrical and subjective expression more than it does to accommodating 
and disinterested modes of judgment. If liberalism conceived of true judgment as that 
which emerges from a clash of standpoints, wouldn’t genres that gave more allowance for 
competing voices have an advantage? 
Because of my skepticism about the individualized modes of feeling promoted by 
poetry, the canonizing efforts that most intrigued me were not Arnold’s or Eliot’s, but 
Leavis’s in The Great Tradition. I was struck by Leavis’s declaration that the great 
tradition of English novelists began with Jane Austen and continued with other realist 
authors. From my experience reading Austen, Eliot, and James, I knew that works in the 
British realist tradition were capable of persuading readers to accommodate different 
viewpoints. These novels did not only convey the enigmatic emotional states of a single 
speaker, but offered an array of perspectives made comprehensible and evaluated by the 
narrative. I shared Leavis’s intuition that the attention to form in these novels was 
inseparable from authors’ “responsibility towards a rich human interest … involving, of 
its very nature, imaginative sympathy, moral discrimination and judgment of relative 
human value” (29). Leavis wasn’t clear about specific formal techniques these novelists 
employed, but I was interested by his suggestion that their formal sophistication made 
them especially useful for liberal reading. 
I was happy to find that Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge corroborated 





Booth, Nussbaum argues that fictional texts can help readers engage in the kind of 
Aristotelian reasoning championed by J.S. Mill.28 Nussbaum goes further than Booth, 
however, in emphasizing the importance of literary form for such clash-of-standpoints 
reasoning. Insofar as practical reasoning depends upon “perspicuous description” of 
alternative views that “already contain an element of evaluation and response,” 
Nussbaum suggests that these views need to be presented in a medium designed to affect 
the emotions of readers. To emphasize the importance of this aesthetic criterion, 
Nussbaum contrasts the language of analytic philosophy with the language of realist 
fiction, arguing that the “correct, scientific, abstract, hygienically pallid” tone of “Anglo-
American philosophical prose” fails to capture ethical views with the “lucidity and 
completeness” exhibited by fictional texts (19). Nussbaum’s work corroborated Matthew 
Arnold’s emphasis on the importance of affecting style, or “poetry and eloquence,” in 
literature (“Literature and Science” 129). And, like Arnold, Nussbaum also helped me 
limit my search for the objects of a liberal aesthetic.29 From their work I understood that 
the objects of liberal reading required a style of affecting language not present in analytic 
philosophy, but present in many fictional works, especially realist novels and Greek 
tragedy. 
Hoping to write a dissertation on books in my field, though, I could afford to 
further limit my search. I wondered if theorists of the novel could help me refine the 
                                                          
28 Insofar as fictional texts depict “alternative views about the good life,” Nussbaum suggests, they can 
help readers “arrive at a view that is internally coherent, and also at one that is broadly shared and 
sharable” (173-174). 
29 Like Nussbaum, Arnold contrasts the dry style of philosophy with the more affecting rhetoric of 
literary works like the gospel of Luke: “Why should it be one thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say 
with Spinoza, Felicitas in eo consistit quod homo suum esse conservare potest–‘Man’s happiness consists 
in his being able to preserve his own essence,’ and quite another thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to 
say, ‘What is a ‘Man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, forfeit himself?’” 





scope of a canon for liberal reading that would make a special claim for the kinds of 
realist novels that Leavis discussed. Mikhail Bakhtin’s “Discourse in the Novel” offered 
an arresting way to justify the significance of the novel form for liberal reading. In 
contrast to poetic discourse that “strips the word of others’ intentions,” Bakhtin’s 
novelistic discourse is “entangled, shot through with shared thoughts; points of view, 
alien value judgments and accents” (507). Insofar as novelistic discourse stages collisions 
between “specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and 
values,” I could see how the novel might possess a distinct utility for the pluralistic and 
accommodating ethos of liberal reading (503). Although I accepted Bakhtin’s distinction 
between novelistic and poetic discourse, I wondered if many works written in verse might 
also be novelistic in precisely the way he described. Couldn’t it be said that Sophocles’s 
choruses, Milton’s devils, and Shakespeare’s fools, for example, also expose readers to 
world views entangled with “alien value judgments and accents”? Granting that the full 
set of objects corresponding to Bakhtin’s novelistic discourse was almost certainly 
broader than the novel, I accepted the novelistic genre as a formal constraint for my 
liberal aesthetic.  
Georg Lukacs’s The Theory of the Novel helped me think about other formal and 
qualitative requirements that could limit my search for a liberal aesthetic even further. If 
Bakhtin’s discussion of discourse allowed me to see how novels present readers with 
illuminating views of experience, Lukacs’s discussion of the problematic individual 
allowed me to see how novels convey impersonal views of experience. In The Theory, 
Lukacs associates the novel form with its depiction of a certain kind of hero, the 





innermost soul with the external practices of life in society. The novel, in Lukacs’s view, 
conveys the successes and failures of the hero to effect this reconciliation between 
subject and object. For Lukacs, the novel is constrained by the requirement to get it right: 
the rhetoric will seem implausible if the reconciliation was forced and will fall flat and 
leave readers cold if no attempts at reconciliation succeeded. 
Crucially for Lukacs, the novel’s success depends on more than the emotionally 
moving language emphasized by Nussbaum. The very same  “enchantment,” or “poetic 
glow,” that Nussbaum recognizes in Dickens rings “false” and “inadequate” to Lukacs 
(107).30 Insofar as Dickens allows heroes to come to terms with bourgeois society 
“without conflict,” Lukacs suggests that his novels fail to achieve the aesthetic standard 
of the genre. For Lukacs, the novel’s willingness to test the views of its protagonist 
through experience is a demanding constraint. A novel can easily fail either by being too 
indulgent to its protagonist or too severe: or more commonly, by neglecting to imagine 
the right situations necessary to challenge the protagonist’s opinions to a sufficient 
degree. In the best novels—which for Lukacs, are realist novels—the narrative form 
needs to correct the incomplete views expressed by the protagonist as they collide with 
experience. Effectively, the novel calibrates new judgments for readers that more closely 
accord with their object. It made perfect sense to discover that Lukacs had been a 
Hegelian when he wrote The Theory. Lukacs presents the novel as an immanent critique 
of the subjective views of its central character. By dramatizing experiences of alienation, 
or failures of alignment between character and world, novels engage readers in the 
                                                          
30 Nussbaum, for instance, uses a discussion of Dicken’s David Copperfield as an example of the 
“seductions” and “enchantments” of the novel form which “can lead the reader past her tendencies to deny 





phenomenological process of acquiring views that accommodate experience in a more 
complete way. Lukacs’s citation of Hegel confirmed my sense that realist novels were a 
special technology for the achievement of the disinterested judgment prized by 
phenomenology and liberal criticism alike. 
 As with Bakhtin’s appreciation of novelistic discourse, I suspected that Lukacs’s 
appreciation for the problematic individual could be extrapolated to a broader set of 
works than realist fiction; it seemed to me that many works of romance, tragedy, and 
melodrama also subject the views of protagonists seeking reconciliation to demanding 
tests by experience.31 But Lukacs had helped me narrow the scope of the liberal canon 
even further. After ruling out analytic philosophy and many works of poetry, I could now 
rule out most non-realist novels. But what features distinguished the qualitative 
achievement of realist novelists like Dickens from other novelists that Lukacs admired? 
With the exception of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister—which I was unable to accept as the 
only work in a liberal canon—Lukacs’s work was short on examples of works that 
accomplish the formal and aesthetic criteria he described.  
I looked at more contemporary scholarship on realism to see if it might give me 
more precise formal requirements of a liberal aesthetic. I sympathized with the intuitions 
of critics like George Levine and Harry Shaw who resisted the lower status that the 
critique years had given to realism, and insisted that these texts were epistemologically 
sophisticated—far from the transparent and deluded repositories of ideology suspicious 
readers have made them out to be. I especially liked Elizabeth Ermarth’s suggestion that 
realism is the genre of consensus: that realist narration underscores the essential relations 
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between a series of particular episodes, thus “invit[ing] us to reach for the inner 
dimension where differences are reconciled” (Realism and Consensus 47). Ermarth also 
suggests, helpfully, that the lack of narration in epistolary novels makes it more difficult 
for them reveal “a final form of the whole” to readers (57). Since I was looking for novels 
that invited readers to accommodate competing perspectives, I used Ermarth’s criterion 
of realist narration as a justification to exclude epistolary novels as well. With the 
exception of Ermarth, this group of scholars was generally more cautious than I would 
have liked in passing judgment on works that failed to meet the formal aesthetic criteria 
for realist novels that they discussed. To isolate the formal and qualitative features that 
made realist novels more helpful than others in promoting liberal habits of mind I would 
need to continue looking. 
I turned next to scholarship on British realism that dealt explicitly with Victorian 
liberalism. Amanda Anderson, Elaine Hadley, and David Wayne Thomas all legitimated 
the idea that novelists in the British realist tradition were informed by ideals of 
liberalism, and their work enriched my understanding of both traditions. These scholars 
didn’t locate the liberalism of these novels in their use of formal or aesthetic criteria, 
however, but in their use of privileged characters to explicitly thematize liberal ideals.32 
The thematic focus of this scholarship didn’t back up Leavis’s assertion that the formal 
                                                          
32 David Wayne Thomas, Elaine Hadley, and Amanda Anderson, all analyze conjunctions between 
ideals of mid-Victorian liberalism and Victorian novels. For instance, Thomas analyzes Camden 
Farebrother’s cultivation of reflective agency in George Eliot’s Middlemarch (Cultivating Victorians: 
Liberal Culture and the Aesthetic, [Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2004], pp. 7-15); Hadley 
discusses Septimus Harding’s display of disinterestedness in Anthony Trollope’s The Warden (Living 
Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain, [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2010]: pp. 
63-125); and Anderson addresses Daniel Deronda’s expression of many-sidedness in George Eliot’s Daniel 
Deronda (The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment, [Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2001]: pp. 119-47). By analyzing how novels use exemplary characters to directly 
thematize liberal ideals in this way, though, this body of work does not consider how novels promoted such 





preoccupation of realist authors was inseparable from their aesthetic achievement. To 
further refine my criteria for a liberal aesthetics I would need to keep looking.  
Both Lukacs’s Theory of the Novel and scholarship on Victorian realism had 
focused heavily on character: the problematic individual, for Lukacs, and characters (both 
primary and secondary) who modeled liberal views for Anderson, Hadley, and Thomas. 
Even though Bakhtin had focused on discourse rather than character, I wondered if 
characters could function as mouthpieces of the clashing vocabularies of value Bakhtin 
described. Were there any specialized techniques of characterization that could help me 
discriminate between realist novels more or less useful for a liberal aesthetic?  
I found that work on character has undergone a modest renaissance in recent 
years. The cognitivist approaches of David Palmer, Blakey Vermeule and Lisa Zunshine 
argue that fictional characters can help readers map intermental activity of other minds. 
Deidre Lynch’s materialist scholarship emphasizes character’s ideological function for 
readers seeking to position themselves within economies of prestige. And Alex Woloch’s 
formalist work explores how character-systems in the nineteenth-century novel distribute 
the attention of readers. As different as these approaches are, they all emphasize the 
crucial role that fictional characters play in informing the judgments of readers. Insofar as 
fictional characters act in coherent ways that invite evaluation, they function as sites for 
readers to practice forming judgments: learning to assess the extent to which actions 
cohere under value-laden categories such as modest and vain, earnest and flippant, or 
trustworthy and treacherous.  
While the emphasis on judgment in all this scholarship confirmed my intuition 





useful for my quest to isolate a liberal aesthetic. In his analysis of Jane Austen’s Pride 
and Prejudice, Woloch demonstrates that the novel uses relations between characters to 
invite readers to discriminate between desirable and undesirable moral qualities. He 
suggested further that this comparative process of judgment followed the logic of the 
Aristotelian dialectic: Austen’s character-systems transform the novel “into a genre that 
abstracts, elucidates, and diagnoses human characteristics,” by “facilitating contrasts 
between inner qualities” (53). From this analysis, I could see how novels used characters 
not only to instruct readers but to inform them by triggering intuitions relevant to 
practical judgment. In Pride and Prejudice, major and minor characters play the 
functional role of allowing readers to see what successful and unsuccessful enactments of 
virtue look like in practice. By inviting readers to perceive different perspectives in 
relation, character-systems showed readers the interdependence of seemingly 
irreconcilable opinions. Woloch’s discussion of the character-system gave me a crucial 
formal device that realist novels use to facilitate the clash-of-standpoint reasoning 
championed by Aristotle and Mill.  
Based on Woloch’s work, I could narrow my liberal canon much further, looking 
for works like Pride and Prejudice whose character-systems reflect “a strong interiority 
[that] grapples with the outside world and absorbs it into categories of consciousness” 
(133). This meant that otherwise brilliant novels that use character-systems differently—
such as David Copperfield and Great Expectations—could be ruled out.33 I wondered, 
though, if there might be an even better fit for a liberal aesthetic than the one-sided 
                                                          
33“In Dickens, the protagonist’s interiority is overwhelmed by the very exterior content that it attempts 
to process, and this condition also underlies the structure of the character-system, motivating the strong 
minor characters who are, in one sense, the distorted consequence of the protagonist’s incomplete processes 





dynamic between major and minor characters Woloch observed in Pride and Prejudice. 
What about characters who were neither minor characters nor protagonists—characters 
whose attitudes differed conspicuously from the protagonist but were not treated merely 
as inadequate ways of thinking to be discarded? Could these characters be formal devices 
that help readers practice the liberal habit of many-sided judgment?  
IX. Expressive Realism as Liberal Aesthetic 
 
That question animated my research. But I knew that prominent secondary 
characters were only one piece of the puzzle in my emerging liberal aesthetic: necessary 
but certainly not sufficient for an aesthetics governed by the liberal ideal of 
accommodating judgment. To construct a canon for liberal reading, I knew I needed to 
figure out how the various formal devices I had discovered in my research fit together. 
What formal features make certain realist novels especially suited to the common pursuit 
of true judgment? I knew the test of the liberal aesthetics I hoped to construct would be 
its ability to make distinctions: I would need to be able to discriminate, as Leavis had 
been willing to do, between major novels useful for liberal humanist criticism and minor 
works that were less useful. But unlike Leavis, I would have to be able to show my work: 
the grounds for inclusion beyond a few provocative judgments interspersed with 
unsystematic observations of novels. 
In Chapter 1, “Expressive Realism and the Phenomenological Turn,” I propose 
formal and qualitative criteria that make realist novels effective instruments of liberal 
persuasion. Drawing from Bakhtin, Lukacs, and others, I propose three specialized 
techniques of characterization that novels use to enlighten the practical judgments of 





correspond loosely to a novel’s discourse, story, and character-system. By showing how 
characters’ value-laden commitments are articulated in concepts, enacted in concrete 
situations, and juxtaposed alongside opposing commitments, I argue that novels invite 
readers to engage in practical reasoning. I discuss examples and counterexamples of 
novels that use these devices, and introduce the term “expressive realism” to describe the 
set of novels in which all these devices are present. 
 One surprising conclusion this chapter draws is that the attitudes of expressive 
realist novels parallel those of the postcritical reader. First, expressive realist novels are 
sensitive: they don’t try to eliminate emotion to view experience objectively, but instead 
allow subjective emotion to infuse their description of experience. Second, these novels 
are curious. Instead of subjecting experience to preconceived ideas, they work to derive 
their ideas immanently, adjusting their conceptual vocabulary to fit closely with the 
experiences they describe. And finally, while these novels are confident they are not 
knowing: they don’t automatically assume a stance of superiority toward the various 
views they describe. Instead, these novels aim to make visible the appealing elements of 
views, even if those views clash with the novel’s primary ethical theme. Chapter 1 thus 
confirms Timothy Bewes’s assertion that the interpretive practice of Ricoeurian 
phenomenology is “tied to the novel form” (4). The formal devices that realist novels use 
to inform judgment are the results of the novel’s own phenomenological reading of 
experience. Rejecting external standards, finalizing formula, and presuppositions, novels 
begin with engaged, first-person experience and put it to the test. In so doing, novels 





suspicious hermeneutics have begun to embrace. Expressive realist novels are postcritical 
readers par excellence.  
The idea of novels as postcritical readers was intriguing, but I wondered about the 
“post” in postcritical reading. Is it really true that the phenomenological readers model 
charitable attitudes not found in practitioners of suspicious reading? As I continued to 
investigate the postcritical turn in literary studies, I had the feeling that if the suspicious 
reader of the critique years had never existed it would have been necessary to invent him. 
Despite the thoughtful qualifications and pleas for pluralism in this literature, it was clear 
that suspicious reading was not primarily a historical entity so much as the negative self-
image of a new movement of criticism seeking to portray itself as progress. Just as 
critique had required the pious, unprofessional, and impressionistic caricature of the New 
Critical reader, postcritical reading required the caricature of the aloof, reductive, and 
smug suspicious reader. 
I wondered how my idea of novels as postcritical readers would change if I 
compared them against an actual practitioner of critique. So in Chapter 2, I test the 
hypothesis that expressive realist novels interpret experience more charitably than works 
of suspicious reading. Franco Moretti’s recent book, The Bourgeois: Between History 
and Literature was the perfect critical case study for my project. A self-conscious and 
dialectically savvy provocateur of contemporary criticism, Moretti practices a version of 
critique far removed from any caricature of suspicious reading. I selected George 
Gissing’s The Odd Women as a novel to compare alongside Moretti’s study. An 
exemplary achievement of expressive realism, The Odd Women offers its own critical 





alongside an ironic aesthete who challenges her way of life. To a degree this chapter 
confirms my hypothesis: it finds that The Odd Women’s reading of bourgeois culture 
exceeds the limitations of Moretti’s critical mode in two respects. By using characters to 
articulate both critical and appreciative views of bourgeois culture, The Odd Women 
cultivates situated and charitable modes of critical judgment unmatched in Moretti’s 
study. This chapter also finds, more unexpectedly, that The Odd Women’s reading of 
experience does not just make it an ideal postcritical reader but also an ideal suspicious 
reader. By presenting experience in ways that are descriptive rather than impressionistic 
and demystified rather than reverent, The Odd Women exhibits virtues central to the ethos 
of critique expressed by Moretti’s study. 
The book’s remaining chapters discuss other exemplary works of expressive 
realism selected to convey a sense of the historical evolution of this liberal aesthetic in 
Britain. However artificial the process of exclusion always is in these cases, I wanted to 
single out novels that gave readers some sense of how expressive realist novels evolved 
in relation to the British realist tradition. So I chose one novel relevant to realism’s 
departure from the epistolary novel in the early 19th century, one to represent the 
expressive realist aesthetic at its height of popularity in the mid 19th century, and one to 
represent realism’s collision with aestheticism at the beginning of the 20th. 
The choice to limit my discussion in each chapter to only a single novel came 
with sacrifices. The cost of this indulgent attention to only four novels has the 
unfortunate effect of obscuring continuity of aesthetic achievement between works I 
discuss and many deserving works I do not. However, I felt that this narrowed scope was 





fellow readers notice afresh their expert use of dialogue, narration, and character 
juxtaposition. I also thought that close textual analysis was essential for making the 
ethical dimension of my arguments persuasive to fellow readers. The arguments of each 
chapter proceed through coduction, feeling along with a sense of how the novels 
themselves are evaluating the characters they depict. Because the value-judgments I take 
from the novels depend on interpretation and are thus potentially disputable, I wanted to 
give readers enough of the novels discussed so that they would not need to trust my 
assertions about what the novels do but can rather see for themselves. By aligning my 
arguments with evaluations of character implicit in the novels themselves, each chapter 
aims to let the content of each work determine its own significance.  
I thought about beginning with Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, which Woloch 
had discussed as an exemplary instance of the realist character-system. In that novel, 
Elizabeth Bennet effortlessly enacts both the ironic playfulness exhibited by Mr. Bennet 
and the dutiful responsibility exhibited by Mr. Darcy. Much like the mature protagonists 
of Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre or Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South, Elizabeth 
Bennet models an Aristotelian mean between extremes exhibited by secondary 
characters. As such, I agreed with Woloch and other Austen critics that the novel could 
aid liberal readers interested in the Aristotelian reconciliation of competing views. 
I admired the aesthetic achievement of Pride and Prejudice immensely. But after 
decades of critique and identity politics that have seen realist novels and liberal thought 
alike unfairly maligned for their false reconciliations, I didn’t want my selection of texts 
to contribute to caricatures of these traditions as naïve or overly optimistic.34 Inspired by 
                                                          





the dialectical method that Hegel had described as “the path of despair,” I instead looked 
instead for novels whose treatment of protagonists insisted more stubbornly on alienation. 
I wanted novels whose protagonists were flawed even when mature, and thus conveyed 
the extent to which any practical expression of value is inherently limited, expressing 
only one side of the truth. I felt that imperfect protagonists would make a novel’s liberal 
demand to accommodate opposing viewpoints more insistent. 
My interest in imperfect protagonists led me to select Mansfield Park as the novel 
most significant for the inception of the expressive realist aesthetic. In Chapter 3, “The 
Problem of Judgment in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park,” I argue that the novel thwarts 
readers’ desires for ethical closure by depicting characters who express conflicting 
virtues. Even as the novel takes pains to reveal the superiority of the sincere and dutiful 
Fanny Price to the urban interlopers, Mary and Henry Crawford, the novel also allows its 
villains to upstage the protagonist. I argue that readers of Mansfield Park are made to feel 
the degree to which the reserved, passive, and constrained Fanny Price suffers by 
comparison to the comparatively open, energetic, and generous Crawfords. The novel’s 
“power to offend,” to borrow Lionel Trilling’s phrase, is commensurate with the reader’s 
feeling of unresolved dissonance between the one-sided judgments voiced by Fanny and 
the many-sided judgments invited by the novel’s depiction of her romantic rival and 
rejected suitor. More than forty years before attention to the many-sided mind would 
emerge within British intellectual life more broadly, Mansfield Park presses the novel 
form to move beyond an Aristotelian appreciation for a single virtuous mean between 






 Chapter 4 considers George Eliot’s Middlemarch as another exemplary work of 
expressive realism whose character-system invites many-sided judgment in readers. 
Liberal habits of judgment have been much discussed in Eliot scholarship, but by locating 
Eliot’s liberalism either in the thematic content of particular novels or in the more general 
effect of Eliot’s style, both recent and older studies of Eliot’s fiction have paid little 
attention to specific rhetorical techniques that her novels use to promote liberal habits of 
mind. I argue that Eliot adapts the technique of character juxtaposition pioneered by 
Austen to cultivate habits of judgment championed by J.S. Mill. To make this case, I 
focus on secondary characters in Eliot’s Middlemarch including Will Ladislaw, Camden 
Farebrother, and especially Fred Vincy, all of whom express an ethos of spontaneous 
enjoyment that contrasts with Dorothea Brooke’s ethos of disciplined sympathy. Insofar 
as Middlemarch uses the liberated practice of characters like Fred as a positive standard 
by which to clarify the comparatively constrained aspects of Dorothea’s sympathy, the 
novel invites readers to cultivate “many-sided” evaluation of practically opposed 
commitments. 
Mid-century Victorians worried that the rising influence of aestheticism in 
Victorian culture would eventually displace liberal judgment in favor of a relativistic 
surrender to experience. The influence of aestheticism on Henry James’s late novels thus 
make them a helpful limit case for the expressive realist tradition. Much ethical criticism 
sees James’s fiction as exhibiting a proto-modernist style that teaches readers to refuse 
the clarity of predetermined thought for the ambiguity of surprised feeling. These critics 
locate the ethic of James’s fiction in its reverent appreciation for alterity, or a principled 





“Henry James at the Ethical Turn: Imagination and Discrimination in The Ambassadors,” 
I defend a more mid-Victorian view of James’s fiction that accounts for his novels’ 
impulses towards abstraction, cognition, and judgment. In keeping with James’s 
description of The Ambassadors as a “fusion of synthesis and picture,” I examine how the 
novel uses its character-system not only to disrupt evaluative categories but to 
synthetically construct them. I argue that James clarifies the strengths and weaknesses of 
his protagonist’s perspective by juxtaposing Strether’s ethos of imaginative exploration 
alongside Mrs. Newsome’s administrative efficiency, Chad Newsome’s polished suavity, 
and Maria Gostrey’s discriminating synthesis. By continuing a mid-Victorian tradition of 
many-sided characterization, James’s novel not only cultivates feelings that attend to the 
particularity of characters’ attitudes but thoughts that attend to the holistic way these 
attitudes cohere. As with other novelists in the expressive realist tradition, The 
Ambassadors uses characters to cultivate many-sided judgment, inviting readers to a 





Chapter 1: Expressive Realism and the Phenomenological Turn: A 
Canon for Postcritical Literary Studies 
 
I. Postcritical Phenomenology  
In a 2004 essay titled “Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” Bruno Latour contends 
that attitudes and methods of critique long cultivated in the humanities have reached a 
point of diminishing returns. In an era where attitudes of suspicion are widespread 
beyond the academy—manifesting in skeptical attitudes about global warming, 
conspiracy theories about 9/11, doubt about the efficacy of vaccines, or cynicism about 
the ability of elected government to regulate healthcare—Latour asks academics to 
rethink the traditional assumption that an ethos of critique entails liberation. Given that 
attitudes of suspicion and detachment are just as likely to be used by our enemies to 
attack things we believe in as by our allies to attack things we hate, Latour asks 
academics to reexamine the utility of well-used critical tools. What has become of 
critique, we might wonder alongside Latour, in an era of feuding TV pundits and 
anonymous internet comment threads expressing attitudes of arrogance and 
dismissiveness rather than openness and engagement? What has become of critique in an 
age where people’s media consumption is determined by their affiliation with self-
selecting enclaves of opinion that reinforce preexisting bias, reassuring people that their 
views are correct and that their opponents’ are wrong? What has become of critique when 
populist candidates in the American political context no longer hold sincere ideological 
convictions that require unmasking, but instead cynically adopt positions that bespeak an 





The prevalence of arrogant and dismissive attitudes in contemporary society is 
directly related to another weakness of the present age: our impatience with reflection on 
the values we do hold. In the age of Twitter, the 24-hour news cycle, and populist 
politics, rallying cries are quickly formed through value-laden rhetoric that pays little 
attention to the features of experience it seeks to describe. For citizens of Western 
democracies, it has become routine to hear in recent years that defenders of health care 
reform are “socialists,” that defenders of immigration reform are “racists,” that Brexit 
will lead to “chaos,” or that globalization is equivalent to “totalitarianism.” Further 
exacerbating contemporary habits of unreflective evaluation are media outlets which, 
facing pressure to gain public attention in information-saturated markets, are pressured to 
simplify and sensationalize stories that cater to preexisting narratives rather than to 
provide the analysis of events necessary for informed value judgments. 
 In a contemporary political environment where dismissive and unreflective 
evaluations are widespread, Latour contends that efforts to cultivate attitudes and 
methods associated with critique in the humanities have become tactically inefficient. 
Latour summarizes the posture of “critique” as a tendency to reduce human attachments 
to one of two positions: either aggressively debunking such attachments as products of 
inflated subjective desires and unconscious indoctrination (the “fairy” position) or 
reductively explaining such attachments as products of discursive power structures or 
economic systems (the “fact” position) (2004: 237). He likens our now reflexive use of 
these two critical moves in the humanities to operations of mechanical toys “who 
continue making the same motion when everything around them has changed” (2004: 





paranoia and block dialogue, Latour urges intellectuals to develop a new set of critical 
tools. Drawing from Heidegger’s conception of “concern,” Latour recommends that 
intellectuals in the humanities cultivate a critical ethos “whose import then will no longer 
be to debunk but to protect and to care” (2004: 232). Inspired by the object-oriented 
ontology of Graham Harman, to whom Latour’s essay is dedicated, Latour describes this 
ethos as “stubbornly realist” in orientation—an approach that does not reduce human 
attachments to the two reductive positions of “fairy” or “fact,” but instead strives to adopt 
a “fair” attitude toward objects of human concern (2004: 231, 243).  
Latour’s call to reimagine the humanities beyond the idiom and methods of 
critique has not gone unheeded. Over the past two decades, Latour’s reaction against 
critique has received traction in literary studies where it has harmonized with internal 
attempts to reimagine the discipline in its ongoing turn away from Theory. Often inspired 
by the work of Bruno Latour and Paul Ricoeur, literary critics including Eve Sedgwick, 
Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, Michael Roth, Michael Warner, Rita Felski, Heather 
Love, and Charles Altieri have all offered challenges to the ethos and methodology of 
critique while exploring alternative models of reading.35 Within this diverse body of 
work, defenses of practices like “reparative reading” (Sedgwick 2003), “reading with the 
grain” (Bewes 2010), and “surface reading” (Best and Marcus 2009) have sought to 
reimagine versions of literary criticism at the level of affective stance, defending modes 
of close engagement with objects of human concern rather than antagonistic modes of 
symptomatic reading, or positivist modes of historicist explanation.36 At the same time, 
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practices like “object-oriented ontology” (Harman 2012) and “close but not deep” (Love 
2010) reading have sought to reimagine literary criticism at the level of cognitive 
orientation, defending practices informed by objective analysis rather than by formulaic 
applications of theoretical constructs or reverent praise for literature’s ineffable 
otherness.37 
Rita Felski has introduced the concept of the “postcritical” to refer to an ethos that 
encompasses both of these ideals: combining an affective stance of openness and 
engagement with a cognitive orientation toward specificity and objectivity (2015: 12). As 
Felski defines it, the aspiration to be postcritical is not a desire to resist critique—“to 
reverse the clock and be teleported back to the good old days of New Critical chitchat”—
but a desire to move beyond critique while incorporating its insights (2015: 5). For 
Felski, being postcritical in this sense requires avoiding lapses into “uncritical” modes of 
“impressionistic judgment” even as it requires adopting an ethos of “first-person 
implication and involvement” with one’s objects of analysis (2015: 151; 2009a: 31). 
Drawing from the philosophy of Paul Ricouer, Felski views phenomenology as a practice 
particularly suited to the cultivation of an ethos that is postcritical in both senses, 
combining an ethos of objective reflection with one of subjective care for objects of 
human concern.38 Rather than either standing back from subjective attachments in favor 
of positivist explanations, or giving way to impressions of feeling unmediated by 
conceptual thought, Felski endorses a critical ethos that proceeds by identifying with a 
                                                          
conception of “surface reading” fits with these two postcritical tendencies toward affect and description, 
see McDonald 2015. 
37 See Love 2010 and Harman 2012. 
38 “Phenomenology …express[es] itself in a care for phenomena as they present themselves to 
consciousness. To engage in a phenomenological description is …to explicate the irreducible, meaning-





first-person subjective attitude that is progressively refined through reflection on the fit of 
the attitude with its object. In keeping with phenomenological methods, this postcritical 
ethos requires the mediation of attachment by reflection, a modification of feeling by 
attention to the features of experience to which the feeling responds.  
Other critics have taken up Felski’s interest in phenomenology not only as a way 
to reimagine literary study at the level of method and stance, but as a way to justify the 
study of literary objects in the first place. Robert Pippin defends the practice of reading 
literature on these terms, arguing that objects of literary analysis, unlike objects of 
scientific research, “express a first-person or subjective view of human concerns” 
uniquely suited for facilitating phenomenological reflection (Pippin 2010). Along with 
Pippin and Rónán McDonald, Charles Altieri has also argued that works of literature are 
particularly well-equipped to enable a “phenomenology of valuing,” by which readers 
reflect on non-instrumental modes of caring relevant to various practical forms of life 
(2015: 57). 39 For Altieri, engagement with literary texts like Flaubert’s Madame Bovary 
allows readers to experience “shifting from a distanced perspective to various models and 
levels of intimacy with aspects of the world,” experiencing a sense of first-person 
involvement with, for example, “the way Charles eats, or Emma daydreams, or Homais 
brims with self-satisfaction” (2015: 58, 53). While readers’ exposure to these various 
modes of caring does not necessarily shape their long term ethical values, such exposure 
can produce what Altieri calls moments of “valuing”: momentary evaluative alignments 
with characters’ perspective and practice that serve “as prelude[s] to what after repeated 
occasions might take shape as the values that govern what a person pursues” (2015: 47). 
                                                          





Insofar as the study of literature routinely elicits various non-instrumental modes of 
caring for the choices made by fictional characters, such study serves as a particularly 
useful resource for cultivating a postcritical ethos championed by Latour and Felski: an 
ethos that is both subjectively invested in various practical forms of life and reflective 
about their objective features.  
 This recent turn to phenomenology in literary studies has the potential to offer 
literary studies the kind of justification it hasn’t had since F.R. Leavis: a field-specific 
rationale for the study of literature that combines a social mission with specialized 
methods and objects particularly suited to its realization.40 That is to say, in an era 
characterized by cynical detachment and dismissive rhetoric, the phenomenological study 
of literature promises the possibility of cultivating evaluative habits lacking in 
contemporary society: an ethos of care for objects of concern mediated by a reflective 
understanding of their features. Whether through “object-oriented criticism,” (Harman 
2012), “reflective reading” (Felski 2009a), “naïve reading” (Pippin 2010), “literary 
reading” (McDonald 2015), “reading with the grain” (Bewes 2010), “cultural 
phenomenology” (Connor 1999), “reading through the work” (Altieri 1983), or reading 
as “self-creation” (Rorty 1989), phenomenological methods offer opportunities to train 
scholars in habits of thoughtful evaluation necessary to become “explorers of the 
normative” rather than just “critics of normativity” (Roth 2010: B5).  
 If recent interest in postcritical methods has brought heightened attention to 
questions of how we read in literary studies, this body of work has not yet brought that 
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same level of attention to questions of what we read. Although Charles Altieri sketched 
criteria for a “high canon” of texts useful for “shap[ing] and judg[ing] personal and social 
values” as early as 1983, Altieri’s general and wide-ranging defense of high literature has 
yet to be supplemented by more focused descriptions of literary works that share the 
specialized aims of postcritical reading (1983: 40). Even though the idea of “an encounter 
with a corpus of significant texts” remains one of the most intuitive justifications of 
literary study to academics and non-academics alike, defenders of postcritical methods of 
reading have done relatively little to select and justify a body of texts particularly suited 
to the cultivation of the ethos they defend (Felski 2015: 184). That is to say, the new 
postcritical literary studies lacks a canon: a tradition of texts distinctly amenable to 
promoting the attitudes of reflective evaluation championed by scholars in the recent 
phenomenological turn. 
II. Phenomenology and the Realist Novel 
 Given that Latour describes the ethos he adapts from Heidegerrian 
phenomenology as a “realist attitude,” it may be no surprise that I view the most 
promising aesthetic for cultivating a postcritical ethos to be a realist one.41 In The Theory 
of the Novel, Georg Lukács attends to the way depictions of character in realist novels 
enable phenomenological reflection on intersections between value and fact. In a modern 
age where the significance of action is no longer self-evident, Lukács tasks novelistic 
characterization with the burden of uncovering relations between “the deeds,” or 
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postcritical reading is also anticipated by Timothy Bewes, who defends his phenomenological practice of 
“reading with the grain” as one “that is tied to the novel form, that recognizes the novel as part of its own 





objective practices of individuals in the world, and “the soul’s inner demand for 
greatness,” or the subjective perspectives of individual minds (1971 [1916]: 30). For 
Lukács, novels that seek to emphasize unities between fact and value do so by depicting a 
central character’s attempt to perceive value in experience: a “problematic individual” 
who “journey[s] towards himself [on] the road from dull captivity within a merely 
present reality …towards clear self-recognition” (1971 [1916]: 80). By depicting 
characters who seek to move from “dull captivity within a merely present reality” to 
experiences of “self-recognition” the novel is particularly well suited to enable readers to 
move “from matters of fact to matters of concern”—that is, to cultivate a critical ethos 
that does not criticize or explain away modes of value-laden attachment, but which seeks 
to create and justify such attachments, mediating objective experience and subjective 
values (Latour 2004: 225). Insofar as the realist novel “seeks, by giving form, to uncover 
and construct the concealed totality of life,” the novel is a postcritical “descriptive tool” 
par excellence—one whose import is not only “to debunk but to protect and to care” 
(Lukács 1971 [1916]: 60; Latour 2004: 232). 
As Lukács sees it, realist novels that seek to mediate fact and value do not only 
take from the constructive or reparative aspects of phenomenological reflection, but also 
from its critical and alienating aspects. For Lukács, the novel’s use of the problematic 
individual to reveal the inner value of experience is complemented by an antithetical 
impulse to reveal the failure of experience to measure up to values individuals seek to 
express. Rather than projecting a character’s values onto the world in an insular and 
subjective way, or depicting “a world which [is] beautiful and harmonious but closed 





picture of life in which “irony” operates as “ethical self-correction …determined by the 
work’s content” (1971 [1916]: 140, 84). The task of this ironizing correction is to do 
justice to the recalcitrance of real experience which so often thwarts the attempts of 
individuals to view it as imbued with value. In keeping with the Hegelian 
phenomenology that informs The Theory,42 Lukács assumes that unification between fact 
and value, or expressive reconciliation, cannot be something immediately posited, but can 
only occur through the mediation of the dialectical thought—a process that Hegel 
describes as the “way of despair” (Hegel 1979 [1807]: §78). For Lukács and Hegel alike, 
if authentic reconciliation is to occur—or if any “true, totality-creating objectivity,” is to 
be depicted—this can only happen after a character’s reconciling projections have been 
tested through alienating reflection on their failure to correspond with the objects such 
projections describe (Lukács 1971 [1916]: 93).43 
Insofar as realist novels interrogate correspondence between subjective valuations 
of characters and their objective experiences, such novels are particularly well-suited to 
promoting the kind of ethos that Latour associates with Heideggerian phenomenology: 
that is, an ethos that adopts a “fair”-minded and “stubbornly realist” attitude to objects of 
human concern (Latour 2004: 231, 243). In what follows, I use the Hegelian concepts of 
“reconciliation” and “alienation”—implicit in Lukács’s analysis of the novel form and in 
much subsequent scholarship on realism—to describe two contrasting rhetorical effects 
                                                          
42 In his later preface to the book, Lukács admits to having “become a Hegelian” at the time The 
Theory was written (1971 [1916]: 15). For more on the young Lukács’s Hegelianism see Miles 1979. 
43 Although Hegel does not always use the concepts of reconciliation and alienation explicitly in his 
own philosophy, two of Hegel’s more well-known statements about them can be found in 1989 [1817]: 
§194 and 1979 [1807]: §32, respectively. For discussions of Hegel’s conception of expressive 
reconciliation, see Beiser 1993: 36-41 and Taylor 1979: 1-3. For a lucid summary of Lukács’s stance 





that novels use to invite phenomenological reflection in readers.44 “Reconciling” rhetoric 
describes moments where novels solicit modes of attachment in readers by uncovering 
successful mediations between a character’s subjective evaluations and their objective 
experiences, while “alienating” rhetoric describes moments where novels solicit modes of 
suspicion in readers by emphasizing distance between the two.45 These two effects of 
reconciliation and alienation, I suggest, can each be mediated through three different 
techniques of characterization I call “articulation,” “enactment,” and “juxtaposition.” 
Corresponding loosely to novelistic discourse, story, and character system, “articulation” 
refers to a character’s expressions of value at the level of intention, “enactment” at the 
level of action, and “juxtaposition” at the level of relations to other values. Taken 
together, these techniques serve as criteria for inclusion in a canon of novels especially 
suited for postcritical reading. I will discuss each of these techniques in turn.  
III. Articulation 
 
                                                          
44 A connection between realism and reconciliation is implicitly emphasized in Percy Lubbock’s 
attention to the role novelistic form plays in producing meaning that reveals the value and significance of 
facts; Mikhail Bakhtin’s formulation of the way novels “collect the hero and his life and …complete him to 
the point where he forms a whole”; Elizabeth Ermarth’s description of realism’s work in extracting unified 
meaning from the particulars of characters’ actions; and in Harry Shaw and Rae Greiner’s view of realism 
as a medium that produces a sympathetic going along with mental attitudes characters use to make sense of 
history (Lubbock 1945 [1921]: 18, 62; Bakhtin 1993 [1921]: 14; Ermarth 1981: 18-19; Shaw 1999: 218-
265; Greiner 2012: 25-29).  
Conversely, a connection between realism and alienation is invoked in Mikhail Bakhtin’s description 
of novelistic discourse that finds its object “enveloped in …alien value judgments and accents”; in J. Hillis 
Miller’s attention to the way realist texts subvert characters’ attempts to impose totalizing meanings upon 
experience; and in George Levine’s description of realism’s fidelity to a world “where things are felt to be 
alienated from human activity” (Bakhtin 1981 [1935]: 276; Miller 2012: 49-51; Levine 1983: 12). 
45 The rhetorical effects of reconciliation and alienation are precarious achievements for Lukács, in 
tension with each other. On the one hand, novels seeking to promote reconciliation face the danger that 
their depiction of objective experience will not be sufficiently realistic to convey its capacity to resist 
subjective apprehension. In such works, an author’s “longing for …dissonance to be resolved, affirmed and 
absorbed into the work” may “lead to a premature closing of the circle of the novel’s world” (1971 [1916]: 
72). On the other hand, novelists attempting to do justice to the resistance of experience to understanding 
may compromise their ability to depict reconciliation; the danger of these cases is that “the fragility of the 
world will manifest itself so crudely that it will cancel out the immanence of meaning which the form 





A. Reconciling Articulation 
The first technique that novels use to promote reconciling views of experience in 
readers is the articulation of values that explain the subjective significance of a 
character’s practice. Although I take the term “articulation” from Charles Taylor, my use 
of this concept is particularly inspired by Richard Rorty’s concept of “final 
vocabularies,” or languages of value that human beings employ to describe their lives. 
Rorty explains: 
All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify 
their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in which we 
formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-
term projects, our deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes. They are the 
words in which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes 
retrospectively, the story of our lives. I shall call these words a person’s 
“final vocabulary.” …A small part of a final vocabulary is made up of 
thin, flexible, and ubiquitous terms such as “true,” “good,” “right,” and 
“beautiful.” The larger part contains thicker, more rigid, and more 
parochial terms, for example, “Christ,” “England,” “professional 
standards,” “decency,” “kindness,” “the Revolution,” “the Church,” 
“progressive,” “rigorous,” “creative.” The more parochial terms do most 
of the work. (1989: 73) 
Since Mikhail Bakhtin, the novel form has been identified with its inclusion of discourses 
that convey “specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and 





associate specific evaluative discourses with characters, effectively using value-laden 
language to articulate “final vocabularies” linked to particular points of view. Insofar as 
novels use language of thick, value-laden concepts to “justify” actions associated with a 
protagonist, they can be said to employ the narrative technique of reconciling articulation.  
Let’s look at an example. George Eliot’s 1860 novel The Mill on the Floss 
concerns the practices of the impulsive protagonist Maggie Tulliver and of her stern and 
protective older brother, Tom. Maggie’s loyalty to a misunderstood friend provides an 
example of a practice the novel justifies to readers through articulation. As Maggie 
criticizes Tom’s unwillingness to understand her friendship with Philip Wakem, the 
disabled son of their father’s business rival, she uses an array of value-laden language to 
defend her behavior: 
You have no pity; you have no sense of your own imperfection and your 
own sins. It is a sin to be hard; it is not fitting for a mortal, for a Christian. 
You are nothing but a Pharisee. You thank God for nothing but your own 
virtues; you think they are great enough to win you everything else. You 
have not even a vision of feelings by the side of which your shining 
virtues are mere darkness! (Eliot 2015 [1860]: 322, emphasis mine)  
This passionate articulation of Maggie’s final vocabulary can be grouped into two kinds 
of concepts. I have underlined the relatively “thin” concepts Maggie employs like 
“Christian” and “sin[ful],” which communicate Maggie’s subjective evaluation but give 
little sense of objective practices corresponding to that evaluation; these concepts tell 





based on.46  By contrast, the “thicker”/bolded terms above link Maggie’s evaluation to 
objective practices readers can identify. I have bolded the term “pity” along with its 
logical opposite “hard[ness]” because this value-laden concept corresponds to the 
practice of showing sensitivity to the suffering of others. Readers can observe the extent 
to which the thick concept of “pity” explains, and thus helps justify, Maggie’s actions, 
such as her decision to visit the socially ostracized Philip when he requests her 
company.47 I have also bolded the negative value-laden concept of “Pharisee” along with 
its logical opposite (“hav[ing] …a sense of your own imperfection”) because it 
corresponds to an objective practice of refusing to acknowledge deficiencies in one’s 
behavior. Maggie’s actions express a sensitive conscience that avoids pharisaical self-
righteousness, for example, when she readily admits her failure to feed Tom’s rabbits or 
her decision to see Philip against her family’s wishes.48 Finally, I’ve bolded the value-
laden concept “vision of feelings” which corresponds to an objective practice of 
sympathizing with others. Readers can observe that Maggie’s actions demonstrate 
sympathetic awareness of Philip’s feelings when she avoids calling attention to his 
                                                          
46 Thick description is an anthropological concept first used by Gilbert Ryle to name an account of 
action designed to clarify its significance to a cultural outsider. Ryle’s conception of thick description has 
been adopted and developed by an array of figures including Clifford Geertz, Charles Taylor, and Richard 
Rorty. My understanding of expressive articulation has been particularly influenced by the reference Taylor 
makes to thick description in Sources of the Self. See Taylor’s chapter “Ethics of Inarticulacy” in Taylor 
1989 especially 77-80. 
47 Free indirect discourse situated to Maggie’s perspective clarifies that her eventual decision to 
continue seeing Philip is motivated in part by pity for “poor Philip, whom some people would shrink from 
only because he was deformed” (Eliot 2015 [1860]: 282). 
48 When a young Maggie forgets to feed Tom’s rabbits and they die, she offers a tearful apology (Eliot 
2015 [1860]: 34). Years later, Maggie continues her habit of admitting wrong-doing to Tom, even when she 





deformity,49 when she remembers his past kindness to Tom,50 and when she empathizes 
with his discontent.51  
To the extent that thick concepts associated with Maggie like “pity” and “vision” 
coherently explain her actions, they help justify her behavior to readers. Insofar as novels 
like The Mill on the Floss use positive value-terms associated with a protagonist’s point 
of view (the “soul”) to explain corresponding objective practices (the “deeds”), these 
novels use articulation in a reconciling way: promoting attitudes of concern toward a 
protagonist’s practices by helping readers perceive unity between mind and world 
(Lukács 1971 [1916]: 30). 
B. Alienating Articulation 
If novels can use thick evaluative concepts to reveal the subjective significance of 
a protagonist’s practice to readers, they can also use such description to call that practice 
into question.52  I use the term “alienating articulation” to capture a narrative technique of 
associating a protagonist’s practices with values they do not express. In Henry James’s 
The Bostonians (1886), a central set of practices is associated with the feminist title 
characters, Olive Chancellor, Miss Birdseye, and Verena Tarrant, who participate in 
women’s movements of 1870s New England. Basil Ransom, an intelligent Southern 
                                                          
49 “She had instinctively behaved as if she were quite unconscious of Philip's deformity; her own keen 
sensitiveness and experience under family criticism sufficed to teach her this as well as if she had been 
directed by the most finished breeding” (Eliot 2015 [1860]: 172). 
50 Early in the novel Philip agrees to tell Tom stories while his foot is recovering from an injury. Years 
later, Maggie remembers Philip’s kindness, telling him “I’ve never forgotten how good you were long ago 
to Tom” (Eliot 2015 [1860]: 277). 
51 After Philip explains how his longing for beauty makes him feel alive and hints at his unfulfilled 
love for Maggie, the narrator emphasizes Maggie’s empathetic response: “Her heart began to beat with 
something of Philip's discontent” (Eliot 2015 [1860]: 280). 
52 The presence of alienating articulation in a novel depends upon its inclusion of what Mikhail 
Bakhtin calls “heteroglossia,” or languages of value formed according to “the intentions and accents of 
other people,” and it is related to the phenomenon Bakhtin calls “dialogization” (1981 [1935]: 298). See 





conservative, pays a visit to his cousin Olive and ends up competing with her for 
Verena’s affection. Following Lionel Trilling’s reading of The Bostonians, it’s possible 
to view Ransom as a vehicle for the novel to place the feminist practices defended by the 
novel’s protagonists under critical scrutiny.53 Using both thick and thin concepts, Ransom 
deploys negative evaluative language to describe the women’s movement in a polemical 
exchange with Verena:  
The whole generation is womanised; the masculine tone is passing out of 
the world; it's a feminine, a nervous, hysterical, chattering, canting age, an 
age of hollow phrases and false delicacy and exaggerated solicitudes and 
coddled sensibilities, which, if we don't soon look out, will usher in the 
reign of mediocrity, of the feeblest and flattest and the most pretentious 
that has ever been. The masculine character, the ability to dare and endure, 
to know and yet not fear reality, to look the world in the face and take it 
for what it is—a very queer and partly very base mixture—that is what I 
want to preserve” (James 2001 [1886]: 260).  
Although The Bostonians is not always clear about the extent to which Ransom’s views 
of the feminist movement should be taken as authoritative, this moment of articulation 
invites readers to use thick, value-laden concepts like “coddled sensibilities,” and 
“hollow phrases” to make sense of the practices of the novel’s feminist characters. Just 
insofar as novels like The Bostonians employ negatively-valenced thick concepts to 
describe their protagonists’ commitments and practices, such novels include alienating 
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articulation. Alienating articulation invites readers to view the practices of central 
characters as dissonant with values that might render them significant. 
IV. Enactment 
 
If novels have the capacity to promote evaluative reflection on matters of concern 
by offering detailed descriptions of value-laden perspectives, novels may also think 
through such connections by depicting concrete situations in which values are expressed. 
I use the term “enactment” to capture the capacity of a literary work to communicate 
information about circumstances in which values are well or poorly manifested. Novels 
that articulate values do not always depict their corresponding enactment, and vice versa. 
In The Bostonians, for example, Basil Ransom enacts relatively few of the values he 
articulates. Although Ransom’s actions arguably do express values like “chivalry” and 
“gentleman[liness]” James does not imagine situations for Ransom to convincingly enact 
other values he articulates such as “sacrifice,” “honour,” or “endur[ance]” (2001 [1886]: 
33, 249, 189, 260). 
A. Reconciling Enactment 
 
My thinking about enactment has been particularly influenced by the Aristotelian 
view of literature Martha Nussbaum advances in Love’s Knowledge.54 The conditions for 
a character’s action to count as reconciling enactment can be clarified by three 
requirements, the third of which paraphrases Aristotle’s view of moral excellence: 
1) action is expressive, or value-driven rather than situation-driven;  
                                                          
54 See Nussbaum’s 1990: 148-168. Nussbaum’s work is influenced in turn by Wayne Booth’s Chicago-
school revival of Aristotelian ethical criticism. For a helpful summary of neo-Aristotelian rhetorical 





2) action is purposive, or arises from conscious rather than unconscious 
motivations;  
3) action is phronetic, expressing a value to the right degree, in the right 
circumstances, at the right time.55 
For an example of reconciling action in a novel that meets these criteria, one can consider 
Maggie Tulliver’s greeting to Philip Wakem in The Mill on the Floss. When a young 
Maggie befriends Philip Wakem, a schoolmate of her brother Tom, she makes Philip a 
promise to remember him.56 After several years, Maggie encounters Philip on a secluded 
walk and offers him the following greeting: “I’m very glad you came, for I wished very 
much to have an opportunity of speaking to you. I’ve never forgotten how good you were 
long ago to Tom, and me too” (2015 [1860]: 278). We can say that Maggie’s greeting to 
Philip counts as a reconciled enactment of values to the extent that the action fulfills three 
criteria, above.  
First, Maggie’s greeting of Philip is value-driven rather than situation driven; 
greeting Philip as she does is not a choice that most people in Maggie’s circumstances 
would have made. A merely polite, or even cool, response would be more likely given 
her brother’s wishes, the reputation of Philip’s family, Philip’s physical appearance, and 
the indifference that would have been expected to develop through the years. But instead 
of responding only to external situational pressures, Maggie responds inwardly on the 
basis of values; Maggie’s action expresses values articulated by the novel insofar as it is 
                                                          
55 To respond “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the 
right aim, and in the right way, is what is appropriate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence” 
(Aristotle, quoted in Nussbaum 1990: 156). 
56 “‘I shan’t forget you, I’m sure,’ said Maggie, shaking her head very seriously. ‘I never forget 





“kind,” “[tender]” “sympath[etic],” and “faith[ful]”; responding to Philip, as Maggie 
reflects to herself shortly after, also helps her avoid negative expressions of these values 
such as “cruel[ty]” and “vindictiveness” (Eliot 2015 [1860]: 275, 209, 424, 281-82). 
Second, Maggie’s greeting to Philip expresses consciously endorsed values, rather 
than unacknowledged impulses at odds with her purposes. The narrator does not 
encourage us to view Maggie’s initial greeting to Philip with the kind of skepticism, for 
instance, that Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1748) invites toward its protagonist when 
she makes her funeral preparations after being raped by Lovelace. Although Clarissa 
intends these preparations to express consciously held values like integrity and chastity, 
Richardson’s realism of presentation suggests the extent to which her actions also express 
narcissism and repressed sexual desire (see Watt 2001 [1957]: 231-234). The distance 
between value and act revealed in Clarissa’s funeral preparations contrasts with the 
expressive unity conveyed by Maggie’s greeting to Philip. Unlike Clarissa’s preparations 
for her death, or Maggie’s own decision to refuse Philip’s proposal later in the novel, 
Maggie’s greeting to Philip is presented as a purposeful expression of value, rather than 
as an accidental product of unacknowledged impulses. 
Third, Maggie’s initial greeting happens in circumstances where adhering to 
values is warranted, rather than in circumstances where such adherence would appear as 
stubbornness, caprice, or delusion. Given the situation she is in, Maggie’s expression of 
belief and loyalty to Philip is justified. Unlike, for instance, the belief that Isobel Archer 
expresses when initially marrying Osmond in Henry James’s Portrait of a Lady (1881), 





the degree and timing of Maggie’s expression of belief in Philip is, in this case, 
appropriate to the circumstances.  
B. Alienating Enactment 
 
By portraying characters whose expressive actions do not fit with their 
circumstances, the enactment of values may also promote alienation instead of 
reconciliation. Gustave Flaubert’s 1856 novel, Madame Bovary, is exemplary for its 
depiction of alienating enactment, or action which calls attention to the lack of fit 
between values and situations in which they are expressed. The novel’s protagonist, 
Emma Bovary, expresses a sensibility that distinguishes her from the unimaginative and 
complacent inhabitants of a provincial French town through acts associated with religion, 
marriage, romance, and luxury. None of these practical spheres ends up providing a 
viable means for the expression of Emma’s interiority, however. In instances when 
Emma’s actions are purposive, they are rarely phronetic: the values associated with her 
perspective (like imagination, sensitivity, depth, refinement, and passion) fail to express 
themselves to the right degree, at the right time, or in the right circumstances. Madame 
Bovary is full of expressive enactment ill-matched to circumstances: Emma gives herself 
to religious raptures when her situation calls for discipline, she views her marriage with 
disgust when the situation calls for patience, she gives herself to passionate infatuation 
when the situation calls for skeptical restraint, she indulges in luxury when the situation 
calls for frugality. Madame Bovary’s depiction of its protagonist’s expressive acts 
promotes alienation insofar as Emma’s circumstances either require a more moderate 







If novels can communicate information about the fit between values and 
circumstances, they can also communicate information about the fit of values with each 
other. One way novels do this is through contrasts between characters who do and do not 
express given sets of values successfully. I use the terms “vivification” and “ironization” 
to describe rhetorical effects solicited by juxtaposition between characters whose actions 
express antithetical value schemas.57 A novel uses antithetical character contrasts to 
promote reconciliation whenever it opposes a set of actions expressing one set of values 
(usually enacted by a protagonist) to another set of actions that fail to express that set of 
values (usually enacted by a secondary character). 
A. Reconciling Juxtaposition, or “Vivification” 
 
My thinking about reconciling juxtaposition is influenced by Alex Woloch’s 
description of relations between major and minor characters. In The One Versus the 
Many, Woloch offers Jane Austen’s novels as paradigmatic instances of works designed 
to communicate contrasts between inner character qualities.58 The function of the 
Austenian “character-system,” for Woloch, is to juxtapose a protagonist’s expressions of 
value with those of surrounding minor characters in order to articulate a “valorized 
symbolic register” around a protagonist (2009: 47). For Woloch, contrasts drawn in Pride 
and Prejudice (1813) between the novel’s major character, Elizabeth Bennet, and minor 
characters, such as her sisters, exemplify this technique of centralizing evaluative 
contrast. It is possible to view the kind of character contrast Woloch identifies in Austen 
                                                          
57 For a sustained example of antithetical character contrasts in Henry James’s The Ambassadors see 
Matthew Flaherty’s “Henry James at the Ethical Turn.” 
58 Woloch credits Austen for transforming the novel “into a genre that abstracts, elucidates, and 
diagnoses human characteristics,” by “facilitating contrasts between inner qualities” (2009: 53). For 
Woloch, Austen’s preoccupation with such contrasts is explicitly foregrounded by her titles Pride and 





as a narrative device that facilitates reconciling juxtaposition, or what I call 
“vivification.”59 In the case of Pride and Prejudice we can say that expressions of 
Elizabeth’s value-schema are vivified to the extent that they are opposed with practices of 
other characters who conspicuously fail to express those same values. For instance, to the 
extent that Elizabeth’s perspective is defined by its investment in independent critical 
thought, that value is communicated through the juxtaposition of Elizabeth’s fine-grained 
judgments with the rigid conduct-book moralism of her sister, Mary. So too, if 
Elizabeth’s practice is characterized by spirited critical wit, this liveliness is vivified by 
its contrast with the compliant resignation of her sister, Jane.  
Other examples of vivification abound in the nineteenth-century realist novel, 
especially in its British incarnations. In George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, Tom 
Tulliver’s rigid indignation clarifies the value of Maggie’s flexible generosity. In 
Anthony Trollope’s Barchester Towers (1857) the unctuous manipulations of the 
evangelical minister, Obadiah Slope, help emphasize the blunt integrity of the high 
church minister, Mr. Arabin. In George Gissing’s The Odd Women (1893), the weak-
willed compliance of Virginia Madden, an impoverished alcoholic, foregrounds the 
autonomous resolve of Rhoda Nunn, the administrator of a women’s school. One can 
speak of a relation between characters as “vivifying” when a novel uses character 
contrasts to make the value of an expressive practice conspicuous. In this way, 
competitive juxtaposition between practices function as a mechanism of communication, 
clarifying the significance of values that characters express. 
                                                          
59 The contrast between Elizabeth and her sisters is Woloch’s. Woloch does not focus on the positive 
rhetorical function of such contrasts as much as on the pathos he sees in the transformation of human 
characters into “characteristics”—a process Woloch affiliates with the growth of market-driven practices of 





B. Alienating Juxtaposition, or “Ironization” 
A novel’s juxtaposition between major and minor practices need not always 
privilege a protagonist, however. I use the term “ironization” to describe the alienating 
influence of contrasts that privilege values expressed by secondary characters at a 
protagonist’s expense. The doctor who briefly appears at the end of Madame Bovary 
supplies one example of a character who plays an ironizing role. Flaubert’s doctor 
promotes ironization of Emma’s commitments to the extent that his dedication to others, 
incisive intellect, and self-control throw Emma’s narcissism, naiveté, and lack of 
discipline into sharper relief (Flaubert 2004 [1856]: 285). Other nineteenth-century 
examples of ironizing contrast can be found, for example, in the way that the contented 
humility of Pip’s adoptive father Joe Gargery, ironizes Pip’s restless vanity in Charles 
Dickens’s Great Expectations (1860), the way that the restrained candor of the scholar 
Vernon Whitford ironizes the polished manipulation of the aristocrat Sir Willoughby in 
George Meredith’s The Egoist (1879), or the way that the composed sophistication of the 
American expatriate Chad Newsome ironizes the scattered naïvete of the Massachusetts 
provincial Lambert Strether in Henry James’s The Ambassadors (1903). 
Minor characters need not have exclusively vivifying or ironizing relations to a 
protagonist’s practice, but can actually serve both functions. For example, although Tom 
Tulliver’s weaknesses in sympathy vivify Maggie’s commitments in The Mill on the 
Floss, Tom’s strengths in dutifulness also ironize them. Insofar as Tom’s practical 
responsibility emphasizes Maggie’s relative lack of decisiveness, resolve, and discipline, 
the novel’s depiction of Tom’s practice facilitates both ironization and vivification. The 





schemas is not strictly limited to novels that articulate values, or even novels that enact 
values in realistic circumstances. One can observe dually vivifying and ironizing 
character contrasts in texts as disparate as Sophocles’s Antigone (441 B.C.), where 
Creon’s rational governance opposes Antigone’s emotional piety; Miguel de Cervantes’s 
Don Quixote (1605), where the Don’s idealistic chivalry opposes Sancho Panza’s 
skeptical practicality; Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights (1847), where Edgar Linton’s 
accommodating refinement opposes Heathcliff’s assertive vitality; and Joseph Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness (1899), where Kurtz’s ruthless control opposes Marlow’s sensitive 
observation. 
VI. The Expressive Realist Canon 
Let us gather the set of texts that use techniques of articulation, enactment, and 
juxtaposition into an informal canon of “expressive realism.” The relation of any given 
text to this aesthetic is one of degree and not essence, since works of art can be 
distinguished in centrality to this aesthetic for generic, qualitative, and technical reasons.  
First, many works of art are composed according to generic constraints that do not 
require a central character’s actions to be value-expressive. Both adventure novels and 
naturalist novels, as different as they are, tend to depict characters whose actions are 
predominantly technical rather than expressive. To the extent that heroes of these genres 
possess distinctive traits, they tend to flow from their possession of unique skills (in the 
adventure novel), or basic passions and drives (in the naturalist novel), rather than from 
unusual commitments to values whose full appeal and dangers are unlikely to be 
recognized by those who haven’t read the novel. Insofar as characters in these genres 





ones, country and so on, the protagonists of such novels do not tend to be the kind of 
problematic individuals seeking self-recognition that Lukacs associates with the novel 
form. 
If works of literature may fall outside an expressive realist aesthetic for generic 
reasons, they may also fall outside the aesthetic for qualitative reasons, based on the 
success with which a given work communicates its evaluative vision to readers. While 
this second criterion is necessarily subjective, readers routinely invoke it whenever they 
feel disjunction between an implied author’s evaluation of a character’s experience and 
the valuation they actually feel when reading a work. As Altieri summarizes: “There are 
no guarantees that [a novel’s] efforts at valuation will be rewarded on any given 
occasion. Even beloved texts or writers sometime just seem incapable of singing” (2015: 
47). Wayne Booth also calls similar attention to the qualitative dimension of rhetoric 
when he recounts his experience reading polemical passages in D.H. Lawrence only to 
find himself “smiling when [he] should be panting, scoffing when [he] should be feeling 
awe” (1983: 138). While Booth leaves open the possibility that readers’ initial evaluative 
disagreements with an implied author may change over time, we can nevertheless make a 
provisional qualitative distinction between works of art that succeed and fail in making 
their reconciling or alienating views of experience compelling to discerning readers.60 
Finally, a work of art’s proximity to the expressive realist aesthetic can also vary 
for technical reasons, as works differ widely in their intent to use reconciling and 
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his own experience of gradual alignment with D.H. Lawrence’s rhetoric in Women in Love as well as his 





alienating effects as well as in the degrees to which they use articulation, enactment, and 
juxtaposition to convey them. On one end of the spectrum, some novels employ 
exclusively reconciling techniques when depicting the practices of central characters: for 
instance, the depictions of Uncle Tom’s compassionate self-denial in Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) or of John Galt’s rationalistic self-assertion in Ayn 
Rand’s Atlas Shrugged (1957) are almost uniformly positive. On the other end of this 
spectrum, novels may also employ techniques of alienation while making relatively little 
effort at reconciliation: the depiction of Sir Willoughby Patterne in George Meredith’s 
The Egoist (1879), or of the indolent title character of Machado de Assis’s The 
Posthumous Memoirs of Brás Cubas (1881) exemplify this latter tendency. If novels vary 
in their ambition to depict characters with reconciling and alienating effects, they also 
vary in the techniques they use to convey them. For instance, the depiction of Emma 
Bovary’s romantic sensibility in Madame Bovary includes some reconciling articulation 
but minimal reconciling enactment, whereas the depiction of the Alyosha Karamzov’s 
loving devotion in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (1880) includes 
reconciling enactment but little reconciling articulation. The use of specific reconciling 
and alienating techniques can even vary widely between novels by the same author. For 
instance, although Jane Austen uses almost no techniques of alienation when depicting 
Elizabeth Bennet’s spirited cleverness in Pride and Prejudice (1813), she employs 
alienating enactment when depicting Emma Woodhouse’s poorly-judged generosity in 
Emma (1815), and alienating juxtaposition when depicting the reserved Fanny Price 





Having considered specific criteria for inclusion in a canon of expressive realism 
along with corresponding examples, we are in a better position to think through what an 
expressive realist aesthetic contributes to postcritical literary studies. We’ve seen that 
techniques of characterization employed by these novels are designed to elicit readers’ 
valuations of various objects of concern: to join the “authorial audience” of expressive 
realist novels, readers must provisionally adopt various modes of feeling toward objects 
of experience (Rabinowitz 1977: 126). Without generalizing about the effects of such 
provisional identifications on empirical readers, we can say that valuations invited by 
expressive realist novels direct their ideal readers to an ethos that is postcritical in three 
senses: realist valuations invite engagement rather than detachment, criticism rather than 
reverence, and description rather impressionism.  
First, expressive realist novels promote valuations that are engaged with objects 
of concern rather than just detached from them. Insofar as novels I’ve discussed depict 
experience in reconciling ways, they promote attitudes of attachment that extend beyond 
the predominantly negative affective registers that critics like Latour, Sedgwick, and 
Felski associate with critique. Expressive realist novels invite affective attachment to 
numerous forms of life: a female minister invested in fanatical evangelicalism (George 
Eliot’s Adam Bede), an arrogant doctor who uses unproven techniques (George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch), a stubborn traditionalist behind the times (Anthony Trollope’s The Way 
We Live Now), an independent spinster who refuses to marry (George Gissing’s The Odd 
Women), an eccentric tourist who neglects his commitments at home (Henry James’s The 
Ambassadors), and a manic depressive who abandons his wife (Jeffrey Eugenides’s The 





likely to be misunderstood by readers are associated with values that make such lives 
appear comprehensible and worthy of sympathy. Whether techniques of reconciliation 
promote socially oriented forms of “sympathy,” or supply individually oriented 
possibilities for “self-creation,” these techniques invite attitudes of investment, an ethos 
of care for objects of concern (Greiner 2012: 1; Rorty 1989: 88). That is to say, by 
including techniques of reconciliation, expressive realist novels promote attitudes that 
extend beyond the “paranoid” affective register of critique and encompass “reparative” 
modes of attachment, investment, and hope (Sedgwick 2003: 138, 150). Instead of 
exclusively rehearsing “vigilant, wary, [and] mistrustful” attitudes, techniques of 
reconciliation also invite affective modes of “inspiration, invention, solace, recognition, 
…[and] passion” (Felski 2015: 188, 17). 
In addition to promoting an ethos of engagement with objects of concern, 
expressive realist novels also invite attitudes that are critical and self-conscious rather 
than merely reverent or pious. Insofar these novels use techniques of alienation, their 
content pushes back against overly ingenuous or one-sided modes of attachment and 
belief. Novels that depict central characters with techniques of alienation, like Gustave 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, or Henry James’s The Bostonians make it difficult for 
readers to adopt uncritical attitudes of devotion to ideals, whether these ideals are 
associated with marriage, literature, religion, class, or politics. So, too, novels may use 
alienating techniques to promote critical attention to the social costs of various forms of 
life, such as those practiced by overzealous disciplinarians (Charlotte Brontë’s Jane 
Eyre), manipulative patricians (George Meredith’s The Egoist), or philandering young 





authorial audience of novels like these, it becomes difficult for readers to adopt the 
“uncritical” attitudes of “fundamentalists” or “ideologues” (Warner 2004: 15); rather than 
exclusively cultivating attitudes of “reverence” or eliciting “sentimental effusion,” the 
valuations elicited by expressive realist novels also cultivate attitudes of critical distance 
in readers (Felski 2015: 29, 151).  
Finally, if expressive realist novels invite evaluations that are critical rather than 
reverent, they also invite evaluations that are descriptive rather than impressionistic. 
Insofar as expressive realist novels use techniques of articulation, enactment, and 
juxtaposition they do not just promote subjective attachment to values but objective 
analysis of them. By showing readers how values are articulated in conceptual language, 
enacted in concrete circumstances, and juxtaposed alongside opposing values, expressive 
realist novels invite readers to reflect on the evaluative commitments a novel depicts. 
Expressive realist novels that use techniques of articulation share the task that Rónán 
McDonald assigns to phenomenological criticism—the task of bringing values out from 
experiences of subjective immediacy and “into the domain of the concept” (2015: 248). 
So too, novels that use techniques of enactment invite readers to cultivate Aristotelian 
ethical wisdom, or phronesis, by reflecting on circumstances that constrain the 
applicability of virtues characters express. Finally, novels that use techniques of 
juxtaposition also invite readers to cultivate Hegelian self-consciousness by attending to 
the way that the significance of a character’s expression depends upon its dialectical 
relations to antithetical expressive modes. By promoting conceptual thought, Aristotelian 
phronesis and Hegelian self-consciousness in these ways, expressive realist works are 





(Pippin 2010). That is to say, expressive realist novels are not just objects we read: they 
are also objects that teach us how to read and think, modeling a mode of 
phenomenological thought that mediates evaluation with understanding (Bewes 2010: 3). 
Rather than stirring up feelings through “impressionistic judgment[s],” or “idiosyncratic 
flurr[ies] of private associations,” expressive realist novels influence feelings through 
techniques designed to promote analytical thought (Felski 2015: 151, 178); instead of 
contemplating “imponderables like human experience or human nature,” or promoting 
encounters with “opacity and ineffability,” such novels cultivate an ethos of careful 
“description” attentive to objective features of experience (Love 2010: 377, 371, 375). 
Insofar as novels in the expressive realist canon use rhetorical techniques to 
cultivate reflective value judgments in readers, they are distinctly well-suited to cultivate 
the postcritical ethos championed by critics in the recent turn to phenomenology. Rather 
than inviting static orientations of critical detachment or uncritical reverence, these 
novels invite open-ended engagement with objects of concern. I’ve argued further that 
such novels invite readers to participate in the phenomenological discipline of mediating 
subjective evaluations with conceptual thought. By conveying reconciling and alienating 
depictions of experience through techniques of articulation, enactment, and juxtaposition 
these novels submit value-laden views to the labor of the concept. To read alongside 
novels in an expressive realist tradition is thus to read postcritically, refusing stances of 
detachment and superiority that lead away from objects of concern and instead adopting 






Chapter 2: Ethos and Judgment in George Gissing’s The Odd 




In recent years, the ethos of critique has come under fire from scholars seeking to 
move beyond the evaluative stances and methodologies associated with suspicious 
hermeneutics.61 Rita Felski's recent book, The Limits of Critique, introduces the term 
“postcritical” to describe widespread efforts from philosophers and literary critics to 
rethink the status of critique in the humanities and to imagine new alternatives to it. 
Although the term “postcritical” is recent, the concept merely gives a name to ongoing 
conversations in literary studies over the past two decades aligned against the limitations 
of suspicious reading. Defenses of practices such as object-oriented criticism (Harman), 
reparative reading (Sedgwick) surface reading (Best and Marcus), and neo-
phenomenology (Felski) have all presented themselves as successors to now outmoded 
critical habits in recent years.  
These attempts to rethink critique in the humanities have not been met without 
controversy. Many commentators have found aspirations to conceive of a postcritical 
humanities to be unpersuasive at best and critically uncharitable or ideologically 
compromised at worst. Some have seen defenders of postcritical reading modes as guilty 
of excessive schematism for reducing complex intellectual traditions and methodologies 
to straw targets.62 A second and equally serious objection to the postcritical movement in 
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literary study is a worry over what seems like a lack of descriptive rigor: a concern that 
an  effort to become ‘postcritical’ is synonymous with resignation to becoming uncritical, 
entailing a loss of more rigorous modes of analysis associated with critique. The turn to 
affect pioneered by Eve Sedgwick’s defense of “reparative reading” and the resistance to 
depth hermeneutics championed in Best and Marcus’s “surface reading” have done little 
to allay fears that postcritical movements aim to substitute the emotivism of a belletristic 
tradition for what appeared to be the gain in analytical rigor associated with critique.63 
Worries about the loss of analytical rigor in literary studies are exacerbated by the fact 
that most prominent defenses of postcritical humanities are pitched at such a high level of 
generality—in calls for turns to aestheticism, affect, surfaces, or hermeneutics—that they 
leave unclear the extent to which postcritical modes of judgment actually differ from 
those associated with “critique,” as well as the extent to which cultivating these different  
modes of judgment is desirable or even possible. 
This chapter is designed to bring clarity to the question of how modes of 
judgment associated with critique differ from modes of judgment championed in ongoing 
postcritical conversations. By way of systematically comparing modes of judgment 
invited by two texts—one critical text I use to exemplify the stance of critique and one 
novel that I use to exemplify a stance of postcritique—the chapter draws out points of 
contact and departure between a tradition of symptomatic criticism and the tradition of 
postcritical phenomenology which I outlined in Chapter 1. To this end, I examine Franco 
Moretti’s recent work of critique, The Bourgeois: Between History and Literature, 
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63 For arguments that critique the lack of descriptive rigor associated with defenses of postcritical 





alongside a masterpiece of Victorian realism, George Gissing’s The Odd Women, in order 
to compare and contrast two of the different orientations to bourgeois cultural practices 
that they invite. The ideal readers constructed by Moretti and Gissing’s texts, I argue, 
share important sensibilities at the level of ethos: both texts invite readers to adopt a 
demystified rather than reverent stance toward bourgeois practices and to take an 
objectively descriptive rather than subjectively impressionistic view of such practices. 
While both Moretti’s study and The Odd Women both cultivate modes of judgment 
associated with critique in these ways, they also depart from each other in important 
respects. I argue that The Odd Women promotes judgments of bourgeois practices in 
ways that are situated rather than abstract and charitable rather than condemning. This 
chapter thus presents specialized works of realism like The Odd Women as a tool for 
cultivating postcritical modes of judgment that do not discard the legacy of critique but 
which instead incorporate some of its virtues while also pressing beyond some of its 
limitations. 
II. Suspicious Reading and Bourgeois Culture 
 
Franco Moretti’s recent study of realism The Bourgeois: Between History and 
Literature, takes the methodological assumptions of symptomatic reading as its starting 
point. In The Limits of Critique, Rita Felski describes the method of symptomatic reading 
thus:  
Symptomatic reading [is] an influential blend of Freudian, semiotic, and 
political (often Marxist) theory developed by Macherey (1975), Jameson 
(1981), and others. Here psychoanalytical categories such as repression 





and a larger social world; the text is held to be symptomatic of social 
conditions that it seeks to repress but to which it nevertheless unwittingly 
testifies” (Felski 2011: 22-23).  
Analyzing literary works that coincide with the onset of capitalist modernization in 
Europe, Moretti’s The Bourgeois mines 18th and 19th century literature for what its forms 
betray about the underlying conditions of capitalist modernity in its infancy. Viewing 
literature as “the fossil remains of what had once been a living and problematic present,” 
Moretti’s study looks for clues in literary form that help reveal the conditions of a society 
riven by “the spasms of capitalist modernity” (13-14). Seeking to analyze the new form 
of life that evolved in conjunction with capitalist modernity, Moretti brings bourgeois 
culture into focus by attending to a realist prose style, bourgeois character types, and 
value-laden keywords such as usefulness, efficiency, earnestness, comfort, and roba (or 
stuff), that gradually emerge in 18th and 19th century literature.  Through discussion of 
literature in a predominantly realist tradition such as Robinson Crusoe, North and South, 
and John Halifax: Gentleman, Moretti’s study places bourgeois culture under scrutiny so 
that readers can freshly perceive its compromises and contradictions—for instance, the 
contradiction bourgeois culture faced in reconciling “the ascetic imperative of modern 
production” along with “the desire for enjoyment of a rising social group” (Moretti 51). 
Although The Bourgeois is not exactly typical as a work of symptomatic criticism 
and is perhaps too recent to be methodologically influential, the study has particular 
utility as a tool to think about the strengths and limitations of critique. First, The 
Bourgeois, like the rest of Moretti’s scholarship, is particularly explicit about questions of 





Moretti’s method of reading in The Bourgeois takes the protocols of symptomatic reading 
to an extreme in ways designed to clarify its limitations as much as to inspire new modes 
of thought.64 In addition to being especially self-conscious about the strengths and 
limitations of its methodology, The Bourgeois is also unusually self-conscious and 
explicit about the ethos underwriting its own critical intervention. Because The Bourgeois 
adeptly articulates its own value-laden critical ethos in ways that serve as standards by 
which to measure expressions of bourgeois culture—evaluating and not just describing 
the cultural forms it discusses—the study is a particularly helpful tool for analyzing the 
modes of value-judgment cultivated by critique.  
In what follows, I focus on four characteristics of critique that shape Moretti’s 
judgments of bourgeois cultural practices and forms. My goal in this discussion is both to 
draw out the ongoing appeal of the critical mode employed in Moretti’s study and to 
clarify some of its limitations. My headings are: 
Critique demystifies 
Critique describes 
Critique negates  
Critique abstracts 
I will discuss each of these in turn. 
A. Critique Demystifies 
 
                                                          
64 Julie Orlemanski makes this point about Moretti’s polemical attention to questions of method: 
“Moretti … acts as a kind of dialectical catalyst, insofar as he pushes constitutive tensions within literary 
study toward a point where opposed forces — say, “discovery” and “intervention,” or literary history and 
literary criticism, or explanation and interpretation — have the potential to transform one another as well as 





Critique is a mode of analysis that resists enchantment. Refusing the allure of 
common sense conviction and the enthusiasm of pious devotees, critique sets itself in 
opposition to unselfconscious investments and unreflective commitments. Rather than 
cultivating attitudes of “reverence” or eliciting “sentimental effusion” for its objects, 
critique cultivates distance from them, bracketing enthusiasm and championing detached 
vigilance (Felski, Limits 29, 151). 
The Bourgeois clarifies its own investment in an ethos of demystification through 
its critique of the Victorian desire to ignore unpleasant truths. Moretti views a fastidious 
reviewer of Henrik Ibsen’s A Doll’s House as exemplifying the Victorian tendency to 
preserve faith in cherished objects at the expense of self-deception. When an anonymous 
reviewer complains of Ibsen’s unfortunate habit of “dragging evils which we know to 
exist …into the light of common day,” Moretti comments: “What is ‘unfortunate’ here—
the fact that certain evils exist, or that we are made to know that they exist? Almost 
certainly the latter. Disavowal” (110). By indicting the Victorian tendency to 
“disavowal,” Moretti’s study casts its lot with an ethos of critique that resists modes of 
uncritical reverence and sentimentality. Rather than expecting art to preserve a halo of 
significance around ideals associated with domesticity and family, for instance, Moretti 
values art and criticism which refuse the allure of enchantment, sternly measuring ideals 
against the realities that betray them. 
Moretti associates tendencies toward mystification and sentimentality with realist 
novels whose “deepest vocation,” as he puts it “lies in forging compromises between 
different ideological systems” (93). Committed to an ethos of demystification, Moretti’s 





they broker between ideological systems. In a discussion of the popular mid-century 
Victorian novel John Halifax: Gentleman, for instance, Moretti presents the novel’s 
idealized picture of reconciliation between workers and industrialists as a screen masking 
the underlying inequality of the wage-labor contract.65 Another reading of Daniel Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe unravels unresolved tensions in the behavior of the title character who 
is divided between an irrational ethos of acquisition by force and more typically ethical 
bourgeois habits of self-restraint. As Moretti puts it: “This coexistence-without-
integration of opposite registers …is clearly a flaw of the novel. But, just as clearly, the 
inconsistency is not just a matter of form: it arises from the unresolved dialectic of the 
bourgeois type himself, and of his two ‘souls’: suggesting, contra Weber, that the rational 
bourgeois will never truly outgrow his irrational impulses, nor repudiate the predator he 
once used to be” (35). Rather than ignoring the novel’s depiction of unacknowledged 
dissonance between Crusoe’s habits of violent exploitation and his bourgeois ideals of 
rational self-discipline, Moretti’s reading invites his readers to adopt demystified 
judgments of the contradictory impulses fostered by capitalist societies. To join the 
authorial audience of The Bourgeois, one must be willing to view bourgeois ideals of 
rationality and equitability in this demystified way: that is to say, one must learn to see 
bourgeois values outside the halo of mystification promoted by novels like Robinson 
                                                          
65 Quoting a study of capitalistic culture by Ellen Wood, Moretti summarizes the novel’s attempt to 
imagine resolution to the realities of class conflict through the chivalric ethos of its title character: “How 
can industrialists secure their workers' consent? The novel's answer, in line with the ‘déjà-là’ of Boltanski 
and Chiappello, explains Halifax's hold on the workers with his adoption of pre-capitalist values; 
specifically, of that 'patriarchal conception of the master-servant relation' to which nineteenth-century 
capitalism gave 'a new lease of life, as the most readily available and adaptable ideological support for the 
inequality of the wage-labour contract.’ Master and servant: thus begins the metamorphosis of the one-
sided bourgeois into a hegemonic gentleman. The patemalism of the master, who promises to take care of 





Crusoe and instead learn to acknowledge the extent to which they are contradicted by the 
imperatives of capitalist society. 
While it’s easy to imagine scholars quibbling over the details of Moretti’s 
readings, it is difficult to imagine anyone seriously disagreeing with the ethos of 
demystification that motivates them. For Michael Warner, the habits of demystification 
have become something we reflexively teach our students: the imperative to read 
critically rather than adopting the “uncritical” attitudes of “fundamentalists” or 
“ideologues” has become “the folk ideology of a learned profession” (Warner 15, 14). As 
Terry Eagleton puts it, “no reversion to a serene, optimistic human faith is possible after 
Marx, Freud and post-structuralism” (160). For better or worse, the feelings expressed by 
the anonymous Victorian reviewer of Ibsen’s A Doll’s House are wholly alien to the 
culture of professional literary criticism after critique. The demystifying impulses of 
suspicious reading have inescapably changed the kinds of judgment valued in 
contemporary literary studies: rather than feeling distaste for literature and criticism 
which “drags evils …into the light of day,” contemporary literary critics tend to view 
skills of demystified judgment as an ethos worthy of cultivation.  
B. Critique Describes 
 
 In addition to its emphasis on demystification, critique can also be characterized 
by an emphasis on description. For post-structuralists, Marxists, and New Critics alike, 
methods of critical reading are defined by being “reflective” and “analytic” in opposition 
to the “reverie” and “sentimentality” of uncritical reading (Warner, 15). That is to say, in 
contrast to modes of reading dependent on “subjective effusion or an idiosyncratic flurry 





conceptual thought (Felski 2015: 178). Heather Love describes this aspect of critique as 
an ethos of “description”: rather than “truck[ing] with imponderables like human 
experience or human nature,” or attending to “the opacity and ineffability of the text,” 
descriptive modes of critique employ categories of thought that make objective analysis 
possible (377, 371). 
Love approvingly cites Moretti’s work on distant reading as an example of the 
descriptive turn; although The Bourgeois is far from a typical example of distant reading, 
Moretti’s discussion of Matthew Arnold in The Bourgeois clarifies that study’s 
investment in the ethos of description. Criticizing the reliance of Arnold’s Culture and 
Anarchy on “vapid formulas” such as “sweetness and light,” or “wisdom and beauty,” 
Moretti takes issue with Arnold’s apparent inability to present his analysis of culture in a 
mode of conceptualized analysis: 
Beauty, sweetness, light, perfection, poetry, religion, reason, the will of 
God ... What is this? … a way of asserting the fundamental and immutable 
unity of culture. What is beautiful has to be also good and holy and true. 
…The result is that culture must not be a profession. This is the source of 
the fog that pervades every page of Culture and Anarchy: the ease and 
grace of the dilettante, drifting among great human values, without 
stooping to those mechanical definitions a professional would be bound to 
give. (142-143) 
In this short polemic, Victorian “fog” is not the result of a willful denial of unpleasant 
truths, but simply the fuzzy thinking of the “dilettante”: that is, a mode of thinking 





values,” without making use of “mechanical definitions” necessary to translate his 
subjective impressions into the domain of the concept. Moretti indicts other Victorians 
along with Arnold for what he sees as their failure to describe reality with critical acuity. 
For example, Moretti offers a persuasive critique of the end of Elizabeth Gaskell’s 
industrial novel, North and South, whose forced conclusion relies on fuzzy ideas of 
mutual “influence” and “intercourse” as an imagined solution to conflicts between 
workers and capitalists (123). For Moretti, the failure of this novel to endow these 
concepts “with an intelligible meaning” is partly a deficiency of description, a failure to 
give the more rigorous definitions that professional criticism would require (125). For 
Moretti, the “fog” promoted by Victorian authors like Arnold, Gaskell, and Joseph 
Conrad arises from their digressive and emotional presentation of bourgeois ideals—a 
reliance on “vagueness” and impressionism, which allows their work to spread “a 
virtuous patina over the harsher reality of social relations” (124).  
In direct contrast to Victorian authors who allow emotion to supersede conceptual 
rigor, Moretti praises more prosaic authors such as Ibsen, whom he credits for 
“reveal[ing] with absolute clarity the unresolved dissonance of bourgeois life” (178). 
Moretti names the literary ideal that Ibsen embodies “prose” and views it as the central 
achievement of bourgeois literature and a foil to the fog of Victorian camouflage. For 
Moretti, Nora’s closing speech in Henrik Ibsen’s Dollhouse is exemplary for embodying 
this ethos of prosaic sobriety. He says:  
By now, readers of this book know that prose is its only true hero. …Prose 
as analysis, first of all; Hegel's 'unmistakable definiteness and clear 





that understands the delusions of metaphors, and leaves them behind. A 
woman who understands a man, and leaves him behind. Nora's dispelling 
of lies at the end of Dollhouse is one of the great pages of bourgeois 
culture: on a par with Kant's words on the Enlightenment, or Mill's on 
liberty. (181) 
Moretti’s praise for Ibsen makes visible the positive standard that informs his judgments 
of Victorian fog: “analysis,” “clarity,” “intelligibility,” and “definiteness” are the 
hallmarks of the bourgeoisie’s finest literary achievements. 
 The ethos of description Moretti describes here is one that, like the ethos of 
demystification, modern critics tend to share. To the extent this ethos of description has 
shaped the profession, literary critics tend to appreciate cultural and ideological 
investments that are “fortified by thought” above vague, impressionistic language whose 
meaning is undecipherable. As such, literary depictions of commitments like Nora’s in 
Dollhouse may be compelling to contemporary critics to the extent that such depictions 
give voice to prosaic ideas, using intelligible concepts to articulate intuitive 
commitments. 
 While I expect many critics to share an appreciation for the ethos of 
demystification and description championed in Moretti’s study, the next two elements I 
associate with the ethos of critique Moretti employs are more controversial. Rather than 
functioning as widely accepted critical ideals, these next two characteristics of critique—
negation and abstraction—can be viewed as limited or fallible opposites to more 
charitable and situated modes of judgment, respectively. 






Roland Barthes took issue with the stock mode of negativity that became 
commonplace in literary criticism in 1971: “Any student,” Barthes writes, “can and does 
denounce the bourgeois or petit-bourgeois character of such and such a form (of life, of 
thought, of consumption). . . . Denunciation, demystification (or demythification) has 
itself become discourse, stock of phrases, catechistic declaration” (qtd in Felski 2015: 
75). The element of denunciation signaled by Barthes’s comment has come under fire in 
recent years by critics including Eve Sedgwick and Rita Felski who resist the narrow 
affective register associated with suspicious hermeneutics.66 
Although Moretti’s tone in The Bourgeois is not without moments of enthusiasm 
and positivity, the study’s symptomatic and historicist methodology invites readers to 
adopt a predominantly negative orientation to the object of bourgeois culture. By 
repeatedly measuring bourgeois culture and practices against unrealized ideals, the study 
frequently invites negative judgments. Consider Moretti’s skeptical view of the esteem in 
which bourgeois culture viewed the value of earnestness. Moretti contends that the 
bourgeoisie’s use of the word “earnest,” which supplanted the more neutral word 
“serious” in 1857, added an emotional halo of significance to modes of work whose real 
conditions were taxing: “The objective ‘seriousness’ of modern life— reliability, respect 
for facts, professionalism, clarity, punctuality—remained of course as demanding as ever, 
and it’s here that ‘earnest’ realized its little semantic miracle: preserving the fundamental 
tonality of bourgeois existence, mostly in the adverbial clause ‘in earnest’, while 
endowing it with a sentimental—ethical significance” (133, emphasis in original). As 
Moretti sees it, this “incrustation of value judgments over matters of fact” facilitated by 
                                                          





words like “earnest” is the legacy of the Victorians who, hiding from self-consciousness, 
tended to obscure the realities of capitalist labor behind a fog of sentiment (130).  
If Moretti’s historicist mode of critique invites readers to adopt a negative stance 
to the ethos of bourgeois earnestness, his critique also invites readers to adopt a negative 
stance to another important value term in bourgeois culture: the useful. Rather than 
focusing on the advantages and appeal of usefulness as an ideal, Moretti argues that the 
value placed on useful work in Defoe’s fiction “become[s] the new principle of 
legitimation of social power,” obscuring the otherwise arbitrary and unfair accumulation 
of resources through imperial exploitation (30). Moretti’s summary of bourgeois 
commitment to usefulness in the Victorian era is similarly disparaging: 
An industrial society needs knowledge; but it only truly needs it in so far 
as it’s useful. That word, again: a battle-cry of Victorianism, from the 
Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, to the industrialist’s words 
in North and South (‘any man who can read and write starts fair with me 
in the amount of really useful knowledge’), Newman’s Idea of a 
University (‘mental culture is emphatically useful), Bagehot’s feline touch 
on Scott— ‘no man had a more useful intellect’— and countless others. 
Following knowledge like a shadow, ‘useful’ turns it into a tool: no longer 
an end in itself, knowledge is briskly directed by the adjective towards a 
predetermined function and a circumscribed horizon. Useful knowledge, 
or: knowledge without freedom. (137, emphasis in original) 
Moretti’s description of the value of usefulness paints a picture of the bourgeoisie as 





ideal at arm’s length—defamiliarizing it with redescription (usefulness as “battle-cry” 
and “tool”), and with a narratorial aside (“That word, again”). Such rhetoric invites 
suspicion toward the Victorian bourgeoisie whose strenuous investments in values like 
usefulness (underscored by Moretti’s italics on “need”), and later, efficiency, appear as 
artifacts of historical accident—or as “steps in the history of capitalist rationalization”—
rather than as products of developing self-consciousness (41). That is to say, Moretti’s 
description does not make the bourgeois commitments to values like “usefulness” and 
“efficiency” appear to be compelling ideals with continuing claims on the loyalties of his 
readers so much as accidental missteps that we are better off avoiding in the present. By 
criticizing the fog cast by bourgeois ideals in such moments, Moretti’s account of the 
Victorians repeats well-worn moves of critique by debunking investments in bourgeois 
cultural ideals and practices.  
 While Moretti’s study often levies negative judgments of bourgeois culture in this 
way, a few moments in his study also suggest an interest in a different critical ideal of 
generosity. During moments, Moretti’s study presents elements of bourgeois culture in 
more charitable ways: not just as an ideological screen obscuring progress toward a 
future classless society, but as a rational form of life with continuing claims upon the 
present loyalties of his readers. In the introduction of The Bourgeois, Moretti suggests his 
aspiration to present bourgeois culture partly “as an incomplete project,” rather than a 
dead object of history, suggesting that the study will work to charitably make the case for 
the continuing appeal of bourgeois culture in the present (19). To this end, Moretti 
favorably contrasts the serious and prosaic bent of bourgeois culture expressed in texts 





emotional and intellectual seriousness” cultivated in present-day American culture (23). 
Moretti describes Ibsen’s prose style “that understands the delusions of metaphors, and 
leaves them behind” as “the true hero” of his book (181).  By purposefully contrasting the 
present-day American preoccupations with mindless entertainment with an older 
bourgeois ideal of prosaic seriousness, Moretti’s study begins to cultivate judgments that 
extend beyond the predominantly negative register associated with critique. Although 
Moretti freely admits that The Bourgeois does not fully live up to this scholarly ideal of 
using knowledge of the past to critique the present,67 the study’s partly unrealized 
impulse to “do justice to the achievements of bourgeois culture” harmonizes with Bruno 
Latour’s challenge for critics to cultivate attitudes of concern for cultural objects (181). 
By admitting the shortcomings of his own method of reading and by seeking in moments 
to move beyond them, Moretti expresses Latour’s desire for a mode of criticism that 
cultivates attitudes of concern rather than attitudes of skepticism, a criticism which gives 
readers “arenas in which to gather” rather than “lift[ing] the rugs from under the feet of 
the naïve believers” (Latour 246).  
D. Critique Abstracts 
 
If critique tends to cultivate dismissive rather than charitable views of its object, it 
also tends to cultivate abstract rather than situated modes of judgment. Instead of making 
its own claims or judgments directly, critique adopts an abstract focus on “big pictures, 
cultural frameworks, [and] underlying schema” (Felski 2012). Thus, rather than arguing 
                                                          
67 Moretti candidly acknowledges the unfulfilled ambitions he had for The Bourgeois in an aside which 
quotes Dr. Cornelius’s view of history professors from “Disorder and Early Sorrow”: “Like Cornelius, I too 
am a history professor; but I like to think that disciplined lifelessness may not be all I will be capable of. In 
this sense, inscribing The Bourgeois to Perry Anderson and Paolo Flores d’Arcais …expresses the hope 
that, one day, I will learn from them to use the intelligence of the past for the critique of the present. This 





directly against practices of discipline employed by prisons or against specific modes of 
socialization associated with gender identity, for example, critique tends to argue against 
the underlying discourses that such practices employ. Seeking to excavate the underlying 
conditions for any judgments to be made, critique abstracts away from local critical 
engagements and normative interventions. By “insist[ing] on its difference from everyday 
practices of criticism and judgment” in this way, critique tends to focus more on abstract 
conditions of possibility rather than on possible future conditions (Felski 2012). 
Moretti’s method of reading in The Bourgeois self-consciously gravitates away 
from a concrete focus on practical argumentation in favor of an abstract focus on 
epistemological structures. The Bourgeois tends to avoid direct modes of value-judgment 
associated with close reading in favor of abstract analysis of frameworks that make value 
judgments possible. By emphasizing relationships between bourgeois values and the 
underlying influence of the capitalist societies which gave rise to them, The Bourgeois 
steers away from more direct modes of judgment and argumentation that would aim to 
clarify practical alternatives to the bourgeois commitments and habits it discusses. 
In recent decades, many commentators have insisted that critique, like any other 
language game, is inextricably embedded in practical forms of life and thus that critique’s 
tendencies to abstract away from practical arguments lead to incoherence and 
contradiction at the level of argumentative stance.68 Amanda Anderson outlines this 
                                                          
68 The ethical and practical dimensions of critique were especially foregrounded in well-known 
criticisms of Foucauldian philosophy, as commentators such as Nancy Fraser, Charles Taylor, and Jurgen 
Habermas placed Foucauldian critique under scrutiny for its failure to elaborate on any coherent “grounds 
of opposition to the modern power/knowledge regime” (Anderson 151). Foucault himself eventually 
corrected his own inattentiveness to the positive practical dimensions of critique in his much-discussed turn 
to ethics. As Amanda Anderson points out, Foucault eventually conceded that the task of critique should be 
a matter of practical and ethical judgment: that is, the task “to give one’s self the rules of law, the 
techniques of management, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which will allow these games 





position in her introduction to The Way We Argue Now, which takes a stand against “the 
underdeveloped and often incoherent evaluative stance of contemporary theory, its 
inability to clearly avow the norms and values underlying its own critical programs” (1). 
Based on the premise that questions of ethos and practice underwrite all epistemological 
endeavors, Anderson contends that modes of critique frequently maintain an unclear 
relationship to the norms and values underlying their own linguistic interventions—a 
relationship which, in many cases, manifests in incoherence at the level of a critical 
argument’s evaluative stance. 
Moretti’s study is perhaps atypical of the kind of critique Anderson describes in 
that the evaluative stance employed by The Bourgeois is quite developed. As we have 
seen, The Bourgeois evaluates its object through a coherent ethos characterized by 
demystification rather than reverence and description rather than impressionism: for the 
most part, the two values which underwrite Moretti’s critical intervention are clearly and 
consistently avowed throughout his study. Nevertheless, the abstract focus of Moretti’s 
study also makes it possible to discern points of tension, if not outright incoherence, 
between the various value-judgments implicit in his critical readings of bourgeois culture 
and literature. 
Consider Moretti’s discussion of Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy, which 
indicts Arnold’s text for failing to live up to an ethos of description. By emphasizing 
Arnold’s refusal to employ the “mechanical definitions a professional would be bound to 
give,” in favor of “the ease and grace of the dilettante,” Moretti presents Arnold’s text as 
offering vague and loose descriptions of cultural ideals that contribute to Victorian “fog” 





itself with an ethos that we might call “professionalism”: that is, the practical ability of 
someone to internalize the various skills, habits, and discipline necessary for doing a job 
successfully—in this case, the habits of a modern day cultural critic.  
An earlier moment in Moretti’s study, however, endorses values directly 
contradictory to those expressed in this defense of professional cultural analysis. In a 
discussion of the way free-indirect discourse affects Elizabeth Bennet in Jane Austen’s 
Pride and Prejudice, Moretti indicts professionalism indirectly. Summarizing D.A. 
Miller’s criticism of nineteenth-century narrative practices, Moretti writes: “Free indirect 
style is a sort of stylistic Panopticon, where the narrator’s ‘master-voice’ disseminates its 
authority …It is a tolerant technique, free indirect style; but it’s the technique of 
socialization, not of individuality (not around 1800, at any rate). Elizabeth’s subjectivity 
bows to the ‘objective’ (that is to say, socially accepted) intelligence of the world” (99, 
97). The carefully chosen rhetoric of Moretti’s description invites readers to adopt a 
negative judgment of the way in which realist novels affix their characters to flexible 
modes of “authority.” By emphasizing the social control effected by free indirect 
discourse—where one must “bow to” (rather than “grow into” or “internalize”) the 
requirements of “socialization”—Moretti’s rhetoric appears committed to a practical 
ethos of “individuality” and unrestrained “subjectivity” which is held to be endangered 
by the controlling requirements of socialization. A stance that places value on 
unrestrained individuality in this way, though, is practically incompatible with the stance 
advocated in Moretti’s earlier discussion of Arnold. The Bourgeois in this moment 
appears to want it both ways: criticizing the “ease and grace” of Matthew Arnold’s 





Bennet’s unconstrained “subjectivity”; advocating a “professional” discipline of cultural 
analysis while also resisting the controlling “socialization” effected in the realist novel. 
Such fine-grained rhetorical analysis may seem to nit-pick, given that Moretti’s 
argument is not particularly invested in these kind of local judgments and ethical 
interventions. Indeed, Moretti’s ambitions in The Bourgeois are much more to describe 
underlying conditions of a form of life rather than to advocate for specific changes to it. 
But precisely because of Moretti’s abstract focus on the bourgeois culture as a product of 
sweeping historical changes, The Bourgeois makes itself vulnerable to contradictions like 
this at the level of stance. Just insofar as Moretti’s critique measures bourgeois culture 
against a shifting set of ideals without clarifying how those ideals might be better realized 
in practice, one can say that his critique of bourgeois cultural practice is unsituated. 
Moments of contradiction or tension in the evaluative stance invited by the study’s 
rhetoric suggest that Moretti’s study is vulnerable to the charges leveled at many works 
of critique—in this case, the accusation that critique measures cultural practices against a 
view from nowhere, a utopian standard which nurtures “mistrust of the routines and 
practices through which the everyday business of the world is conducted” rather than 
clarifying desirable changes in practical judgment (Felski 2012). 
III. The Odd Women and Bourgeois Culture: Cultivating Postcritical 
Judgments 
 
I’ve argued then, that Moretti’s study invokes a critical ethos with specific 
features, some of which appear desirable to contemporary critics and some of which 
appear limited for their incompatibility with other modes of judgment. We’ve examined 
how The Bourgeois invites readers to evaluate bourgeois culture readers with modes of 





rhetoric to call attention to blind spots, compromises, and contradictions in cultural 
practices of the bourgeoisie, Moretti’s study invites readers to evaluate such practices 
with new eyes, perceiving both strengths and limitations of this form of life.  
Insofar as The Bourgeois seeks to cultivate critical judgments of bourgeois 
commitments in its readers, its ambitions actually have more in common with Victorians 
like Matthew Arnold than might first appear. By inviting readers to perceive immanent 
contradictions in values professed by the bourgeoisie—between “enjoyment” and 
“ascetic[ism]” or between earnest conviction and objective description, for example—
Moretti’s dialectical method closely resembles the morally intelligent judgment 
championed by mid-Victorian liberals (Moretti 51). Indeed, Moretti praises Mill’s 
thoughts on liberty, along Kant’s reflections on Enlightenment and Ibsen’s closing pages 
of Dollhouse as “one of the great pages of bourgeois culture” (181).  
By inviting readers to adopt critical judgments of bourgeois values and practices, 
Moretti’s study not only promotes the ideals championed by mid-century Victorian 
philosophers but also echoes rhetorical strategies employed by Victorian novelists. I 
argued in chapter 1 that realist authors such as George Eliot and Jane Austen used 
specialized techniques of characterization to promote liberal habits of judgment in 
readers. By depicting characters’ expressions of value through techniques of articulation, 
enactment, and juxtaposition, these novelists invited readers to make reflective judgments 
of values expressed by Victorian cultural practices. I turn now to the work of another 
Victorian novelist, George Gissing, whose specialized depictions of character also 





Although Gissing’s centrality to a tradition of liberal aesthetics is less established 
than the likes of Eliot or Henry James, Gissing had much occasion to incorporate liberal 
ideals of cultivated judgment into his fictional practice. In addition to being known in 
liberal circles by the likes of Fredric Harrison and Matthew Arnold, Gissing was 
personally acquainted with John Morley, the editor of the influential liberal Victorian 
publication, The Fortnightly Review. Gissing also learned much from the example of 
George Eliot, whose writings he admired and whose serious and intellectually-acute 
depictions of character he imitated.69  
While Gissing is perhaps best known for New Grub Street (1891), his 1893 novel 
The Odd Women is an exemplary achievement of liberal aesthetics: by employing a 
tightly constructed character-system of characters who do and do not express bourgeois 
values, the novel cultivates many-sided critical judgments of bourgeois values and 
practice. The protagonist of The Odd Women is Rhoda Nunn, an intelligent and hard-
working bourgeois who runs a secretarial school designed to teach middle-class women 
the practical skills and discipline necessary for financial independence. The novel 
juxtaposes the self-reliance Rhoda teaches in her school and displays in her own life with 
the predicament of less fortunate women in the novel, including that of Monica 
Madden—a younger woman who decides to marry for financial security and ends up 
being controlled by her conventional husband, Edmund Widdowson. As Monica 
gradually finds herself stifled by her husband’s serious temperament and paternalistic 
expectations, Rhoda works to teach women the practical skills necessary to avoid 
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financial dependence on men. Rhoda’s focus on her school is later interrupted when she 
meets a cousin of her work associate, Everard Barfoot, a rakish aesthete determined to 
treat life as a holiday. Everard decides it would be a diverting challenge to make Rhoda 
fall in love with him and eventually succeeds in this task, only to surprise himself by 
falling in love with Rhoda’s resolve and intellectual independence in the process. Everard 
and Rhoda end up disagreeing over the idea of whether to have a conventional marriage 
and soon after, a misunderstanding over Everard’s relationship with Monica exacerbates 
their rift. Although Everard eventually explains his behavior and renews an offer of 
marriage on Rhoda’s terms, Rhoda rejects his second proposal after deciding that his 
initial offer had been “not quite serious.” The novel ends after Monica dies in childbirth 
and Rhoda decides to continue working in the school while raising Monica’s child. 
Because The Odd Women uses specialized rhetorical techniques to cultivate 
critical judgments of bourgeois character types—both Rhoda Nunn and Edmund 
Widdowson are serious, dutiful bourgeoisie who place a high value on work—the novel 
is particularly useful to compare alongside the critical judgments of bourgeois culture 
invited by Moretti’s study. We’ve seen that The Bourgeois cultivates critical judgments 
that are demystified and descriptive, on the one hand, but predominantly negative and 
abstracted, on the other. In what follows, I contend that The Odd Women invites a 
different critical orientation to bourgeois culture in its readers—an orientation that 
presses beyond limitations of critique visible in Moretti’s study while also preserving 
some of its strengths.  
There is no way to qualitatively appreciate the many-sided judgments of 





has to perceive moments when the novel’s characters articulate and enact bourgeois 
values with close attention to the rhetorical effect invited by such moments. To the extent 
that readers of The Odd Women join the novel’s authorial audience, feeling along with 
particular characters in accord with the novel’s rhetorical purpose, they are invited to 
experience moments of both alignment and dissonance with aspects of bourgeois culture 
that characters express. My reading of The Odd Women examines scenes in the text 
where the speech and actions of Gissing’s characters bear a significant relationship to 
bourgeois values and practice, inviting either positive or negative judgments in the 
process.  
I begin by examining moments in the novel where the novel’s rhetoric invites 
alignment with bourgeois values: that is, moments designed to promote positive 
judgments of bourgeois characters for their earnest, efficient, and useful behavior. By 
examining the way in which The Odd Women favorably contrasts the behavior of Rhoda 
Nunn with secondary characters who fail to enact the values she expresses, I aim to 
demonstrate two claims. First, I contend that the novel’s rhetoric promotes judgments of 
bourgeois culture that are charitable: insofar as the novel imagines situations where 
bourgeois characters successfully express values alongside characters who fail to do so, 
the novel aims to reveal bourgeois culture at its most appealing. To join the novel’s 
authorial audience in these situations, readers must view bourgeois culture as an 
unfinished project with continuing claims upon their present loyalties rather than a dead 
object of history. In addition to promoting charitable judgments of bourgeois practices, 
this first set of character-contrasts also promotes descriptive judgments of such practices. 





thick description that articulates the values these practices express, I argue that the novel 
cultivates conceptualized judgments corresponding to objectively identifiable actions 
rather than impressionistic evaluations corresponding to an observer’s subjective feelings. 
To make a case that The Odd Women promotes charitable and descriptive orientation to 
bourgeois practices in these ways, I will discuss moments in the novel corresponding to 
judgments that bourgeois characters are earnest, efficient, and useful, respectively. 
IV. Charitable and Descriptive Judgments in The Odd Women 
 
A. Bourgeois culture is earnest 
 
First, the novel’s presentation of Rhoda Nunn’s action and speech invites readers 
to view her as earnest. Rhoda and her work associate Mary Barfoot believe their work 
teaching secretarial skills to women serves a moral purpose, and they expect women in 
their school to pursue their own work with the same devotion. Describing their idealistic 
rather than instrumental approach to work in a speech, Mary comments: “I don't care 
what results, if only women are made strong and self-reliant and nobly independent!” In 
Rhoda’s case, her seriousness about teaching women secretarial skills expresses Mary’s 
conviction that the skills learned in the school cultivate the qualities of strength, self-
reliance, and independence Mary describes. Rhoda pursues her work not merely with 
professional decorum, but with a genuine belief in its value, echoing the prevalent 
Victorian view of work as a vocation rather than mere duty. Rhoda’s earnestness is 
manifested most significantly in the advice she gives to Monica Madden, who is newly 
pregnant and driven to despair after a failed attempt to escape her unhappy marriage. 
After initially refusing to extend polite sympathies to Monica, Rhoda eventually helps 





avoid succumbing to despair and to “think bravely and nobly of [herself],” Rhoda’s 
expression of conviction in the ideals of the women’s school both challenges and inspires 
Monica, inciting her gratitude.  
The Odd Women invites readers to adopt positive judgments of Rhoda’s 
earnestness in large part by making contrasts between Rhoda’s actions and those of 
characters who lack her depth of feeling. Monica Madden’s predicament is precipitated 
when she falls for a charming young musician, Mr. Bevis, who conspicuously lacks the 
earnestness Rhoda displays. Monica’s initial surprise that Bevis can appear “so much at 
ease” in conversation with others if he is truly in love with her is later justified when 
Bevis writes a letter attempting to excuse his refusal to follow through on their plan to 
run away: “with such conception of him his letter corresponded; it was artificial, lifeless, 
as if extracted from some vapid novel.” In contrast to the artifice and vapidity of Bevis’s 
letter, Rhoda’s earnestness appears a welcome contrast, indeed.  
The irresponsible bachelor Everard serves as another foil character whose actions 
promote charitable judgments of Rhoda’s earnestness.70 Everard’s romantic interest in 
Rhoda begins not as a serious pursuit of the heart, but as a matter of personal indulgence, 
based on his sense that “a contest between his will and hers would be an amusement 
decidedly to his taste.” Finding himself increasingly impressed by Rhoda, Everard 
eventually asks her to be his wife under the condition that they forego a legal ceremony. 
Although Everard’s attraction to Rhoda is genuine, the terms of his proposal are 
nevertheless designed as a game to test his power over her: if Rhoda were willing to 
compromise on her anti-marriage stance out of love for him, Everard would then view his 
                                                          
70 For another take on the way Rhoda’s capacity for blunt expression is positively contrasted with 





triumph to be complete. Although Rhoda’s own habitual sincerity initially leads her to 
misunderstand the terms of his proposal,71 Rhoda eventually corrects her error, observing 
to Everard that his feelings toward her lacked the serious quality of her feelings to him: 
“After all, the perfection of our day was half make-believe. You never loved me with 
entire sincerity. And you will never love any woman--even as well as you loved me.”  
Rhoda’s statement emphasizes the contrast the novel draws out between the 
earnestness of the Victorian bourgeois and the irony of the Victorian dandy. Occupied 
with gratifying his own vanity and playing at experiments in love, Everard’s lack of 
earnestness limits the range of his feeling, even to the point, the novel suggests, that he 
could “never love.” Although Everard values Rhoda highly, his limited ability to invest 
seriously and sincerely in causes outside of himself leaves him impoverished in feeling 
by comparison. Everard’s self-consciousness of this fact lends a note of pathos to the 
depiction of his contrast with Rhoda—as Everard eventually acknowledges to himself, 
“Rhoda's love had been worth more than his.” In matters of the heart, an inability to 
achieve bourgeois earnestness may appear to be a sad thing. Readers who join the novel’s 
authorial audience are invited to feel the significance of bourgeois earnestness by 
comparing Rhoda’s behavior favorably with the actions of characters who lack this 
quality. 
B. Bourgeois culture is efficient 
 
Rhoda is not just distinguished from other characters in the novel for her 
earnestness but also for her efficiency. Monica’s sister Virginia observes this quality in 
                                                          
71 “She believed him entirely serious. Another woman might have suspected that he was merely trying 
her courage, either to assure himself of her love or to gratify his vanity. But Rhoda's idealism enabled her to 





Rhoda, noting the gendered expectations that Victorians typically associated with this 
trait: “She is quite like a man in energy and resources. I never imagined that one of our 
sex could resolve and plan and act as she does!” The string of action verbs—“resolve,” 
“plan,” and “act”—emphasize the way in which Rhoda does not just make decisions, but 
does so as rapidly as possible, matching predetermined ends with energetic purpose. 
When Rhoda is later conflicted about her failed relationship with Everard, she continues 
to achieve the efficiency praised by Virginia: “[Rhoda] made a plan of daily occupation, 
which by leaving not a vacant moment from early morning to late at night, should give 
her the sleep of utter weariness. New studies were begun in the hour or two before 
breakfast.”  
Although Rhoda’s strenuous regimen occurs as a partly defensive response to a 
personal crisis, Rhoda’s efficiency here actually appears far preferable in the novel to the 
alternative of postponing crucial decisions when it is time to make them. Much better 
Rhoda’s tireless efficiency than the Madden sisters’ wishful speculations about using 
their capital to open a school that never materialize into action72 or Bevis’s nervous and 
“umanly” attempts to delay making plans when the time has come to run away with 
Monica.73 Even such a “fine specimen of a man” as Everard Barfoot appears to his cousin 
                                                          
72 Rhoda’s view of the Madden sisters is quite unsparing: “And the elder ones will go on just keeping 
themselves alive; you can see that. They'll never start the school that there's so much talk of. That poor, 
helpless, foolish Virginia, alone there in her miserable lodging! How can we hope that any one will take her 
as a companion? And yet they are capitalists; eight hundred pounds between them. Think what capable 
women might do with eight hundred pounds.'” 
73 When the time has come to run away with Monica, Bevis hesitates by saying that “in a few weeks it 
might all be managed very easily.” With narration situated to Monica’s perspective, the novel emphasizes 
Monica’s disillusionment in seeing Bevis’s “shaking voice,” “quivering …nerves,” and “woeful 
perplexity”: “The unmanliness of his tone was so dreadful a disillusion. She had expected something so 
entirely different--swift, virile passion, eagerness even to anticipate her desire of flight, a strength, a 





Mary to be a “poor, ineffectual creature” in comparison with Rhoda and her steely 
resolve. 
C. Bourgeois culture is useful 
 
If Rhoda’s behavior appears earnest and efficient to readers, it also appears useful. 
A pragmatist by nature, Rhoda understands the value of developing marketable skills in a 
capitalist society. Although the Madden sisters are “excellent creatures,” Rhoda is quick 
to place their excellence in context, noting that they are “useful for nothing except what 
they have done all their lives.” By contrast, Rhoda’s diligent work at the school—not 
only typing and instructing others but also practicing “shorthand, book-keeping and 
commercial correspondence”—ensures that she will remain independent and self-reliant 
in her career.  Placing weight on the humble value of usefulness does not merely help 
Rhoda accommodate herself to economic exigencies; it is also a strategy for securing 
psychological well-being. When Monica comes to Rhoda for advice, Rhoda’s words of 
consolation hold this modest bourgeois ideal before her: “My dear girl, you may live to 
be one of the most contented and most useful women in England.” When Rhoda makes 
this connection between usefulness and contentment in her advice to Monica, she is 
drawing from her own experience. By considering the practical effects of her work on 
behalf of disenfranchised women, Rhoda finds “a sense of power and usefulness,” that 
arises from her awareness that she makes a practical difference by being of service to 
those around her.  
As it does with the values of earnestness and efficiency, the novel also invites 
readers to perceive the significance of Rhoda’s useful behavior by contrast with the 





together over what they see as Everard’s waste of considerable talent: “Does he aim at 
nothing whatever?” Rhoda asks. Rather than using his efforts to further causes that lead 
to practical change—such as the emancipation of the working class, which Rhoda and 
Mary take to be the “great sphere for men”—Everard’s goals extend no further than a 
Paterian desire to take in the “the spectacle of existence,” to refine his nature through 
observation of “an infinite series of modes of living.” The contrast with Everard’s 
unproductive anti-bourgeois practice is most apparent during a sequence that describes 
Everard’s narcissistic preoccupation with his own self-refinement. Leaving the company 
of Rhoda and Mary to travel abroad, Everard shifts his romantic attentions to the 
comparatively graceful and placid Agnes Brissenden, whose “perfect simplicity of 
demeanour” provides food for his exploration of alternative modes of life. As Everard’s 
discerning eye reveals Agnes’s unassuming openness to be neither an expression of coy 
flirtation nor romantic submission, he feels his “masculine self-assertiveness” replaced by 
“a genuine humility such as he had never known.” While this exchange appears at first to 
reveal Everard’s desire to sensitively understand various modes of life, the reader’s 
appreciation of Everard’s development in values is disrupted by the unexpected intrusion 
of narratorial distance in his ensuing self-reflection: “As he sat conversing in one of these 
drawing-rooms, he broke off to marvel at himself, to appreciate the perfection of his own 
suavity, the vast advance he had been making in polished humanism.” If Rhoda has an 
ideal of social usefulness before her, devoting herself to a cause greater than herself, the 
surprising intrusion of irony into the end of this passage presents Everard’s aestheticism 
as a kaleidoscopic mirror that reflects back to him little more than variations on his own 





privileges individual reflection over political action, preferring the improvement of one’s 
own “suavity,” over improvement in the social order. No wonder that Everard’s neglect 
of “the social point of view” is criticized by Rhoda and Mary for its “selfish” and “idle” 
implications. 
By depicting characters who do and do not express bourgeois values of 
earnestness, efficiency, and usefulness, The Odd Women promotes charitable judgments 
of bourgeois culture. As we have seen, these judgments of bourgeois practices take shape 
through contrasts in the novel’s character-system that work to clarify the objective 
occasions for each positive judgment: the novel juxtaposes Rhoda Nunn’s concrete 
expressions of earnest conviction with Bevis’s superficial charm and Everard’s ironic 
gamesmanship, Rhoda’s efficient resolve with Bevis’s unmanly hesitations and Everard’s 
willful idleness, and her social usefulness with the Madden sisters’ unmarketable 
refinement and Everard’s self-indulgent humanism. By following along with the positive 
and negative feelings invited by these contrasting modes of behavior, readers are invited 
to cultivate judgments of bourgeois practices that are both charitable and precise, 
matching positive subjective evaluations with specific objective situations that 
correspond to them. 
V. Demystified and Situated Judgments in The Odd Women 
 
After considering ways in which the novel promotes charitable and descriptive 
judgments of bourgeois cultural practices, I now want to consider moments where the 
novel promotes demystified and situated judgments of such practices. I will show that 
The Odd Women demystifies bourgeois practices by inviting readers to adopt negative 





ethos: Rhoda Nunn, whose behavior also displays bourgeois cultural ideals at their best, 
and Edmund Widdowson, the hapless husband of Monica Madden whose behavior 
reveals only the vices of bourgeois culture and none of its virtues. By inviting readers to 
critically evaluate moments where actions of bourgeois characters display traits of 
constraint, rigidity, and bluntness, The Odd Women cultivates demystified judgments of 
bourgeois cultural practices in readers. Such moments do the work of critique by 
measuring such practices against ideals they fail to express and inviting readers to 
perceive such practices outside a halo of sentimental significance. The novel’s work of 
demystification in such moments is also complemented by a second tendency to promote 
situated judgments of bourgeois practices in readers: that is, judgments that measure 
bourgeois practices by comparison with a clearly visible positive alternative. By 
juxtaposing the constrained, rigid, and blunt behavior of bourgeois characters with the 
expressive, curious, and refined behavior of Everard Barfoot, the novel invites readers to 
judge bourgeois practices with reference to a situated alternative to these practices, rather 
than by reference to an “underdeveloped and often incoherent evaluative stance” 
(Anderson 1). 
A. Bourgeois culture is constrained 
 
One weakness of bourgeois practices emphasized by The Odd Women is the 
judgment that such practices are constraining, or that they disable impulsive and 
spontaneous modes of enjoyment and self-expression. The novel calls attention to the 
constraint imposed by Rhoda’s habits of efficiency in its description of the self-imposed 
regimen Rhoda embraces after quarreling with Everard. After Everard refuses to clear up 





satisfaction in a regimen of discipline that banishes all frivolous forms of emotion from 
her life:  
During the next week she threw herself with energy upon her work … 
This was the only way of salvation. Idleness and absence of purpose 
would soon degrade her in a sense she had never dreamt of. She made a 
plan of daily occupation... She even restricted her diet, and ate only just 
enough to support life, rejecting wine and everything that was most 
agreeable to her palate. 
It is not difficult to perceive the negative judgment the novel associates with Rhoda’s 
plan of work as “the only way of salvation.” By leaving “not a vacant moment,” Rhoda’s 
regimented schedule makes no allowance for pleasures including “wine,” or indeed 
“everything that was most agreeable to her palate.” Soon after this passage, Rhoda even 
persuades herself later that the entire concept of sexual love is “an impure idea, a vice of 
blood.” Although the novel’s depiction of Rhoda’s non-traditional views and bright sense 
of humor render her quite far indeed from a caricature of the stern bourgeois worker, 
Rhoda’s interest in efficiency nevertheless unmistakably interferes with her expression of 
the antithetical values of playfulness and amusement. Rather than allowing her emotional 
impulses free reign, Rhoda instead seeks to revive a “stern discipline” to manage 
frivolous impulses that would interfere with her work. The cost of Rhoda’s commitment 
to her work is further suggested by her choice to remain single at the end of the novel. 
Rejecting a chance at a potentially happy marriage to a to a man she once loved, Rhoda 
instead chooses a career over relationship partly out of a sense of duty to model the ideal 





The constrained behavior that results from Rhoda’s commitment to efficiency is 
much more starkly manifested in Edmund Widdowson, the dutiful husband of Monica 
Madden. The narrator notes Widdowson’s inhibited manner soon after he meets Monica 
for the first time, as his “sober” and “respectful” conversation precludes any more playful 
or spontaneous mode of interaction. Although Widdowson’s expressions are innocuous 
enough to Monica upon their first meeting, Widdowson’s habitual constraint takes on a 
more ominous tinge after Monica Madden finds it interfering with her capacity to enjoy 
married life: to Monica, Widdowson appears perpetually unhappy, as if he always has 
“cares on [his] mind,” and is perpetually “struggling to get rid of them.” In a moment of 
candor, Monica tentatively wonders to Widdowson after their marriage if he might 
possibly “take life rather too gravely” and suggests that they “ought to have more 
enjoyment” in their lives. When Widdowson responds by telling Monica that each of 
them should find pleasure enough in their daily occupations and “duties,” Monica argues 
that it is not “right to make dull work for oneself, when one might be living.” 
 The limitations of bourgeois habits of discipline are thrown in conspicuous relief 
by the novel’s juxtaposition of Rhoda and Widdowson’s behavior with a contrasting 
ethos of playful expressiveness enacted by Everard Barfoot. Everard’s rejection of 
bourgeois efficiency in favor of indulgent amusement is self-consciously defended: 
having worked for ten years “as hard as any man,” after his college years, Everard refuses 
to let his future be determined by the constraints of economic necessity. When Rhoda 
asks him what he is going to do with himself, Everard answers that he has “nothing 
whatever in view, beyond enjoying life.” Believing that “to work for ever is to lose half 





bourgeois responsibility for playful diversion: “We have bidden the world go round for 
our amusement; henceforth it is our occupation to observe and discuss and make merry.” 
Everard’s actions and speech are consistent with the goals he articulates. One example 
where Everard’s behavior meets this standard of playful expressiveness is the letter he 
sends to his cousin Mary Barfoot. By employing a delicate balance of playful 
compliments, self-deprecating humor, and personal warmth, Everard challenges the stiff 
moral judgments that have previously impeded his relationship with Mary: 
DEAR COUSIN MARY,--I hear that you are still active in an original 
way, and that civilization is more and more indebted to you. …Our last 
interview was not quite friendly on your side, you will remember, and 
perhaps your failure to write to me means continued displeasure; in that 
case I might be rejected at your door, which I shouldn't like, for I am 
troubled with a foolish sense of personal dignity. I have taken a flat, and 
mean to stay in London for at least half a year. Please let me know 
whether I may see you. Indeed I should like to. Nature meant us for good 
friends, but prejudice came between us. Just a line, either of welcome or 
"get thee behind me!" In spite of your censures, I always was, and still am, 
affectionately yours, 
EVERARD BARFOOT.' 
The distance between Everard’s expressiveness and Rhoda’s regimented efficiency and 
Widdowson’s constrained respectability is apparent from the opening sentence of 
Everard’s letter which offers cheerful credit to Mary for contributing to the “progress of 





Mary and Rhoda tend to employ when describing their work: by describing civilization as 
“indebted” to their work, Everard makes it seem as if civilization is a personal friend who 
had been singing Mary’s praises over cocktails rather than a cause worthy of earnest self-
sacrifice. Further references to matters in the letter that one might expect to be treated 
with gravity are subjected to a similarly light touch: the idea that Everard might be 
offended by having his invitation refused is playfully credited to his “foolish sense of 
personal dignity” and Mary’s moral objections over Everard’s conduct (which we learn 
later involve the alleged seduction of a young woman) are treated as a matter of mere 
“prejudice” interfering with their friendship. Like Everard himself, whose expressions of 
“delicate, good-natured irony” seem “to caress the ear,” the tone of Everard’s letter 
privileges playful banter over weightier matters of moral respectability. This playful tone 
in the letter deflates the significance of other concerns—including matters of social 
progress, norms of hospitality, personal pride, and moral reputation. Insofar as Everard’s 
discourse is designed to please at a personal level, his expressions are free from the 
constraining regulations of respectable bourgeois behavior. Everard’s letter is 
conspicuously purposeless: he is renewing an old acquaintance not out of duty but out of 
the occasion it affords for an impulsive expression of feeling. Everard’s playful attempts 
to lighten up the constrained bourgeois characters throughout the novel are often 
successful: the narrator notes that Everard’s “freedom of expression” causes Rhoda’s 
eyes to twinkle and Miss Barfoot to laugh, and that his “mirthful humour” and “jesting 
trivialities,” provoke “a reception of corresponding tone” in his audience. By depicting 





constrained bourgeois characters do not, the novel invites readers to compare deficiencies 
of bourgeois practices alongside a situated alternative to them. 
B. Bourgeois culture is rigid 
 
If the novel invites judgment of Rhoda and Widdowson’s constraining sense of 
duty, it also invites judgment of their rigid and often conventional adherence to social 
norms.  Rhoda has a tendency to prefer outcomes that are simple, clear, and resolved 
even when this preference comes at the expense of exploring novel sensations, 
perspectives, and feelings. One particularly notable instance of Rhoda’s rigidity occurs in 
her response to Bella Royston, a student from Rhoda’s school who leaves the secretarial 
school for women to get married and eventually tries to return. Because Rhoda views 
Bella as having compromised her principles of female independence through her choice 
of marriage, Rhoda rejects Bella’s penitent request for re-admittance. After Bella 
commits suicide partly in response to Rhoda’s decision, Rhoda is not led to reflect on her 
decision to ban Bella from the school: instead, Rhoda doubles down on her initial view of 
the situation. Expressing a consistency and resolve that Everard finds partly admirable, 
Rhoda refuses to second guess her decision even when the school’s co-founder Mary 
voices impassioned disagreement. In this instance, Rhoda’s expression of consistency 
looks more like “obstinacy” than resolution—a quality which Rhoda later admits to Mary 
is one of her faults. Because Rhoda’s firm resolve leads her to suspect any idea or feeling 
that “sullie[s] the swift, pure stream of her life,” she is reluctant to explore new 
perspectives and feelings. In part because Rhoda tends to stick to what she knows and 
already believes, she grants to Everard later that “it is difficult …to keep pace” with his 





possibilities that a marriage with him would entail, Rhoda also eventually chooses to 
reject him in order to keep her life consistent and regulated. Her parting words to Everard 
express both the strength and weakness of a bourgeois mindset when it comes to novelty 
of thought and sensation: “Don't let us spoil it; things are so straight--and clear--.'” 
Rhoda’s expressions of rigidity pale in comparison to the obtuse intractability of 
Widdowson, her less intelligent and less confident bourgeois counterpart. Like Rhoda’s 
rigidity, the costs of Widdowson’s stubbornness are exacerbated by his position of power 
over a younger women, who in this case is his wife, Monica. Widdowson’s attempt to 
regulate Monica’s behavior is a partly a function of his adherence to outdated patriarchal 
norms and partly a function of his interest in reinforcing what he already believes and 
disinterest in reflecting on those beliefs. As Monica observes early in their relationship, 
“[Widdowson’s] mode of speech did not suggest a very active brain”: as such, 
Widdowson appreciates Monica most when she “listen[s] passively” to his philosophy of 
life, rather than when she actively reflects on it or supplies alternatives to it. 
Widdowson’s uneasy relation to thoughts that move beyond the pale of established 
wisdom is depicted in a brief episode where he honestly considers the difficulties with his 
and Monica’s marriage. As Widdowson questions to himself the strangeness of forcing 
Monica to remain in a marriage which is “physical and nothing more,” where both parties 
are demonstrably unsuited to each other, Gissing’s narrator describes him as engaging in 
“daring speculation” that renders him “more worthy of his wife's companionship than 
ever hitherto.” However, Widdowson quickly becomes uncomfortable as he entertains the 
unsettling idea of legalized divorce over irreconcilable differences: he feels himself led 





morality into wildest confusion,” and thus returns from “his excursion into the realms of 
reason … to the safe sphere of the commonplace.” In direct opposition to Everard’s 
curious and creative reflection that remains open to new perspectives, Widdowson is 
most comfortable in a realm of common-sense wisdom, where reflection is not required.  
The rigid quality of Rhoda’s preference for clarity and Widdowson’s preference 
for convention contrasts sharply with Everard’s flexible curiosity. Since his college days 
at Eton—where Everard’s “force of originality” leads him to become a “furious radical” 
out of distaste for the Eton aristocracy—Everard’s character expresses interest in novelty, 
challenge, and opposition. Rather than sticking to well-trodden paths proven by tradition 
and accessible to common-sense, Everard is stimulated by contact with new ideas and 
perspectives: seeking to think beyond the constraints of “conscience,” “habit,” and “fear 
of public opinion,” Everard suggests to Rhoda that on the subject of marriage “the 
world's opinion has no validity for me.” Everard’s interest in exploring new perspectives 
also expresses itself in the reflective appreciation he displays for women. Whereas the 
traditional Widdowson eventually admits to himself that he does not know what his 
wife’s “thoughts really are, what her intellectual life signifies,” the more curious Everard 
is initially drawn to Rhoda Nunn out of a purely intellectual interest in her mind. When 
Everard first meets Rhoda “he long[s] to see further into her mind, to probe the sincerity 
of the motives she professed, to understand her mechanism, her process of growth.” 
Although there is a degree of aesthetic objectification in Everard’s desire to understand 
Rhoda, the attention he pays to her is sensitive and generous as a result. When Rhoda 
differs from his views, Everard does not treat those differences as threats to be controlled, 





of mind as “a perpetual irritation,” Everard instead feels an urgent desire “to understand 
[Rhoda’s] line of thought.”  
One example of Everard’s curiosity occurs during an argument he has with 
Rhoda: even when Everard willfully refuses to explain to Rhoda the truth behind the 
rumor about his history with another woman, he continues to seek out other ways of 
viewing their conflict by asking his cousin Mary if she thinks that he has behaved 
“badly” in refusing to explain himself and whether Mary thinks that Rhoda “had reason 
on her side” in expecting an explanation. Another example of Everard’s curiosity and 
attentiveness to other perspectives is when he seeks to understand why Rhoda refuses to 
readmit Bella Royston to the school. Instead of being horrified at what many men of the 
time period might have viewed as Rhoda’s chillingly unfeminine response to Bella’s 
plea, Everard is instead intrigued, treating Rhoda’s behavior as a puzzle to investigate 
rather than an abnormality to be corrected. When Rhoda says that she has “not the 
slightest regret,” about Bella’s behavior, Everard’s response is to think her answer 
“magnificent.” Given that most people would easily have hedged about past decisions 
given a negative outcome, Everard recognizes Rhoda’s action as essentially related to the 
resolution and efficiency that distinguishes her character. Everard expresses his 
admiration openly: “How I admire your consistency! We others are poor halting creatures 
in comparison.” Rhoda does not appreciate Everard’s response because she cannot tell if 
he is giving his “sincere” approval, or whether he is “practicing [his] powers of irony.” 
Likely, Everard is doing both: he is using his powers of irony to explore new perspectives 
with curiosity and sensitivity, while genuinely admiring the results of his investigation.  






In addition to inviting negative judgments of Widdowson and Rhoda’s rigid ideas, 
The Odd Women also invites negative judgments of their blunt authenticity. Rhoda seeks 
to remain true to her own impulses and to remain comparatively unaffected by the desires 
and expectations of others, she does little work to maintain an engaging self-presentation 
to others. One conspicuous example of Rhoda’s inattentiveness to rituals of social 
politeness appears when Monica Madden seeks out her advice about an unwanted 
pregnancy. Rhoda, who also has more personal reasons to be upset with Monica at the 
time, initially waits in silence, “offering no help whatever, not even that of a look 
expressing interest.” Even after Monica rushes to assert that the rumors romantically 
linking Monica and Everard are false, Rhoda remains unmoved, reasserting that she has 
not asked for Monica to explain anything. It is only when Monica begins to defend her 
reputation and notes how difficult it is for her to speak that Rhoda’s feelings are touched 
by Monica’s distress “in spite of herself.” Because Rhoda prides her fidelity to her own 
feelings rather than her responsiveness to the feelings of others, the grudging sensitivity 
she eventually displays to Monica in this scene occurs not as a result of, but in opposition 
to her better judgment. As Monica explains her situation, Rhoda feels torn between the 
impulses of sociability and fellow-feeling and the impulse to say only what she really 
feels: “Human feeling prompted the listener to declare that she had no doubts left. Yet 
she could not give utterance to the words. She knew they would sound forced, insincere.” 
Although Rhoda eventually gives Monica counsel, even then Rhoda’s speech is not 
carefully crafted to take Monica’s feelings into account but is expressed with unfiltered 
fidelity to her own inner conviction: Rhoda sees what she says to Monica as an 





hoped to make the ennobling element of her life.” In this interaction, the novel invites 
readers to see that Rhoda’s earnestness comes at the cost of some coldness and aloofness 
in her interactions: rather than seeking to charm or soothe her listeners with artistry and 
attentiveness, Rhoda’s communication is blunt and straightforward.  
The comically stilted interactions of Edmund Widdowson serve as a more clearly 
negative example of bourgeois sincerity gone awry. As Monica insightfully observes, 
Widdowson has very little interest in or awareness of the feelings of others: “That is the 
fault in you which causes all this trouble. You haven't a sociable spirit.” Because 
Widdowson does not have interest in others, his intuitions about other characters are 
often crude and misdirected: he is completely unaware of his wife’s feelings towards 
their friend Bevis, and he mistakenly assumes that she has feelings for Everard Barfoot.74 
Even when Widdowson displays interest in a person, such as the attention he pays to 
Monica before they are married, Widdowson’s bluntly authentic expressions of personal 
feeling take little account of how they might be perceived.75 When Widdowson attempts 
to keep his hat from blowing away, Gissing’s narrator has some fun at his expense, 
noting in an aside that “the ungainliness with which he returned Mrs. Cosgrove's greeting 
could not have been surpassed.” Widdowson’s awkwardness with others does not just 
arise from the challenge (“difficult for any man,” the narrator reminds us) of remaining 
graceful in a high wind, but from his inattentiveness to the requirements of artful and 
charming social intercourse.  
                                                          
74 “[Widdowson’s] jealousy of Barfoot did not glance at Monica's attitude towards the man; merely at 
the man himself, whom he credited with native scoundreldom.” 
75 Consider Widdowson’s disturbingly intense expression of love to Monica: “'I can't live without 
seeing you,' he said at length. 'If you refuse to meet me, I have no choice but to come wandering about the 





The relatively stilted interactions of bourgeois characters who pride themselves on 
authenticity are ironized by contrast with the charming, if somewhat superficial, social 
artistry of Everard Barfoot. Mary Barfoot’s appreciative view of her cousin astutely 
articulates the diplomatic quality of Everard’s interactions with others: “She took refuge 
in the undeniable fact that the quality of his mind made an impression upon her, that his 
talk was sympathetic. Miss Barfoot submitted to this influence; she confessed that her 
cousin's talk had always had a charm for her.” The distinct influence Everard’s 
communication has over his cousin depends upon its ability to respond flexibly to the 
feelings of his audience—to be “sympathetic,” and thus, to provide “a charm” to his 
listeners. Everard’s sympathetic talk is demonstrated during an episode where 
Widdowson finds Everard talking to Monica, who has just lied to her husband about her 
whereabouts: Everard quickly observes the “obvious embarrassment” on Monica’s face, 
and based on this intelligence, begins to “smooth what he saw as an awkward situation” 
by talking lightly about pictures in the gallery. Everard’s attention to others often gives 
him this ability to divine what his audience is feeling and quickly respond in context, 
such as when he takes note of Widdowson’s jealousy,76 Rhoda’s desire to be relieved of 
his company,77 or Rhoda’s pleasure when he forcefully holds her hand.78 It perhaps is 
because Everard calculates what to say in context of this diplomatic awareness that his 
conversation has the appeal it does. Indeed, Monica later credits a previous conversation 
                                                          
76 “Turning at length, he began to talk with Mrs. Widdowson, and, because he was conscious of 
[Widdowson’s] jealous eye, assumed an especial sprightliness, an air of familiar pleasantry, to which the 
lady responded, but with a nervous hesitation.” 
77 “The situation embarrassed both of them. Barfoot suspected a hope on Miss Nunn's part that he 
would relieve her of his company, but, even had there been no external hindrance, he could not have 
relinquished the happy occasion. To use frankness was best. 'Out of the question for me to leave the house,' 
he said, meeting her eyes and smiling. 'You won't be hard upon a starving man?'” 
78 After Rhoda says that she “make[s] no pretence of equalling you in muscular strength, yet you try to 





with Everard—in which he had immediately assumed “an air of familiar pleasantry”—as 
giving her “a new interest in life.” By depicting Everard’s successful expressions of 
sociable refinement alongside Rhoda and Widdowson’s comparatively blunt and stilted 
interactions, the novel again invites its readers to make situated judgments about the 
limitations of bourgeois culture and practice. 
VI. Conclusion 
 
After comparing evaluations of bourgeois practices invited by Moretti’s critical 
study and Gissing’s novel, we are now in a position to assess the kind of judgments each 
text invites. The first characteristic of the mode of critical judgment cultivated by 
Moretti’s study was demystification: a tendency to resist reverence for bourgeois ideals in 
favor of a skeptical view that perceives moments of contradiction and compromise in 
their expression. Rather than idealizing ideals of earnestness, efficiency, and usefulness, 
we observed that Moretti’s study took distance from such ideals to emphasize the 
limitations of these ideals as practically expressed. For instance, Moretti noted that the 
ideal of bourgeois efficiency in Robinson Crusoe functioned to rationalize power 
arbitrarily acquired through exploitation; he also observed that the ideal of “influence” 
and “intercourse” in North and South spread “a virtuous patina over the harsh realities of 
social relations” (123, 124). In each case, Moretti’s readings avoided being swept into 
enthusiasm for bourgeois ideals and instead promoted critical detachment from them.  By 
emphasizing conflict between these value-laden cultural expressions and other unrealized 
ideals—in this case, between efficiency and equitable social arrangements in Robinson 
Crusoe, and between diplomacy and descriptive clarity in North and South—Moretti’s 





Gissing’s The Odd Women, we observed, follows suit in promoting demystified 
views of bourgeois culture and practice. By emphasizing a conflict between bourgeois 
practices and unrealized ideals of playfulness, curiosity, and refinement, the novel 
promotes demystified judgments of its object. Bourgeois culture, the novel suggests, 
promotes constraint: by calling attention to Rhoda Nunn’s habits of “stern discipline,” 
and Edmund Widdowson’s habit of “tak[ing] life rather too gravely” under the weight of 
“cares” and “struggles,” the novel invites readers to view the conflict between such 
practices and an opposing ideal of uninhibited self-expression—what it describes as an 
ethos of “amusement,” “mirthful humour,” and “freedom of expression.” The novel also 
cultivates demystified judgments of bourgeois tendencies to rigidity and bluntness: by 
drawing attention to Rhoda’s “obstinacy” and Widdowson’s lack of “sociable spirit,” the 
novel measures their practices according to unrealized ideals of curiosity and refinement, 
respectively. By analyzing bourgeois practices in light of ideals they fail to express, The 
Odd Women mirrors the work of critique, promoting demystified judgments of its object. 
 In addition to cultivating demystified judgments, Moretti’s study also cultivates 
descriptive judgments. The Bourgeois, we observed, invites appreciation for an ethos of 
professional description that explains the features of bourgeois art and culture in 
conceptualized language rather than impressionistic effusion. Through attention to 
keywords and to prose style, The Bourgeois aims to make a cultural mindset visible to its 
readers rather than to promote judgment of something whose meaning is taken for 
granted. By using specific examples from literature to describe bourgeois habits of 
earnestness, efficiency, usefulness, comfort, and roba (or stuff), Moretti’s study ensures 





example, we observed that Moretti’s discussion of usefulness employed descriptive 
rhetoric to invite judgment of the way Victorian authors like Gaskell, Newman, and 
Bagehot instrumentalize the acquisition of culture. Rather than inviting vague critical 
judgments of these authors for their ‘vulgarity’ or praise for their ‘profundity,’ this 
discussion invited readers to perceive a specific limitation of the mindset these authors 
expressed. In moments like this, The Bourgeois does not simply tell its readers how to 
feel about the objects it describes but instead blends evaluation with description in ways 
that invite readers to perceive cultural expressions from new perspectives. 
The same care for description employed in Moretti’s study is evident in Gissing’s 
novel. Instead of using abstract evaluative language to praise and criticize bourgeois 
practices the novelist esteems and dislikes, the novel instead uses a language of thick 
description designed to cultivate new understandings of objectively identifiable 
behaviors. For example, the novel describes Rhoda’s counsel to Monica as “earnest” and 
adds further definition to this concept by contrasting Rhoda’s advice with the “artificial,” 
“lifeless,” and “vapid” tone of Bevis’s letter to Monica. The novel also describes Rhoda’s 
efficient work in her school by reference to her “courage” and “resolve”—two character 
traits which it explicitly contrasts with the “timid” and “weak” behavior of Virginia 
Madden. Rather than obscuring the reality of bourgeois practices under a shroud of 
sentimental significance, this language of thick description blends evaluation and 
description, inviting readers to perceive the practices it describes in conceptualized 
language. 
While the ethos of critique we’ve observed in Moretti’s study offers terms in 





that The Odd Women also cultivates modes of judgment that contrast with other 
tendencies of critique. In Moretti’s study, we observed a tendency to rely on abstract 
judgments which created the possibility of performative contradiction at the level of 
evaluative stance. I focused on one point of tension between Moretti’s critique of 
impressionistic discourse in Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy and his critique of omniscient 
narration in Austen’s Pride and Prejudice: by indicting Arnold’s text for his failure to 
describe culture in a professional manner and criticizing Austen’s narration for the way it 
disciplines Elizabeth’s subjectivity, Moretti appears to endorse both disciplined 
subjectivity and undisciplined subjectivity at the same time. At the very least, Moretti’s 
reluctance to cite positive examples of professional cultural analysis in his discussion of 
Arnold or of individualistic resistance to power in his discussion of Austen leaves unclear 
what practical ethos or form of life might successfully express the positive ideals that 
underwrite his critique.  
If Moretti’s critical study courts incoherence at the level of evaluative stance 
when indicting expressions of bourgeois culture, Gissing’s novel does a better job 
situating its criticism of bourgeois practices by reference to a coherent alternative. That is 
to say, The Odd Women does not just describe limitations of bourgeois culture with a 
critical vocabulary but also imagines an alternative form of life that would be free from 
its limitations. Although the novel’s depiction of Everard Barfoot is far from uniformly 
positive, we have seen that the novel imagines situations where his actions express ideals 
bourgeois characters fail to live up to. By conducting conversations in a light-hearted 
tone and enjoying an early retirement, Everard concretely enacts an ideal of playful self-





too, by seeking to understand the perspectives of those who disagree with him and by 
expertly playing off of the feelings of others, Everard positively enacts the ideals of 
curiosity and refinement that motivate the novel’s critical judgments of bourgeois rigidity 
and bluntness. By embedding its critical judgments of bourgeois culture in Everard’s 
situated perspective, The Odd Women thus avoids the tendency of critique to rely on 
abstract judgments which lead to “underdeveloped and incoherent evaluative stance[s]” 
and which nurture “mistrust of the routines and practices through which the everyday 
business of the world is conducted” (Anderson 1, Felski 2012). 
Finally, while Moretti’s analysis cultivates predominantly negative judgments of 
bourgeois culture, we have seen that The Odd Women cultivates more charitable modes 
of judgment. Despite Moretti’s own explicit attempts to do justice to bourgeois cultural 
achievements, we observed that his historicist method promoted predominantly skeptical 
judgments of bourgeois commitments to values such as earnestness, efficiency, and 
usefulness. By viewing bourgeois cultural ideals like these as imaginary resolutions to 
real contradictions in society, Moretti’s study invites readers to take distance from the 
bourgeoisie: to indict them for their tendencies to rationalization, instrumentalism, and 
greed and for their blindness to the real nature of the capitalist and imperialist societies in 
which they lived. The only positive value of bourgeois culture celebrated in Moretti’s 
study is prosaic seriousness—an ethos which mirrors the values of description and 
demystification that underwrite the study’s own critical methodology.  
In contrast to the predominantly suspicious attitude toward bourgeois cultural 
practices promoted by Moretti’s methods of critique, we observed that The Odd Women 





actions positively express bourgeois ideals of earnestness, efficiency, and usefulness 
alongside secondary characters who conspicuously fail to express these values, the novel 
invites readers to adopt attitudes of care and concern for bourgeois cultural achievements. 
To fully understand the significance of characters’ actions in the novel, readers must 
learn to evaluate such actions from a bourgeois perspective: appreciating how Rhoda’s 
commitment to earnestness gives her interactions with others a depth of gravity that 
contrasts with Mr. Bevis’s vapidity, how Rhoda’s commitment to usefulness secures her 
independence in contrast to Monica’s subservience, and how a commitment to efficiency 
provides Rhoda with a resolve that contrasts with Virginia’s timidity. Rather than inviting 
readers to view bourgeois practices as dead objects of history, the novel’s use of these 
vivifying character juxtapositions invites readers to view bourgeois culture as an 
“incomplete project,” with ongoing appeal and relevance in the present (Moretti 19). To 
borrow Bruno Latour’s language, The Odd Women’s imaginative depiction of its 
protagonist promotes critical judgments of bourgeois practices that assemble rather than 
debunk, that “offer participants arenas in which to gather” rather than “lift[ing] the rugs 
from under the feet of the naïve believers” (246).  
By cultivating judgments that are descriptive, demystified, situated, and charitable 
in these ways The Odd Women cultivates a specific critical ethos that, in some respects, 
accomplishes the work of critique better than critique itself. Recognizing the 
sophisticated array of value-judgments invited by the character-system of novels like The 
Odd Women makes it possible to see works of Victorian realism as allies, and not just 











Chapter 3: The Ambiguous Ethics of Mansfield Park  
 
I. Introduction  
 
  To what extent did Jane Austen’s systematic depictions of character anticipate the 
liberal aesthetic of Victorian realists? In this chapter, I explore Austen’s contribution to a 
tradition of expressive realism that uses characters to inform the ethical judgments of 
readers. I begin by examining formalist and ethical critics of Austen who have drawn 
attention to the innovative way that Austen’s novels use character-systems to cultivate 
readers’ ethical judgments. By depicting characters who express ethical qualities such as 
‘pride’ and ‘prejudice,’ or ‘sense’ and ‘sensibility,’ critics have followed Wayne Booth, 
Gilbert Ryle, and Alex Woloch in arguing that Austenian novels seek to promote right 
judgment in readers, helping them perceive a golden mean between extremes such as too 
much pride or not enough sense. This chapter builds on the work of such critics by 
applying this Aristotelian ethical framework to the novel that has given critics of Austen 
the most difficulty: Mansfield Park. While formalist and Aristotelian understandings of 
Austen’s character-systems have allowed readers to make important ethical distinctions 
in other novels—between Knightley’s respectful advice and Emma’s intrusive 
interference in Emma or between Elinor’s judicious sense and Marianne’s volatile 
sensibility in Sense and Sensibility, for example—ethical critics have struggled to discern 
comparatively clear standards for judgment in the character-system of Mansfield Park. At 
once viewed as Austen’s most profound and problematic work, Mansfield Park remains 
Austen’s most polarizing novel for critics sharply at odds both over the ethical status of 
the novel’s protagonist and of the work as a whole. Joel Weinsheimer’s description of the 





questions—the character of the novel's heroine—constitutes a crux and has elicited no 
consensus among its readers. Whether Mansfield Park presents Fanny Price as a prig, a 
saint, or merely a young woman of mixed qualities is yet to be determined” (185).  
  This chapter accounts for the critical controversy elicited by Mansfield Park by 
focusing on the role of the novel’s stylish secondary characters, Mary and Henry 
Crawford, who are both rejected as potential love-interests by Fanny Price and her 
eventual husband Edmund Bertram. Despite the novel’s controversial ending, which 
achieves moral closure through vindicating the protagonist’s unequivocal condemnation 
of the Crawfords, I argue that Mansfield Park nevertheless deliberately depicts the 
marginalized Crawfords as possessing virtues that the novel’s heroine does not possess. 
Fanny’s moral denunciation of her romantic rival and rejected suitor thus clash with the 
rhetorical effect of the novel’s character-system: a system which presents the theatrical 
Crawfords not only as discarded foils but as dialectical antagonists to the sincere Fanny 
Price. The novel’s “power to offend,” to borrow Lionel Trilling’s phrase, is 
commensurate with readers’ feelings of unresolved dissonance between the one-sided 
ethical judgments of its protagonist and the many-sided judgments invited by the 
depiction of its stylish villains. By using the Crawfords to foreground positive virtues that 
the novel’s protagonist does not possess, Mansfield Park paves the way for a new kind of 
novel: a novel whose character contrasts function not only to clarify the judgments of one 
conscience through contrasts of degree and situation, but to foreground conflict between 
multiple consciences in agonistic conflict. Resisting the narrow tone of moral 





invites readers to practice the liberal discipline of holding the strengths and weaknesses 
of conflicting ethical modes in their minds.  
II. The Austenian Character-System 
 
 The use of fictional characters to engage and inform the value judgments of 
readers is a narrative practice that has special affinity with the rise of the realist novel in 
England. For instance, one can see Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa as inviting readers to 
discern whether what seems to be virtuous behavior is in fact virtuous—that is, whether 
the judgments made in the novel, either of Clarissa or Lovelace, fit the practices of those 
they describe. Given the importance of sifting through imprecise and inaccurate ethical 
judgments in Clarissa (1748), it’s possible to describe the novel as a drama of evaluation 
that hinges on the reader’s attempt, along with Clarissa, to discern which judgments in 
the novel fit their object: for instance, whether Lovelace’s behavior does indeed display 
“ardor,” “respect,” and “solemn[ity],” as Clarissa’s sister Arabella suggests, or “patience” 
and “gentlemanl[iness],” as the family servants suggest, or “vanity” and “humorous 
vivacity,” as Anna Howe suggests. By depicting situations in which accurate judgment is 
difficult, Clarissa engages its readers in a project of discerning the extent to which 
abstract evaluations fit the concrete behaviors of characters.  
Jane Austen’s fiction preserves Richardson’s interest in linking abstract qualities 
to concrete practice, along with a realistic attention to everyday situations and 
motivations. However, in the Austenian novel, readers are expected to move beyond 
assessing primarily logical puzzles for judgment (questions of veracity or distortion, 
integrity or hypocrisy), to assessing qualitative differences in judgment (questions of 





drama of the realist novel no longer primarily involves sifting through what distorts and 
illuminates the truth about another character, as Clarissa must judge Lovelace’s true 
qualities in light of his reputation, rumors about his past, and her own desires. By 
juxtaposing characters against each other to illumine finer nuances of virtue appropriate 
to particular situations, Austen’s novels also ask readers to practice a different kind of 
judgment: her novels solicits readers’ energies in an ethical process of discriminating 
between degrees of virtue that characters express in practice.  
In The One vs. the Many, Woloch emphasizes Austen’s contribution to the 
narrative technique of drawing comparisons between expressions of value. Woloch sees 
Austen’s novels as exemplary for the way in which her narrators’ habit of evaluative 
assessment of different expressions, suggested by titles like Sense and Sensibility (1811) 
and Pride and Prejudice (1813), create a symbolic architecture that structures readers’ 
attention to the values that characters express. On the basis of comparisons between 
values like these, readers learn to discriminate between the practices of characters who 
are privileged by the novel and practices of those who are marginalized: 
The process of interior character development...is essentially a via 
negativa, a dialectical process of rejecting different extremes (too much 
pride, too much sensibility, etc.) to find a middle ground. This process 
accommodates itself perfectly with an asymmetrical structure of 
characterization, as various minor characters exemplify certain traits or 
ways of thinking that the protagonist must learn to discard. This is the 
pattern in all of Austen’s novels: dialectical progress for the central 





minor characters who facilitate this progress as negative examples. (The 
One vs. the Many, p.55) 
For Woloch, Austen’s ‘‘asymmetrical structure of characterization’’ creates a centrifugal 
movement, directing attention away from peripheral characters’ inferior ‘‘traits or ways 
of thinking’’ and toward the central character’s superior traits. ‘‘Character-system’’ is 
Woloch’s term for the set of oppositions that novels use to privilege a protagonist. The 
Wolochian character-system works by positioning a protagonist’s expressive practice 
within a field of practical alternatives selected to clarify its advantages. For example, the 
superiority of Elizabeth Bennet’s practice in Pride and Prejudice is emphasized through 
comparison with inferior modes of thinking and feeling demonstrated by her sisters. 
(Thus, readers perceive the sophistication of Elizabeth’s ethical judgments by comparison 
with Mary’s rigid moralism; readers see the discretion in Elizabeth’s romantic 
relationships by comparison to Kitty’s frivolous infatuations.) By contrasting with the 
protagonist’s practice in this way, the discarded expressive practices of minor characters 
articulate a ‘‘valorized symbolic register’’ around their protagonists (The One vs. the 
Many, p.47). Generalizing from Woloch’s emphasis on the antagonistic aspects of this 
process, we can say that oppositions within a novel’s character-system solicit readers’ 
interest in a protagonist’s perspective by revealing distinctive strengths, or competitive 
advantages, of a protagonist’s practice. In Chapter 1 I introduced the term “vivification” 
to describe the kind of contrast between practices Woloch identifies in the character-
system of Pride and Prejudice. Novels that use vivifying character contrasts juxtapose 






 It is not difficult to see how the narrative technique of vivification could be placed 
in the service of cultivating ethical judgment. An Aristotelian tradition of literary 
criticism beginning with Gilbert Ryle anticipates what Woloch would later call the 
“character-system” by noting how Jane Austen’s novels embed moral judgments in 
character contrasts. As Ryle puts it, “[Austen] pin-points the exact quality of character in 
which she is interested, and the exact degree of that quality, by matching it against the 
same quality in different degrees, against simulations of that quality, [and] against 
deficiencies of it” (7). In Sense and Sensibility, for example, Ryle notes that “the ecstatic 
emotionality of her Marianne is made to stand out against the sham, the shallow, the 
inarticulate and the controlled feelings of Lucy Steele, Willoughby, Edward and Elinor” 
(7). Since Ryle, critics have seen this mode of discrimination through character 
comparison functioning in an Aristotelian way, to draw attention to a virtuous mean by 
contrast with expressions of excess or deficiency. 
If the character system of Sense and Sensibility explores the question of the right 
degree and manner of feeling, one can see the character system of Emma as exploring the 
right degree of solicitude towards another person: as Joel Weinsheimer puts it, “Emma 
Woodhouse's managerial disposition, for example, is defined by its relation to Mrs. 
Elton's officiousness on the one hand, and on the other, Mr. Knightley's solicitude. By 
establishing a clear base of comparison the novelist is able to make delicate and yet 
thoroughly believable discriminations among her characters” (188). Wayne Booth goes 
Emma’s ethical scheme offers the novel’s implied author to readers as the model of the 
“perfect human being, within the concept of perfection established by the book”—that is, 





subtle and witty as Emma would like to think herself” (265). Granting that the kind of 
perfection exhibited by the novel “is not quite attainable in real life,” Booth nevertheless 
suggests that Emma harmonizes the competing views of its characters into a single view 
of the good life. For Booth and other Aristotelian critics, Austen’s novels convey a view 
of right ethical judgment as a harmony between competing views, or a virtuous mean 
between extremes.  
 Gilbert Ryle argues that all Austen’s novels excepting Northanger Abbey can be 
understood as operating in this Aristotelian mode.79 But Mansfield Park has also proved 
difficult to reconcile with Ryle’s Aristotelian conception of the Austenian character-
system. While the ethical judgments invited by character contrasts in Austen’s other 
novels, have appeared relatively straightforward to ethical critics, the abstract moral 
judgments embedded in Mansfield Park have elicited hesitance and even hostility. While 
critics including Lionel Trilling, William Derecsiwicz, David Lodge, and Joyce Tarpley 
defend the moral judgments associated with the protagonist, others complain about the 
moral judgments associated with Fanny Price. Jenny Davidson summarizes a few such 
objections: “Avrom Fleishman attributes to Fanny the ‘moral aggressiveness’ that is the 
submissive person's only way to express hostility towards those on whom she depends; 
Kingsley Amis describes Fanny as ‘a monster of complacency and pride ... under a cloak 
of cringing self-abasement’; Claudia, L. Johnson identifies Fanny as Mansfield Park's 
‘most obsequious and most disastrously indoctrinated inmate’” (qtd in Davidson 146).  
                                                          
79 Ryle includes Pride and Prejudice, which “really is about pride and about the misjudgements that 
stem from baseless pride, excessive pride, deficient pride, pride in trivial objects, and so on,” Persuasion, 
which concerns itself with “persuadability, unpersuadability and over-persuadability,” and Mansfield Park, 
which concerns itself with “affection which [characters] feel, or do not feel, or which they only pretend to 





If critics have disagreed about the degree to which Fanny’s judgments are 
warranted, they have also disagreed about whether the novel aligns itself with those 
judgments. While critics like Allen Dunn, Andrew Wright, Felicia Bonaparte, and 
Thomas Williams view Fanny’s judgments as a guide to the opinions of the novel’s 
implied author, critics such as William Magee, Marvin Murdrick, and Michiel Heyns 
have contended that the authority of Fanny’s judgments are undermined in many cases by 
the novel’s ironic presentation.80  Massimiliano Morini’s formal analysis of evaluation in 
the novel sheds no light on these difficulties, concluding that linguistic scrutiny of 
evaluative patterns offers little help in discerning who evaluates whom in Austen and the 
degrees of authority accorded to each.81  
These thorny and seemingly irreconcilable critical disagreements about the novel’s 
protagonist could not have persisted for more than two hundred years of Austen criticism 
unless the opinions of each camp had firm foundation in the novel. This chapter accounts 
for the polarized responses of ethical critics by arguing that Mansfield Park differs from 
other Austenian novels in its use of a character-system that invites conflicting judgments 
in readers. I make this case by focusing on the novel’s use of two rhetorical tasks of 
character-juxtaposition that invite readers to adopt both favorable and unfavorable 
judgments of the protagonist, respectively. I call these tasks vivification and ironization: 
                                                          
80 For instance, although Allen Dunn acknowledges that “there is an implicit tension between 
[Fanny’s] role as caretaker and her role as impartial judge of character,” Dunn views Fanny’s ability “to 
judge herself objectively” as giving her “the right of judging Mary” (497, 496). Thomas Williams argues 
similarly that “Fanny Price is the one character whose judgment never leads her astray,” since “she sees all 
the folly of Maria's engagement, the intrigues of the rehearsals of Lover's Vows, and the vices of the 
Crawfords with a discernment that no one around her approaches” (226). In direct contrast, Michiel Heyns 
suggests that “Jane Austen shares at least some of our reservations about Fanny Price” and argues that 
“much of what we may be tempted to see as a 'straight' presentation of Fanny Price is in fact tempered by 
an amused mimicking of the prim speech of a morally immature girl” (4).  





vivification describes a novel’s depiction of a protagonist who expresses virtues that a 
secondary character does not, whereas ironization describes a secondary character who 
expresses virtues that a protagonist does not. In what follows, I analyze these two 
rhetorical operations in turn as they apply to the depiction of Fanny Price and Mary and 
Henry Crawford in Mansfield Park. I begin by considering evidence for vivification in 
the novel: in this case, moments in which Mansfield Park invites rhetorical alignment 
with its protagonist, Fanny Price, by calling attention to the way she successfully enacts 
values of feeling, discipline, sincerity, and modesty. 
III. Vivification in Mansfield Park 
 
In Mansfield Park, one of the foremost qualities that distinguishes Fanny Price’s 
character to the implied reader of the novel is her discipline, or what Fanny’s principled 
and upright cousin, Edmund Bertram, perceives as her “strong desire of doing right.” 
Lionel Trilling and others have viewed the title character of Mansfield Park as Jane 
Austen’s attempt to explicitly thematize the importance of principled religious conduct to 
her young niece—a view further reinforced by Austen’s statement to her sister that 
Mansfield Park addresses the topic of “ordination.”82 Even the cavalier Henry Crawford 
astutely recognizes the quality of principled discipline in Fanny: “When he talked of her 
having such a steadiness and regularity of conduct, such a high notion of honour, and such 
an observance of decorum as might warrant any man in the fullest dependence on her faith 
and integrity, he expressed what was inspired by the knowledge of her being well 
principled and religious.”83 “Steadiness,” “regularity,” “decorum,” “integrity”— such 
                                                          
82 lane Austen's Letters to Her Sister Cassandra and Others, ed. R. W. Chapman, 2nd ed. (London: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1952), p. 298, qtd in Weinsheimer 190.  





diction thematizes the scrupulous and conscientious mindset of a person determined to do 
the right thing even when it is difficult or unpleasant or when no one else may be watching 
to approve. Edmund’s description of the clergy also articulates the kind of principled 
integrity that Henry recognizes in Fanny. Rather than being merely “the arbiters of good-
breeding,” or “the regulators of refinement and courtesy,” a clergyman must regulate his 
conduct in accord with good principles: he must prove himself through “constant 
attention” to the practice of daily life among his parishioners. It is Fanny even more so 
than Edmund whose scrupulous and conscientious mindset displays steady determination 
to do the right thing apart from any promise of praise or reward. When Fanny makes the 
unpopular choice not to participate in the play “Lover’s Vows” while Sir Thomas is away, 
she does so out of a principled sense of duty. Even though Fanny does briefly agree to fill 
in as a substitute, Edmund praises her for being the only one of the party “who has judged 
rightly throughout; who has been consistent” in her condemnation. Austen presents 
Fanny’s choice as regulated not by a sense of what will meet with the approval of Fanny’s 
peers (they all entreat her to join), or what will give her most pleasure (she personally 
enjoys the idea of viewing a performance), but by a sense of what is proper for a group of 
unmarried young people to do and a sense of obligation to her uncle.84 Fanny’s resistance 
to acting is, simultaneously, an embrace of strictures arguably necessary to moral and 
social life: rather than using the play as a thinly-veiled excuse to exercise immodest and 
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unregulated desires, Fanny remains steadily entrenched in her habit of responsible 
discipline.85 
 The novel presents Fanny’s conscientious, disciplined response to the theater as a 
striking contrast with the undisciplined behaviors of other characters who lack her almost 
religious fear of wrongdoing. Foils with much the same function as Kitty and Lydia 
Bennet from Pride and Prejudice, Fanny’s cousins Maria and Julia Bertram both 
succumb to unregulated desires and eventually elope in disgrace. Fanny’s uncle, Sir 
Thomas, reflects on Maria and Julia’s upbringing in a way that emphasizes their lack of 
discipline: “He feared that principle, active principle, had been wanting; that they had 
never been properly taught to govern their inclinations and tempers by that sense of duty 
which can alone suffice. They had been instructed theoretically in their religion, but 
never required to bring it into daily practice.” “Active principle,” or principle not merely 
praised and rehearsed but practiced and believed, sharply distinguishes Fanny’s behavior 
from Maria and Julia’s. This same deficiency in principled integrity is more interestingly 
present in Mary and Henry Crawford, whose parents failed to model a sense of principle 
in their feelings toward their children, each showing unabashed favoritism for a different 
child.86 Raised by his parents to live in harmony with his own inclination rather than with 
a sense of duty, Henry Crawford lacks Fanny’s embrace of discipline. Before Henry and 
Maria’s affair, Edmund observes this contrast between Henry and Fanny: “Crawford's 
feelings, I am ready to acknowledge, have hitherto been too much his guides. …You will 
                                                          
85 For a helpful take on the way the theatricals function as a means for the characters “to express their 
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86 “Admiral and Mrs. Crawford, though agreeing in nothing else, were united in affection for these 
children, or, at least, were no farther adverse in their feelings than that each had their favourite, to whom 





supply the rest; and a most fortunate man he is to attach himself to such a creature—to a 
woman who, firm as a rock in her own principles, has a gentleness of character so well 
adapted to recommend them” (emphasis added).  
Austen’s narrator again explicitly foregrounds the weakness of Henry’s habit of 
guidance by feeling in an aside about his decision to postpone a trip to administer his 
estate in Norfolk for a party at Mrs. Fraser’s: “The temptation of immediate pleasure was 
too strong for a mind unused to make any sacrifice to right: he resolved to defer his 
Norfolk journey, resolved that writing should answer the purpose of it, or that its purpose 
was unimportant, and staid.” Although postponing a business trip may be a matter of 
practical responsibility more so than a matter of what is morally “right,” Henry’s inability 
to regulate behavior out of a sense of duty appears deficient in contrast to more 
disciplined characters like Fanny or Sir Thomas. When Fanny refuses Henry’s proposal, 
she does so out of her low view of Henry’s old habit of guidance by impulse at the 
expense of duty. Seeking novelty, pleasure, and excitement above duty, discipline, and 
propriety, Henry although possessing “sense and temper which ought to have made him 
judge and feel better,” nevertheless “allow[s] himself great latitude” especially in his 
careless and eventually harmful flirtations with Julia and Maria. 
In addition to foregrounding a contrast between dutiful responsibility and 
unregulated desire, Fanny is also the site at which the novel contrasts single-minded 
sincerity with self-divided flippancy.87  Fanny displays a Romantic unity of practice with 
feeling—she speaks and acts on the basis of what she genuinely feels rather than what 
she expects will appear pleasing to others. For instance, Fanny’s gratitude for Edmund’s 
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kind hospitality when she first arrives at Mansfield is communicated through “a few 
artless words”; although she would like to please Edmund, her candid communication 
does not perform with regard to its calculated effect on her audience. Recognizing this 
quality in Fanny, Edmund later describes Fanny as possessing a “heart which knew no 
guile.” Fanny’s unaffected, heartfelt expressions contrast directly with Mary Crawford’s 
canny diplomacy. As they both receive a tour of the Rushworth mansion, the distinction 
between Fanny’s earnest sincerity and Mary’s masked detachment is apparent: “There 
was no comparison in the willingness of their attention; for Miss Crawford, who had seen 
scores of great houses, and cared for none of them, had only the appearance of civilly 
listening, while Fanny, to whom everything was almost as interesting as it was new, 
attended with unaffected earnestness to all that Mrs. Rushworth could relate of the family 
in former times.” The differences between Fanny’s sincere interest and Miss Crawford’s 
detached performance of interest become ethically significant when applied to other 
situations. Mary’s surface level engagement with feelings not only leads to her 
detachment from boring conversations in polite society but her detachment from virtuous 
principles. The latitude and laxity that Henry, Maria, and Julia display in practice, Mary 
displays in judgment, as Mary sees no appeal in the profession of clergyman, has no 
admiration for those who are honest but poor, and who confesses her happiness at the 
prospect of Tom Bertram’s death (which would supply the man she loves with an 
inheritance). While Mary is responsive to what others feel, the novel does not present her 
as speaking and judging based on the depth of her own conviction about particular issues; 
instead, she appears strangely depthless in matters of value judgment. Like her brother, 





seriousness on serious subjects.” Although Mary’s worldly, even “amoral” conscience 
does not lead her to commit vice herself, it does lead her to take vice lightly (Bonaparte 
58). The fatal judgment that divides Mary from Edmund occurs when he hears her 
canvass Maria’s adulterous affair with Henry as merely an imprudent act of “folly” that 
would be alleviated if hushed up rather than as an act with moral valence reflecting 
negatively on the character of those involved.88 
In direct contrast to Mary’s undiscriminating performances of feeling, Fanny’s 
convictions are presented as more measured and careful; she is earnest about the 
profession of the clergy and views Tom’s illness with the gravity it deserves. Fanny’s 
ability to discriminate between the weight of competing claims is perhaps most apparent 
in the thought she supplies about whether to wear the necklace Mary lends her to a ball: 
Fanny only does so after acknowledging that Mary has a claim to her affections and that 
acknowledging it does not “interfere with the stronger claims” of William and Edmund 
on her heart. Fanny’s level of fine-grained attention to matters of feeling—her 
discriminating judgment based on a hierarchy of competing convictions—appears 
exemplary by contrast with Mary’s more cavalier and indiscriminate relation to matters 
of the heart and soul. 
In addition to prioritizing earnest discrimination at the expense of glib 
equivocation, character contrasts also emphasize Fanny’s grateful modesty at the expense 
of other characters’ entitled vanity. Fanny does not possess an ego easily wounded by 
others; rather than expecting to be treated according to a particular standard, Fanny 
modestly appreciates any kindness shown to her. When the Bertrams decide briefly that 
                                                          





Fanny should leave Mansfield to live with the unpleasant Mrs. Norris, Fanny accepts the 
decision, taking care not to show ingratitude despite her disappointment.89 Fanny’s 
accepting nature is not just reflected in her responses to her adult benefactors, but to their 
children. When the young Fanny suffers mistreatment from the careless Maria and Julia, 
“she [thinks] too lowly of her own claims to feel injured by it”; when it appears that Tom 
is about to ask her to dance but then does not, she feels unreasonable to have expected 
such a “great honor”; when Edmund asks to borrow her mare to ride with Mary Crawford 
she “far from feeling slighted, [is] almost over-powered with gratitude that he should be 
asking her leave for it.” Fanny’s expectations for how others treat her are low: she does 
not demand to be treated a particular way, and is thus content with neglect and grateful 
for any kindness that is bestowed upon her. Even Fanny’s relatively intimate relationship 
with Edmund does not make her feel entitled to make assumptions about his regard: her 
treatment of him is not just “tender” and “confiding,” but also “respectful” and 
“grateful.” Like Fanny, Edmund is also a positive exemplar in his unassuming 
expectations for others: he is not offended when Mary speaks ill of the profession of the 
clergy, and his vanity is not sufficient to make him assume that Mary loves him. 
Because Maria and Julia grow up accustomed to the flattery of their aunt Mrs. 
Norris, whose continual praises “strengthen them in believing they had no faults,” they 
grow up lacking the “self-knowledge, generosity, and humility” of their cousin and 
brother. As Sir Thomas later reflects, too great a degree of “self-consequence” can have 
harmful effects on one’s character. Julia’s sense of entitlement is displayed primarily in 
the resentment she bears towards her sister for stealing the attentions of Henry Crawford, 
                                                          
89 Fanny takes care not to show ingratitude to her aunt despite displeasure at the idea of leaving 





which she feels counts as conduct “shameful towards herself.”90 Maria’s vanity is more 
pronounced. It is her pride that initially attracts her to Rushworth, a man she does not 
love: as Maria tours Rushworth’s property, she is elated by the idea that “Mr. 
Rushworth's consequence was hers,” taking care to point out every detail of his property 
to Mary Crawford. Maria’s pride both instigates and precipitates her marriage since she 
not only seeks to possess the Sotherton estate but also to expedite the marriage after 
Henry’s departure injures her pride.  
Maria’s thirst for consequence is shared not only by Mary Crawford, whose taste 
for “distinction” is so powerful that she has little regard for honest clergymen who aren’t 
wealthy,91 but also--especially--by Henry Crawford, whose need to be appreciated by 
others fuels his romantic pursuits. Henry’s interest in Fanny does not begin with any 
depth of feeling on his side, but as an idle flirtation spurred on by the challenge of 
overcoming Fanny’s indifference. Here, the implications are relatively harmless: the 
coldness of Henry’s initial decision is mitigated by the fact that he eventually comes to 
love her, even if the intensity of his love is partly due to his sense of “glory” at the 
prospect of victory and in a questionable belief that her affection is “of greater 
consequence because it was withheld.” Henry’s inability to tolerate any indifference to 
his charms, while innocuous in his relationship with Fanny, has more serious 
consequences in his flirtation with Maria. Henry makes the imprudent decision to visit 
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herself as well as towards Mr. Rushworth. … Julia could never see Maria distinguished by Henry Crawford 
without trusting that it would create jealousy, and bring a public disturbance at last.” 
91 Edmund tells Mary that he is anxious for her to not look down upon “honesty …in the middle state 
of worldly circumstances,” and Mary replies: "But I do look down upon it, if it might have been higher. I 





Maria after her marriage to Rushworth because his invitation to the Grant’s party is made 
to be “of flattering consequence.” After vanity places him in the dangerous situation, it is 
further rankled by the cold reception he receives from Maria: “He could not bear to be 
thrown off by the woman whose smiles had been so wholly at his command: he must 
exert himself to subdue so proud a display of resentment …and make Mrs. Rushworth 
Maria Bertram again in her treatment of himself.” Rather than modestly accepting 
Maria’s lower view of him, Henry cannot resist soliciting the flattering attentions he had 
previously enjoyed. Especially after being met with sustained indifference from Fanny 
despite his best efforts, winning over Maria satiates Henry’s craving for the attention of 
others. By contrast, the more modest Fanny, far from acting rashly as a result of injured 
pride, hardly even feels resentment towards the object of her true affection when he loves 
another woman.92 Like Julia, Maria, and his sister Mary, Henry’s vanity motivates him to 
have excessive concern for the opinions of others in comparison to the more grounded 
Fanny and Edmund. 
In addition to foregrounding Fanny’s modest gratitude at the expense of other 
characters’ entitled vanity, character contrasts also highlight Fanny’s superior depth of 
feeling at the expense of other characters' lighter and more indiscriminate attachments.93  
Fanny is described as possessing “an affectionate heart,” by Edmund and as displaying 
“tenderness of disposition” by Austen’s narrator. After Henry Crawford falls in love with 
                                                          
92 Even when Edmund borrows Fanny’s mare so that Mary can ride it, forgetting that Fanny needs it, 
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resentment to Edmund, she does not act on it, instead displacing her feelings onto the innocent Henry 
Crawford. (See Heyns 6-8). 
93 Ryle: “Their capacities or incapacities to make good husbands or wives are a direct function of their 
lovingness or unlovingness inside their own families. Fanny's devotedness to her brother William, her 
cousins, aunt and uncle gets its reward in happy marriage; while her coldheartedness at home results in 





her, he realizes that Fanny’s initial reserve masks a deep underlying affection for those 
she loves: “He was no longer in doubt of the capabilities of her heart. She had feeling, 
genuine feeling. It would be something to be loved by such a girl.” Fanny’s “genuine 
feeling” for others is not just acknowledged verbally by characters but displayed in 
practice, nowhere more vividly than early in the novel when she sits with Mr. Rushworth, 
the hapless suitor of her cousin Maria Bertram. The group of young people are on a walk 
at the Rushworth property when they come to a locked gate. After Rushworth leaves to 
retrieve the key, Fanny observes Henry persuading Maria to pass around the gate, 
effectively abandoning Rushworth. Jealous of Henry’s attentions to Maria and dejected at 
the prospect of being abandoned by the others, Rushworth voices his feelings to Fanny 
when he returns. Feeling that Rushworth “had been very ill-used,” Fanny emphasizes 
how unlucky Rushworth’s situation is, observes how obliging he was to retrieve the key 
in the first place, and encourages him to rejoin the party since his opinion on the view of 
the house will be wanted. After the fact, Henry accords the small heroism of Fanny’s 
generous response to Rushworth the recognition it deserves: “You were Mr. Rushworth's 
best friend. Your kindness and patience can never be forgotten.”  
Along with Edmund’s kindnesses to Fanny after she first arrives at Mansfield 
Park, the value of Fanny’s tenderness to Rushworth is especially emphasized when 
juxtaposed against the actions of those less responsive to others. For instance, Henry 
Crawford and Maria Bertram both display carelessly selfish behavior when they abandon 
Rushworth during the walk and also later when they flirt in front of him during the 
theatricals. The absence of Fanny’s generous sensitivity is also emphasized by contrast 





economy respectively display a nearly comical disregard for Fanny’s feelings. Whether 
Fanny is instructed to gather roses until she becomes sick for Lady Bertram’s 
convenience or to learn to do without frivolous luxuries like a fire at Mrs. Norris’s 
command, the importance of feeling for others is made conspicuous in the novel by its 
absence. Even Sir Thomas’s insistence that Fanny reconsider Henry Crawford’s proposal 
reveals a moment where his initial concern for Fanny’s financial future veers into “cold 
sternness.” Here, Fanny’s regret that “she had no one to take her part, to counsel, or speak 
for her,” emphasizes the standard by which Sir Thomas’s practice falls short.  
It is not just Fanny’s ability to sympathize with those slighted by others, but even 
more her depth of feeling for those she cares about that distinguishes her character. Fanny 
displays an affection for the inhabitants of Mansfield Park that they don’t wholly 
deserve94.  Although as a child she regrets her relief when Sir Thomas first leaves the 
house, she cherishes every member of the house when she is later away for three months 
in Portsmouth: “Her eagerness, her impatience, her longings to be with them, were such 
as to bring a line or two of Cowper's Tirocinium for ever before her. ‘With what intense 
desire she wants her home,’ was continually on her tongue.” Excepting Mrs. Norris, the 
inhabitants of Mansfield are dear to her: not only Edmund, but even her insensible aunt, 
brusque uncle, and frivolous cousins entwine themselves around her heart. Like the 
evergreen tree she admires at the Grants’, Fanny remains constantly attached to the soil in 
which she has grown.  
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to its gaiety, they could not but be missed. Even their mother missed them; and how much more their 
tenderhearted cousin, who wandered about the house, and thought of them, and felt for them, with a degree 





By contrast, Mary and Henry Crawford display a lighter touch when it comes to 
matters of the heart, shedding associations that become boring or inconvenient like so 
many leaves. Edmund’s reflection on whether Mary is really beginning to love him 
conceptualizes the danger presented by Mary’s lighter orientation to matters of the heart; 
he speculates that “the whirl of a ballroom, perhaps, was not particularly favourable to 
the excitement or expression of serious feelings.”95 Unlike Fanny, who feels things too 
strongly and earnestly to modulate them with ease, Mary has the ability to detach herself 
more readily from what she feels—a quality that, while exciting interest and enhancing 
desire, does not recommend itself to a person seeking emotional security from a potential 
spouse. Concern about the capacity for deep feeling not only characterize Edmund’s 
speculations about Mary before the dance, but Fanny’s judgments of Henry at a party. 
After a bitterly disappointed Maria has married Rushworth, Henry Crawford returns to 
Mansfield Park apparently insensible to remembrances of his past romance. Upon 
observing Henry, Fanny observes the difference in their level of feeling for those not 
present: 
Her two absent cousins, especially Maria, were much in her thoughts on 
seeing him; but no embarrassing remembrance affected his spirits. Here he 
was again on the same ground where all had passed before, and apparently 
as willing to stay and be happy without the Miss Bertrams, as if he had 
never known Mansfield in any other state. She heard them spoken of by 
him only in a general way, till they were all re-assembled in the drawing-
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room, when Edmund … began talking of them with more particularity to 
his other sister. With a significant smile, which made Fanny quite hate 
him, he said, "So! Rushworth and his fair bride are at Brighton, I 
understand; happy man!" 
Fanny is led to hate Henry after this exchange not just because he appears insensible to the 
ties of the past, passing his time “as if he had never known Mansfield in any other state” 
and was unaffected by any “embarrassing remembrance.” In addition to Henry’s 
forgetfulness, it is the impersonality of his feelings that jars Fanny: Henry comments on 
the happiness of Maria and Mr. Rushworth as if it were a morsel of gossip rather than an 
event in which he shares a personal history.  The ironic detachment of his knowing, 
“significant smile,” is what provokes Fanny’s ire. Even Henry’s brief moment of serious 
reflection later that Maria “is much too good” for Rushworth masks any personal 
sentiment that may remain for her under a cloak of impersonal judgment. In his initial 
flirtation and eventual affair with Maria, Henry’s display of superficial feeling is 
consistent: as Lionel Trilling astutely puts it, Henry “becomes …the prey to his own 
charm, and in his cold flirtation with Maria Bertram he is trapped by his impersonation of 
passion.”  
IV. Ironization in Mansfield Park 
 
Through a careful system of character juxtapositions, the novel thus invites its 
implied reader to make favorable value judgments of its heroine. To fully understand the 
significance of the action in the novel, the ideal reader of Austen’s novel must perceive 
the ethical contrast between Fanny’s behavior and that of other characters: appreciating 





sincerity rather than self-divided flippancy, grateful modesty rather than entitled vanity, 
and steadfast loyalty rather than wavering selfishness. To the degree that the novel asks 
its implied readers to judge its protagonist in a positive light, Mansfield Park closely 
follows the model of earlier novels, like Sense and Sensibility, and Pride and Prejudice.  
The novel also differs from such works, however, by the degree to which it uses 
its character-system to place the actions of its protagonist in an unflattering light. While 
other critics of the novel precede me in identifying ways in which Mansfield Park 
ironizes its protagonist, I am not aware of any discussion of irony in the novel that 
attributes negative judgments of the protagonist to the effect of the novel’s character-
system.96 I turn now to an examination of how Mansfield Park invites negative judgments 
of Fanny Price’s comparatively sedentary, anxious, simple, and reserved behavior by 
contrast with the vivacity, confidence, theatricality, and openness, exhibited by Henry 
and Mary Crawford.  
 Perhaps the foremost quality that distinguishes the Crawfords from other 
characters in the novel is their energy: Mrs. Grant notes upon meeting them that “the 
manners of both were lively and pleasant,” and Maria Bertram accurately observes 
                                                          
96 Critics such as Lionel Trilling and Joel Weinsheimer precede me in intuitively associating the 
character-system of Mansfield Park with a mode of many-sided judgment. As Trilling puts it: “Of Mary 
Crawford, whose charm almost equals her brother's, we are led to expect that her vivaciousness and 
audacity will constitute the beneficent counter/principle to the stodginess which, as the novel freely grants, 
is one of the attributes of Mansfield Park” (Sincerity and Authenticity 78). However, because Trilling and 
Weinsheimer read the novel as asking its readers to dismiss rather than appreciate the Crawfords’ 
antithetical expressions of value, their accounts of the novel give short shrift to the narrative techniques the 
novel uses to elicit the kind of many-sided judgments they make. 
Explicit discussions of irony in Mansfield Park have also shed little light on the many-sided judgments 
built into the novel’s character system. While Michiel Heyns makes an especially persuasive case that the 
novel’s attention to Fanny’s jealousy and immature moral vocabulary mitigates the privilege the novel 
accords to her perspective, Heyns tends to locate the ironic undermining of Fanny’s perspective in the 
novel’s revelation of unconscious biases and inconsistencies in her judgments. This focus tends to neglect 
the effect of irony that results from the novel’s deliberate juxtaposition of Fanny’s weaknesses with the 





Mary’s “energy of character.” Liveliness and energy characterize the action and speech 
of the Crawford siblings throughout the novel, most notably with respect to their 
performance in the theatrical production of Lover’s Vows. As Henry later reflects: “I shall 
always look back on our theatricals with exquisite pleasure. There was such an interest, 
such an animation, such a spirit diffused. Everybody felt it. We were all alive. There was 
employment, hope, solicitude, bustle, for every hour of the day.” The articulate terms of 
evaluation placed in Henry’s mouth (“interest,” “animation,” “spirit,” “employment,” 
“hope,” “bustle”) suggest that the lively energy he and his sister display is not just a 
reflex of their animal spirits, but also a practice whose value Austen wants to foreground 
to readers. Dialogue given to both Henry and Mary, (who also looks back on the 
theatricals as a time of “exquisite happiness”), eloquently praises energetic activity: 
valuing “animation” above passivity, “spirit” above lifelessness,” “employment” above 
idleness, “interest” over fastidiousness. Whether they are riding horses or playing cards, 
their actions are characterized by spirited investment in the activity in question. Although 
Fanny judges Mary’s “lively and affectionate” style of writing to be “an evil,” Edmund’s 
more fine-grained affirmation of the liveliness displayed by the Grants and Crawfords 
communicates the more pluralistic and precise standard of judgment exhibited by the 
novel’s implied author. As Edmund justly reflects after the theatricals: “We [at Mansfield 
Park] are sometimes a little in want of animation among ourselves. … I have been feeling 
as if we had never lived so before.” Although Edmund’s stated regret is that the Grants 
are no longer there to “enliven” Mansfield Park, the actual enlivening force has been the 
presence of the Crawford siblings, who interact much more frequently with the residents 





depict the Grants interacting with the residents of Mansfield Park, during a card game, it 
is not they who enliven the group: it is rather the Crawfords’ table whose animating 
influence turns out to make “a very comfortable contrast to the steady sobriety and 
orderly silence of the other.”97  
 The contrast between the Crawfords’ liveliness and Fanny’s stillness is explicitly 
foregrounded by telling juxtapositions that reveal the rhetorical design of the novel’s 
creator.98 Fanny finds that “to sit in the shade on a fine day, and look upon verdure, is the 
most perfect refreshment”; by contrast, Mary’s energy is so abundant that she actually 
feels drained by stillness, responding to Fanny, “’I must move …Resting fatigues me.’” 
Fanny’s instinctive contentment with a low threshold of stimulation and her resistance to 
activity and noise faces pressure from the competing standard exhibited by the Crawfords 
during the performance of the play. When Mrs. Grant cannot attend the play’s final 
rehearsal, the energy, bustle, and animation that Henry, Mary, and Edmund identify with 
the theatricals is threatened: “They could not act, they could not rehearse with any 
satisfaction without her. The comfort of the whole evening was destroyed.” In order that 
the evening’s animating activity not to come to a grinding halt, every member of the 
party entreats Fanny to read Mrs. Grant’s part. Were Fanny an aspiring actress, or 
anticipating a chance to attract Edmund’s attentions with a breakthrough role, there’s no 
question that her principled resistance against the pressure exerted by the entire group 
would appear to readers as heroic. As is, though, Fanny’s instincts are mixed: she finds 
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the prospect of the play entertaining but also distressing and wonders to herself: “Why 
had not she rather gone to her own room, as she had felt to be safest, instead of attending 
the rehearsal at all? She had known it would irritate and distress her; she had known it her 
duty to keep away.” Whether Fanny’s sense of “duty” is the driving force or an 
afterthought isn’t precisely clear from this description, since the same activity that 
enlivens everyone else only “irritate[s]” and “distress[es]” her. Whether Fanny’s irritation 
bespeaks the pangs of a disciplined conscience or merely the same dislike of 
overstimulation and “noise” she experiences in Portsmouth is left indeterminate by the 
passage.  After Fanny does finally agrees to participate, she perhaps risks complicity with 
what turns out to function as a “proximate occasion of sin” (Lodge); however, she also 
avoids being the one who ruins the party. Were Fanny’s mixture of preference for 
stillness and dutifulness so strong that everyone else’s happiness in the evening’s activity 
were of no consequence to her, she might well be a saint, but she would certainly not 
appear perfect as a friend. 
 In addition to displaying greater animation than the residents of Mansfield Park, 
the Crawfords also display a greater penchant for performance, playing their parts in the 
drama of social life with exceptional poise and grace.99 During the rehearsals for the 
theatricals, even Fanny admits that Henry “was considerably the best actor of all.”100 
Henry’s interest acting arises from his appreciation of novelty. He relishes the 
opportunity to try out new characters, demonstrating his protean ability to adapt precisely 
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to the tone and feeling required in a given situation:101 “whether it were dignity, or pride, 
or tenderness, or remorse, or whatever were to be expressed, he could do it with equal 
beauty. It was truly dramatic.” Where the expression of Henry’s talent for acting most 
matters in the novel, though, is not in the theater, but in its application to social life. 
Henry’s pursuit of Fanny is aided by “all that gallantry and wit” can supply; his quick 
cleverness leads him to the precise manners that most recommend themselves to others. 
Henry displays this flexibility of manner particularly when he goes to Portsmouth to visit 
Fanny, who is accompanied by her younger sister, Susan. Although Henry is initially 
disappointed at the necessity of sharing Fanny’s attention with Susan, he readily adapts to 
the requirements of the setting: “Such a man could come from no place, no society, 
without importing something to amuse; his journeys and his acquaintance were all of use, 
and Susan was entertained in a way quite new to her.” Henry’s ability to find the precise 
tone and manner to keep his company entertained also demonstrates itself when he 
teaches Fanny to play cards “in high spirits, doing everything with happy ease, and 
preeminent in all the lively turns, quick resources, and playful impudence that could do 
honour to the game.” This knack for gamesmanship and play is shared by Mary, whose 
“wit” and “clever[ness]” both when performing on the harp and in social interactions, 
match her brother’s. Whether Mary is indicting her brother for poor letter writing, 
comparing Maria’s marriage to a pagan sacrifice, or resisting Edmund’s attempt to 
“attack” her with his watch, she readily supplies the “agreeable trifling,” “pleasant 
anecdotes,” and “entertaining stories” that make society amusing. 
                                                          
101 As Henry observes to the Bertram sisters: “I feel as if I could be anything or everything; as if I 





The contrast between the Crawfords’ theatrical performance and the rest of 
Mansfield Park parallels the contrast between their card table and the “steady sobriety 
and orderly silence” of Sir Thomas’s. Although Fanny sits with the Crawfords, she lacks 
their penchant for gamesmanship: rather than adopting the feelings the game requires, she 
instead expresses her true feelings by trying to give away her best cards to her brother, 
William.102 Although Fanny possesses taste enough to recognize a stylish performance 
when she sees it, her emotions are too personal and too strong to be readily regulated and 
channeled into the various games adopted for pleasing social performance. When Mary 
sends a letter expressing her congratulations for Henry’s proposal to Fanny, Fanny judges 
her own response “excessively ill-written” since “her distress had allowed no 
arrangement.” Fanny expresses this lack of “arrangement” in an earlier discussion with 
Edmund and Mary when she interjects a “tender apostrophe” about her brother William 
that, as the narrator notes with light irony, “was very much to the purpose of her own 
feelings if not of the conversation.” Whereas Fanny finds it difficult to control her 
emotions sufficiently to respond even to misplaced congratulations or impersonal 
conversations, Mary, in direct contrast, performs with remarkable grace under fire only 
moments after the man she loves explains at length why he no longer loves her.103 Mary’s 
poise in conversation is absent not only in Fanny, but Edmund, who possesses none “of 
                                                          
102 The novel emphasizes Henry’s inability to coach the sincere and tender-hearted Fanny to invest 
fully in the spirit of the card game: “he had yet to inspirit her play, sharpen her avarice, and harden her 
heart, which, especially in any competition with William, was a work of some difficulty.” 
103 Edmund describes Mary’s impressive struggle to retain her composure in response to his brutal and 
potentially heart-breaking honesty: “She was astonished, exceedingly astonished—more than astonished. I 
saw her change countenance. She turned extremely red. I imagined I saw a mixture of many feelings: a 
great, though short struggle; half a wish of yielding to truths, half a sense of shame, but habit, habit carried 
it. She would have laughed if she could. It was a sort of laugh, as she answered, 'A pretty good lecture, 
upon my word. Was it part of your last sermon? At this rate you will soon reform everybody at Mansfield 
and Thornton Lacey; and when I hear of you next, it may be as a celebrated preacher in some great society 





the arts of flattery or the gaieties of small talk.” Like Fanny, Edmund recognizes his 
distance from the standard of agile performance set by the Crawfords, describing himself 
as “a very matter-of-fact, plain-spoken being, [who] may blunder on the borders of a 
repartee for half an hour together without striking it out.” The most dramatic foil to the 
Crawfords’ refined performance, however, is neither Edmund nor Fanny, but Fanny’s 
parents, Mr. and Mrs. Price. When visiting Portsmouth, Fanny recognizes their distance 
not only from the order and serenity of Mansfield Park, but from the manners and style 
exemplified by the Crawfords. Mrs. Price, who has “no talent” and “no conversation,” 
and Mr. Price, who has “no curiosity, and no information beyond his profession,” both 
lack the verve and polish of manners adopted to entertain and amuse. In this respect the 
Price parents parallel the unfortunate Mr. Rushworth, who dooms Maria to listen to “the 
repeated details of his day's sport, good or bad, his boast of his dogs, his jealousy of his 
neighbours, his doubts of their qualifications, and his zeal after poachers”: like Fanny’s 
parents, Mr. Rushworth does not possess the ability to distance himself from his 
immediate interests in order to flexibly adapt himself to the interests of an audience.  
The Crawfords’ skill in entertainment stems not only from their protean 
performance, but from their accommodating and indiscriminate warmth.104 Mary 
describes Henry as “good-nature itself,” after he volunteers to fetch her harp, and Henry’s 
actions in the novel bear out that description. The Bertram sisters find him “the most 
agreeable young man [they] had ever known,” recognizing an agreeability that arises not 
                                                          
104 “From their first encounter at Mansfield where Fanny sat "exactly opposite" Mary, the two are so 
totally dissimilar that they seem "two distinct orders of being" (355). Fanny is reserved, humble, and 
obedient; Mary vivacious, often vain, and irreverent of authority. Fanny's "feelings were very acute" (14), 
and she "was always more inclined to silence when feeling most strongly" (369). Mary, on the other hand, 
is a voluble conversationalist- witty, sarcastic, humorous-and is so precisely because she lacks "Fanny's 





just from entertaining anecdotes but from his ready, if not necessarily lasting, affection. 
Although Henry’s warmth of spirit rather than principle does not go so deep as to attend 
to the feelings of his rival Mr. Rushworth, his “more than common agreeableness” does 
decidedly distinguish him from characters who fail to even show interest in others, like 
Fanny’s parents.105 It is Mary, though, even more so than Henry who displays this quality 
of ready affection, instinctively promoting others’ happiness: as Edmund marvels, “How 
readily she falls in with the inclination of others! joining them the moment she is asked.” 
Whether Mary is expressing admiration for the Sotherton estate to Maria, complimenting 
Fanny on all the praise she deserves but does not hear, or “blam[ing] herself …with all 
her heart” for speaking ill of Edmund’s chosen profession, Mary is warmly sensitive to 
the feelings of others. No less significant than Fanny’s heroic assistance to the crestfallen 
Mr. Rushworth when he is abandoned by Henry and Maria, Mary also offers crucial 
assistance to Fanny after she is belittled by the contemptuous Mrs. Norris: like Fanny to 
Mr. Rushworth, Mary expertly supplies distraction, encouragement, and comfort, during 
a moment of acute distress.  
Admittedly, Mansfield Park gives some reason to question the depth and 
rootedness of Mary’s affections: her feelings for Edmund are jarred by his chosen 
profession, her increased intimacy with Fanny results primarily from her “desire of 
something new,” and her loyalty to Fanny is tarnished by the unjustified blame she later 
                                                          
105 Henry’s characteristic mode of friendly attentiveness is displayed when he visits Fanny’s family at 
Portsmouth. Recognizing that his visit is a surprise, Henry “giv[es] her time to recover, while he devot[ing] 
himself entirely to her mother, addressing her, and attending to her …with a degree of friendliness, of 
interest at least, which was making his manner perfect.” Henry’s politeness contrasts sharply, of course, 
with the deficiencies of affection Fanny observes both in her mother, “who had …no affection towards 
herself; no curiosity to know her better, no desire of her friendship, and no inclination for her company that 
could lessen her sense of such feelings.” Henry’s attentiveness to Fanny also contrasts directly with that of 





places on Fanny for Henry’s affair.106 Nevertheless, for all the difference between Mary’s 
quick affection and Fanny’s rooted devotion, it’s not evident from the objective 
expression of each that one standard enjoys strict superiority in the novel. By any 
measure, Mary is a better friend to Fanny than vice versa. In addition to aiding Fanny 
after Mrs. Norris’s criticism, Mary chastises Edmund for neglecting Fanny during horse-
riding, insists that Fanny wear her necklace at a ball, and writes her affectionate letters. In 
direct contrast to the outpouring of affection from Mary’s instinctive good nature, Fanny, 
excepting a single tearful embrace, holds her feelings remarkably aloof from Mary’s. 
Although Fanny visits frequently after the Bertram sisters leave Mansfield Park, their 
newfound intimacy has “little reality in Fanny’s feelings”: even what little pleasure 
Fanny does derive from Mary’s conversation arises at the expense of her solemn 
judgment.107 Fanny’s relative indifference to Mary can be credited to understandable 
factors: considering that Julia can’t even remain civil to Maria when she competes for 
Henry’s affections, Fanny’s relationship to her more successful romantic rival seems 
almost gracious by comparison. Nonetheless, when contrasted to Mary’s continual 
display of good-will to Fanny, Fanny’s often anxious, jealous, and vexed judgments of 
Mary appear remarkably deficient in good-will. The disproportion between Fanny’s 
                                                          
106 At first glance, one might see Mary’s unfair judgment of Fanny for refusing to marry her brother as 
no better or worse than Fanny’s own unfair judgment of Henry for not assisting Mary during horse-riding. 
Both misjudgments arise from an attempt to defend someone the person loves (Henry, Edmund) at the 
expense of someone innocent (Fanny, Henry). For accounts of Fanny’s uncharitable reasoning during horse-
riding see Heyns 6-8, and Wainwright 2014: 64-67. 
107 “Fanny went to her every two or three days: it seemed a kind of fascination: she could not be easy 
without going, and yet it was without loving her, without ever thinking like her, without any sense of 
obligation for being sought after now when nobody else was to be had; and deriving no higher pleasure 
from her conversation than occasional amusement, and that often at the expense of her judgment, when it 





feelings toward Mary and Mary’s toward her is foregrounded most clearly when Fanny, 
having just refused Henry’s proposal, dreads Mary’s ensuing visit:  
The promised visit from ‘her friend,’ as Edmund called Miss Crawford, 
was a formidable threat to Fanny, and she lived in continual terror of it. As 
a sister, so partial and so angry, and so little scrupulous of what she said, 
and in another light so triumphant and secure, she was in every way an 
object of painful alarm. Her displeasure, her penetration, and her 
happiness were all fearful to encounter; and the dependence of having 
others present when they met was Fanny's only support in looking forward 
to it. 
When Edmund refers to Miss Crawford as Fanny’s “friend,” the term hardly seems to 
deserve the scare-quotes it receives. If friendship is an earned quality, Mary’s actions 
have done everything possible to deserve the attribution. Any inability to have become 
genuine friends with Mary would seem to be entirely Fanny’s doing. While Mary 
genuinely enjoys Fanny’s company—she cheerfully interrupts her other plans to fuss 
over Fanny when she is stuck in the rain or seeks advice—Fanny’s anxious view of Mary 
as a “formidable threat” falls obviously short of Mary’s instinctive warmth. It’s not just 
that Fanny’s anticipation of “continual terror” in Mary’s presence contrasts with Mary’s 
delight in Fanny’s company: Mary’s tasteful recognition of Fanny’s best qualities 
especially contrasts with Fanny’s own judgments of Mary as “partial,” “angry,” and 
“[un]scrupulous”—attributions that turn out to be wildly disproportionate to Mary’s 
actual behavior when she arrives. Far from chastising Fanny for refusing Henry’s 





that she “feel[s] it quite impossible to do anything but love you.” Mary’s speech is 
“partial” only in the sense of bias in favor of Fanny’s best quality, what Mary describes 
as the possession of “so much more heart … than one finds in the world at large.” 
Although Fanny’s heart is sufficient to provoke a tearful reciprocation to Mary’s 
outpouring, “as if she had loved Miss Crawford,” the contrast between Fanny’s 
withdrawn care and Mary’s instinctive affection does not always privilege the former. 
Although Fanny may have a higher standard of commitment to the relationships she does 
maintain, Fanny’s very hesitance to value any relationships but those of the past falls 
short of the instinctive good-nature expressed in Mary’s more mobile affection. 
 If Mary’s generous feelings ironize Fanny’s reserved loyalties, her candid 
transparency also ironizes Fanny’s deceptive delicacy. Mary expresses her feelings 
openly, for instance, in her admission to Edmund and Fanny that her uncle is not her 
“first favorite in the world.” Although this blunt statement about a caretaker to which she 
ought to feel dutifully affectionate violates Fanny and Edmund’s delicate sense of 
propriety, Mary’s candid admissions nevertheless can be read as maintaining a standard 
that Fanny’s actions do not meet. Mary cheerfully shares her judgments of others in more 
than one instance: she counsels her brother to remember that Maria is engaged, calls him 
out for being a “horrible flirt” in front of Mrs. Grant, and admits to Fanny that she 
initially hated Sir Thomas after the theatricals before coming to admire him.108 Mary’s 
open judgments also extend to herself: when she and Edmund keep Fanny waiting for her 
horse, Mary apologizes openly, admitting that she has “nothing in the world to say for 
                                                          
108 "Yet, Fanny, do not imagine I would now speak disrespectfully of Sir Thomas, though I certainly 
did hate him for many a week. No, I do him justice now. He is just what the head of such a family should 





[her]self,” and that she was “behaving extremely ill.” Although Mary is perhaps a bit 
presumptuous in expecting forgiveness for what she bluntly admits to be “selfishness” 
(the disease, in her view, with “no hope of a cure”), Mary’s frank admission of 
wrongdoing contrasts favorably with Edmund’s much more presumptuous attempt to 
dismiss the whole incident. (Speaking for Fanny, Edmund assumes that Fanny “could be 
in no hurry” and, even more, that she has probably benefitted by the delay due to the 
change in weather). Although Edmund later becomes sensible of his neglect later when 
he sees firsthand how severely the lack of horse-riding inconveniences Fanny,109 it is 
Mary, with her characteristic openness, who is again more direct in voicing judgment 
both of herself and Edmund. When Mary learns from Edmund how quickly Fanny 
fatigues when walking, she responds: “How abominable in you, then, to let me engross 
her horse as I did all last week! I am ashamed of you and of myself, but it shall never 
happen again.” Here, Mary’s admission of her and Edmund’s failure is unmitigated by 
any plea to be excused for selfishness. It also helps Fanny to a greater degree than would 
a more polite route designed to preserve Edmund’s feelings; had Edmund not already 
realized the extent of his neglect himself, Mary’s openness would help ensure that 
Fanny’s interests were preserved.  
 If Mary’s candid admission of wrongdoing contrasts with Edmund’s initial 
attempt to downplay it, Mary’s transparent judgments contrast even more directly with 
Fanny’s habit of judging others in secret. Austen’s narrator draws explicit attention to the 
                                                          
109 Vexed as Edmund was with his mother and aunt, he was still more angry with himself. His own 
forgetfulness of her was worse than anything which they had done. Nothing of this would have happened 
had she been properly considered; but she had been left four days together without any choice of 
companions or exercise, and without any excuse for avoiding whatever her unreasonable aunts might 
require. He was ashamed to think that for four days together she had not had the power of riding, and very 
seriously resolved, however unwilling he must be to check a pleasure of Miss Crawford's, that it should 





deceptive implications of Fanny’s reserve when describing Fanny’s reception of Henry’s 
attentions: “Her manner was incurably gentle; and she was not aware how much it 
concealed the sternness of her purpose.” Granted, Fanny’s lack of self-awareness of her 
own manner makes her act of deception excusable, and she does vocalize her real 
feelings about Henry to Sir Thomas who fails to take her statements with sufficient 
seriousness. Nevertheless, as Jenny Davidson points out, Fanny’s politeness leads to 
anxiety about the way she appears to others that may appear off-putting and disingenuous 
to modern readers. While the stuffy modesty adopted by relatively powerless benefactors 
of patronage like Fanny may have occasionally been a necessity, Mansfield Park makes it 
appear to be a regrettable one.110 The dissonance between Fanny’s stern judgments of 
others and her unassuming behavior is especially off-putting when she masks her 
judgments from Mary, a person with whom she is on affectionate terms and relatively 
equal footing. Fanny never gives Mary an inkling either of her feelings for Edmund or of 
her disapproval of Mary’s choices. By keeping her affection for Edmund a secret, Fanny 
enables Mary to unwittingly wound her feelings and arouse her jealousy; and by keeping 
her disapproval of Mary’s attitudes hidden, Fanny makes it impossible for Mary to earn 
her trust and respect. When it comes to preserving the integrity of relationships, it’s 
possible to see Mary’s cheerful transparency as more effective and admirable than 
Fanny’s polite dissimulation. 
V. Conclusion 
 
I’ve argued, then, that Mansfield Park uses techniques of vivification and 
ironization to invite readers to perceive both strengths and weaknesses of its protagonist’s 
                                                          
110 Fanny’s vulnerability also explains the dissonance between her privately harsh judgments of her 





practice. By foregrounding conspicuous contrasts between the behaviors of its 
protagonist and its secondary characters, the novel invites readers not only to appreciative 
views of Fanny’s disciplined, sincere, modest, and loyal behavior, but also critical views 
of her comparatively passive, unrefined, self-abasing, and reserved behavior.  
To close, I want to briefly consider the implications of these contrasting rhetorical 
techniques for existing debates on Mansfield Park. First, I hope to have shown that the 
presence of vivification in the novel lends credence to the readings of critics who glean 
Aristotelian ethical discriminations from the novel’s treatment of its characters. By 
depicting characters as they enact and fail to enact virtues, the novel continues in the 
Aristotelian mode of earlier novels like Sense and Sensibility, inviting its implied reader 
to discriminate between superior and inferior expressions of virtues such as discipline and 
sincerity as they are practically enacted. Because characters in Mansfield Park express 
qualities that are not merely different, but “different inside the same genus,” or 
conceptually parallel along a given virtue spectrum, vivifying character-contrasts can 
inform the implied readers’ ethical judgments about situations in which virtues were well 
or poorly applied (Ryle 7). As one early reviewer of Jane Austen justly observed, "We 
know not whether Miss Austen ever had access to the precepts of Aristotle, but there are 
few, if any, writers of fiction who have illustrated them more successfully” (qtd in Gallop 
97). Due to the presence of vivification in the novel, it is possible to see how critics have 
interpreted the novel to be one-sided in its judgments: Bonaparte associates Edmund’s 
choice of Fanny over Mary as his perception of “the true nature of the good,” and Trilling 
views the novel’s depiction of Henry Crawford’s moral detachment as demonstrating that 





vivifying contrast in the novel invite readers to assess comparatively virtuous and base 
behavior in accordance with a single set of coherent standards. 
An ethical attitude that seeks to discriminate between the behavior of characters 
who do and do not express right virtue has further justification beyond the presence of 
vivifying character-contrasts. This Aristotelian way of conceiving virtue is also 
rhetorically reinforced by the novel’s conclusion which rewards its protagonists’ 
expressions while punishing more peripheral characters. For example, Fanny’s 
expressions of discipline, sincerity, modesty, and loyalty are rewarded with a marriage to 
Edmund, while characters who do not express Fanny’s virtues, including Maria, Julia, 
Mrs. Norris, and the Crawfords are all punished by the events of the plot to varying 
degrees. The vain adulteress, Maria, and the encourager of her vanity, Mrs. Norris, are 
both exiled from Mansfield Park. Likewise, the philandering Henry, who lacks Fanny’s 
sincerity and discipline, loses his chance to be with Fanny after his affair with Maria. 
Finally, the flippant Mary Crawford also loses Edmund’s love and respect after failing to 
appreciate the gravity of Henry’s actions. The rhetorical effect of the vivifying character-
system and the conclusion’s heavy-handed distribution of novelistic justice both suggest 
that Mansfield Park echoes rather than transcends the Aristotelian character-systems of 
other novels.   
While an Aristotelian conception of ethics offers a powerful framework for 
explaining the significance of the novel’s character-system and its distribution of poetic 
justice, it offers little help in explaining the interpretive problem that this chapter began 
by discussing: why have ethically-minded critics been so divided about the protagonist of 





character-systems and poetic justice to reinforce a single set of virtues modeled by 
protagonists, the unusually polarizing status of Mansfield Park requires a different 
explanation. This chapter argued that divided judgments are built into the moral intuitions 
elicited by the novel’s character-system, and specifically into those triggered by the set of 
contrasts between Fanny’s behavior and that of Mary and Henry Crawford. Through a 
close analysis of some moments of conspicuous ethical contrast, I made the case that the 
novel does not only use character-contrasts to vivify Fanny’s actions but also to ironize 
them. Rather than functioning only as negative foils in Mansfield Park, deficient in 
Fanny’s values, I attempted to show that Crawfords function as dialectical 
counterprinciples who express antithetical values of their own. That is to say, in 
Mansfield Park, contrasts between Fanny and the Crawfords do more than privilege 
Fanny’s practices at the expense of “flatten[ed],” and “fragment[ed]” minor characters 
such as Maria and Julia Bertram (Woloch 55).111 Insofar as Henry and Mary express 
vivacity rather than passivity, theatricality rather than stodginess, confidence rather than 
self-abasement, and openness rather than reserve, they signify Austen’s creation of an 
unusual type of secondary character whose antithetical expressions of virtue occur at the 
protagonist’s expense. The ironizing contrasts between the Crawfords and Fanny Price 
suggest that there is no character in Mansfield Park like Elinor Dashwood or Elizabeth 
Bennet who exhibits an Aristotelian mean between extremes. Rather than foregrounding 
one exemplary character who displays the highest degree of virtues relevant to every 
situation, the novel depicts admirable characters who specialize in virtues that others do 
not match.  
                                                          





 By depicting primary and secondary characters in this antithetical way, Austen 
does not just make the rhetoric of her novel difficult to parse for critics, but also begins to 
press the evolving novel form to cultivate a new kind of judgment in readers. To make 
sense of the character-system of Mansfield Park—to feel moral intuitions that harmonize 
with the rhetorical effect of particular scenes—readers must practice making evaluative 
judgments that navigate between incommensurable standards. The potential ethical 
effects of this mode of characterization are significant: Austen’s juxtaposition of Fanny 
and Edmund’s sincerity alongside Mary and Henry’s stylishness does not just facilitate 
Aristotelian phronesis in readers but Hegelian self-consciousness. Despite its one-sided 
ending, Mansfield Park invites readers to perceive ethical practices less in terms of 
degrees of excellence according to a single scale, than in terms of dialectical tensions 
between antithetical scales. In harmony with the philosophical methods of her historical 
contemporary Hegel, Austen’s novel presents the discovery of moral insight as hinging 
upon readers’ ability to perceive “estrangement of what is simple, that is, …the doubling 
which posits oppositions” (Hegel 15).112 By challenging readers to perceive oppositions 
between incommensurable values exhibited by its characters, Mansfield Park is ahead of 
its time and even the rhetorical constraints of its own ending.113 It requires what J.S. Mill 
                                                          
112 Trilling precedes me in connecting Austen’s fiction with Hegelian dialectics, but argues that 
Mansfield Park is actually the least dialectical of Austen’s novels since the novel uses the Crawfords to 
thematize the dangers of irony (Sincerity and Authenticity 77). This apparent contradiction with my own 
argument stems from my more formal focus that Trilling’s. Although Trilling is right that Mansfield Park is 
the Austenian novel least enamored with dialectics at the level of theme, my claim is that the novel’s 
character-system makes it the most engaged with dialectics at the level of form. To put my argument in 
Trilling’s terms, I would say that the character-system of Mansfield Park exhibits a dialectical ambivalence 
between the qualities of single-minded sincerity and dialectical irony itself. 
113 Due to the vivifying and ironizing character-system of Mansfield Park, I would maintain that its 
one-sided conclusion is dissonant with the moral intuitions elicited in readers by the novel’s narration of 
events. (For a helpful account of the centrality of moral intuition to the experience of reading the Victorian 
novel, see Rosenthal 2017). In the case of Mansfield Park, both Joel Weinsheimer and Michiel Heyns have 
offered perspicuous takes on why the ending of Mansfield Park effectively feels wrong. Both critics argue 





would later call a “many-sided” mode of perception to be fully understood. More than 
forty years before attention to the many-sided mind would emerge within British 
intellectual life more broadly, Mansfield Park presses the novel form to move beyond the 
analysis of a single virtuous standard approached by various characters to the 
appreciation of conflicting standards they practically enact. 
To be sure, family resemblances to Fanny Price and Henry Crawford’s 
characterization in Mansfield Park can be detected in fiction by Austen’s predecessors 
and at least one of her contemporaries.114 Successors such as the Brontë sisters and 
Elizabeth Gaskell also partake to varying degrees in the mode of antithetical 
characterization visible in Mansfield Park.115 Nevertheless, it would not be until George 
Eliot’s fiction that Austen’s vivifying and ironizing depictions of antithetical values 
enacted in realistic circumstances would be matched. Influenced by her readings of 
                                                          
Bertrams clash with the moral intuitions triggered by the novel’s conclusion. Heyns’s take is worth quoting 
in full: “If Jane Austen had been less of an artist, she could have kept Fanny within the limits set by her 
moral scheme, and she could have created a perfectly admirable, perfectly dull heroine like Little Dorrit. 
But her creative vitality did not allow that, and she created a believable, amusing, but ultimately self-
deceived heroine. ….Somewhat bluntly put, Jane Austen conceived a very serious heroine and ended up by 
finding her funny. Unfortunately, her moral scheme had not provided for a funny heroine. Fanny's 
seriousness was to be vindicated against the superficially attractive light-mindedness of the Crawfords, and 
any implication that that seriousness was other than wholly admirable would have undermined this 
schematic opposition. Thus, at the conclusion of her novel Jane Austen had no choice but to suppress such 
an implication, and to vindicate Fanny's wrong judgements along with her correct judgments. For this to be 
held up to us as an example of ‘the sterling good of principle and temper’ [p. 471, Ch. 48] seems to be a 
sacrifice of Fanny, the created character, to Fanny, the bearer of Jane Austen's moral burden” (16, 3). 
114 Sophocles’s depiction of Antigone and Creon in Antigone (441 B.C.), Cervantes’s depiction of 
Sancho Panza and Don Quixote in Don Quixote (1605), and Sir Walter Scott’s depiction of Major Melville 
and Mr. Morton in Waverly (1814), all resemble the mode of antithetical characterization achieved in 
Mansfield Park. 
115 Echoes of this mode of antithetical characterization can also be detected in novelists after Austen 
including Emily Bronte’s depiction of Heathcliff and Edgar Linton in Wuthering Heights (1847), Charlotte 
Bronte’s depiction of St. John Rivers and Mr. Rochester in Jane Eyre, and Elizabeth Gaskell’s depiction of 
Mrs. Thornton and Mr. Hale in North and South (1854). Although character-systems in these contemporary 
texts resemble the many-sided contrasts of Mansfield Park, they all differ in degree from what Austen 
achieves in Mansfield Park. Antigone and Don Quixote do not depict their protagonists acting in 
circumstances relevant to the lives of modern readers; Wuthering Heights does not use its protagonists to 
enact positive values endorsed by the novel (see Gregory 2004); Waverly does not vivify the values of its 





German idealist philosophy and by mid-century conceptions of Victorian liberalism, Eliot 
would make use of the antithetical character contrasts in her 1860 novel, The Mill on the 
Floss. My next chapter considers how Eliot incorporates the practice of antithetical 
characterization first developed in Mill into her later masterpiece Middlemarch (1874): a 
novel which depicts the strenuous sympathy of its protagonist, Dorothea Brooke, 
alongside the impulsive egoism of secondary characters whose significance to the novel’s 






Chapter 4: Liberal Evaluation in the Character-System of 
Middlemarch 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The realist novel has long been viewed as an agent of liberal humanist values—as 
a tool distinctively suited to cultivating sympathetic views of diverse human practices. 
According to F.R. Leavis and others, novels invite readers to refine their everyday moral 
feelings and practical judgments insofar as they depict life with “imaginative sympathy, 
moral discrimination and judgment of relative human value” (Leavis p. 23).116 Yet claims 
like Leavis’s raise more questions than they answer: in this liberal view of the novel, 
what qualities make a given novel’s moral judgments more sympathetic or discriminating 
than another? What techniques, if any, do novelists use to produce such enlightened 
value-judgments? And what historical and philosophical influences led novelists to create 
art designed for this specialized task? Even as scholars from F.R. Leavis to Martha 
Nussbaum have linked novels with the development of the liberal imagination, the 
subjective and relatively ahistorical nature of much of this criticism has yet to 
satisfactorily address the question of what makes the novelistic genre distinctively 
                                                          
116 The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1948), p. 29. Intersections between liberal ideals and novelistic form are also visible in critical judgments 
as diverse as Lionel Trilling’s appreciation for the novel’s unparalleled ability to convey “the extent of 
human variety and the value of this variety” (The Liberal Imagination [New York: NYRB Classics, 2008] 
p. 220); Mikhail Bakhtin celebration of the novel’s capacity to include a “social diversity of speech types” 
(“Discourse in the Novel,” The Novel: an Anthology of Criticism and Theory 1900–2000, ed. Dorothy Hale, 
[Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005 (1935)]: p. 485); and Martha Nussbaum’s assertion that “the moral 
imagination is encouraged by the …activity of novel-reading” (Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy 
and Literature, [Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1990]: p. 166). Insofar as such statements associate novels 
with ethically sensitive responses to diverse forms of life, they associate the genre, either implicitly or 





amenable to the cultivation of liberal judgment.117 Even more historically focused studies 
that read novels alongside liberal philosophy and politics have provided little help in 
clarifying specific formal features that allow novels to promote liberal habits of mind.118  
By reading George Eliot’s depiction of characters in Middlemarch (1874) 
alongside John Stuart Mill’s account of practical judgment in On Liberty (1859), I argue 
that British realist novels made use of the specific technique of character juxtaposition to 
promote ideals of mid-Victorian liberalism.119 More specifically, this chapter contends 
that Eliot uses systematic contrasts between characters in Middlemarch to invite her 
readers to adopt two liberal habits of mind defended by J.S. Mill: a mode of strong 
evaluation first introduced to English novelists by Jane Austen, and a mode of “many-
sided” evaluation especially noticeable in English novelists writing after Eliot (Mill p. 
130). Although strong and many-sided evaluation both require the ability to make 
comparative judgments about practical forms of life, these evaluative postures are in 
                                                          
117 Martha Nussbaum’s acknowledgment of the limitations of Love’s Knowledge could just as easily be 
applied to Leavis’s The Great Tradition or Trilling’s The Liberal Imagination. Although Nussbaum 
describes her project as “rooted in [a] love for certain novels,” she concedes that “no claim about novels in 
general …could possibly emerge from this book” (p. 23). If the concrete focus of Leavis, Trilling, and 
Nussbaum on their love of particular novels explain too little about what makes the novel form ethically 
distinctive, the more abstract focus of Mikhail Bakhtin on concepts like heteroglossia and dialogism has 
different limitations. Bakhtin’s reluctance to discuss specific novels in detail makes it difficult to see what 
makes particular novels more effective than others in promoting the liberal and humanistic ethos his writing 
privileges. 
118 David Wayne Thomas, Elaine Hadley, and Amanda Anderson, have all analyzed conjunctions 
between ideals of mid-Victorian liberalism and Victorian novels. For instance, Thomas analyzes Camden 
Farebrother’s cultivation of reflective agency in George Eliot’s Middlemarch (Cultivating Victorians: 
Liberal Culture and the Aesthetic, [Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2004], pp. 7-15); Hadley 
discusses Septimus Harding’s display of disinterestedness in Anthony Trollope’s The Warden (Living 
Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain, [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2010]: pp. 
63-125); and Anderson addresses Daniel Deronda’s expression of many-sidedness in George Eliot’s Daniel 
Deronda (The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment, [Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2001]: pp. 119-47). By analyzing how novels use exemplary characters to directly 
thematize liberal ideals in this way, though, this body of work does not consider how novels promoted such 
ideals through formal structures in which characters were presented. 
119 Middlemarch, ed. Gregory Maertz, (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2004 [1874]); John Stuart 





tension with each other: strong evaluation requires firm practical commitment to a 
specific good whereas many-sided evaluation requires flexible critical detachment from 
specific commitments. Among the results of focusing on these dialectically 
complementary modes of evaluation as they are described in J.S. Mill’s philosophy and 
promoted by Eliot’s novel is a new sense of the character-system of Middlemarch and, 
more particularly, the novel’s distinctive use of secondary characters to promote flexible 
ethical thinking in readers. 
Bringing together Mill’s philosophy with Alex Woloch’s concept of the character-
system, this chapter will, as in the previous chapter, demonstrate Middlemarch depicts 
vivifying and ironizing examples of character evaluation. In the first section, I show 
systematic contrasts between Dorothea Brooke and other characters that elicit a strong 
evaluative stance favorable to the practice of sympathy in readers. By deliberately 
juxtaposing sympathetic behaviors expressed by the protagonist alongside egoistic 
behaviors of secondary characters committed to different ways of life, Middlemarch 
invites its implied reader to endorse the specific version of the good life expressed by 
Dorothea at the expense of indifference to the commitments of characters such as 
Rosamond Vincy and Edward Casaubon. The remainder of the chapter argues for a more 
controversial thesis: namely, that Middlemarch also ironizes Dorothea, or uses character 
contrasts to cultivate critical judgments of her sympathetic practice. To make this case, I 
focus on secondary characters including Will Ladislaw, Camden Farebrother, and 
especially Fred Vincy who all express an ethos of spontaneous enjoyment that contrasts 
with Dorothea’s ethos of disciplined sympathy. Insofar as Middlemarch uses the liberated 





comparatively constrained aspects of Dorothea’s sympathy, the novel invites many-sided 
evaluation in its implied reader—that is, a flexible critical stance that perceives the 
reciprocal advantages and disadvantages of practically opposed commitments.  
This paper’s focus on Fred Vincy as a positive ethical exemplar is unusual in Eliot 
criticism. Although Fred Vincy plays an important structural role in Middlemarch as the 
protagonist of the novel’s third marriage plot, critics of the novel since Henry James have 
struggled to account for Fred’s prominence in the narrative given his seeming distance 
from the more serious ethical concerns of Dorothea and Lydgate.120 By arguing that Fred 
expresses an ethos of enjoyment that facilitates readers’ critical analysis of the novel’s 
other central characters, this paper helps justify Fred’s inclusion in the novel. Insofar as 
characters like Fred Vincy and Will Ladislaw point readers to ethical deficiencies in the 
practice of otherwise privileged protagonists, I argue that they function as a specialized 
mid-Victorian type of secondary character designed to facilitate liberal habits of 
evaluation in readers. 
                                                          
120 Henry James asserts in his 1873 review of Middlemarch that “we care less so about Fred Vincy than 
appears to be expected of us,” and associates Fred’s depiction with the tendency of the novel “to make light 
of the serious elements of the story and to sacrifice them to the more trivial ones” (“Review, Nation, 
August 1866.” George Eliot: The Critical Heritage, ed. David Carroll, [London: Routledge, 2013]: p. 355). 
David Wayne Thomas, Bruce Martin, and Robert Scholes follow James in seeing Fred Vincy as a character 
who has little ethical significance in his own right, viewing him as a negative foil to the novel’s favored 
sympathetic practices. See Thomas 11; Bruce Martin, “Fred Vincy and the Unravelling of Middlemarch.” 
Papers on Language & Literature 30, 1 (1994): 3-24; and Robert Scholes, “The Novel as Ethical 
Paradigm?” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 21, 2/3 (1988): 192. 
J. Hillis Miller sees Fred’s story as separated from Dorothea’s for tonal reasons as well as ethical 
reasons, asserting that Eliot employs “a lower, pastoral, ironic, comic, or ironic style …for the courtship of 
Fred Vincy and Mary Garth” (Reading for Our Time: “Adam Bede” and “Middlemarch” Revisited. 
[Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2012]: p. 141)—a register which contrasts sharply with the what 
Hilary Mackie describes as the novel’s use of “a classical, if not actually an epic, model for Dorothea” to 
narrate her story (“The Key to Epic Life?: Classical Study in George Eliot’s Middlemarch.” Classical 
World 103, 1 [2009]: 65). 
James Phelan’s account of Middlemarch offers a notable exception to the critical trend of viewing 
Fred’s narrative as disparate from the novel’s overall ethical scheme. As Phelan has it, the kindness that 
Caleb Garth and Camden Farebrother display to Fred plays a critical role in justifying the narrator’s 
concluding assertion that “the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts” (qtd in 





George Eliot had much occasion to integrate the ideas of John Stuart Mill’s liberal 
philosophy into her fictional practice: Eliot edited Mill’s essays for the Westminster 
Review, read widely from Mill’s Logic and Political Economy, and paraphrased passages 
from On Liberty in Daniel Deronda.121 To examine Middlemarch’s participation in a 
mid-century conjunction between liberal ethics and novelistic form, I will discuss the 
concepts of strong and many-sided evaluation in turn: first as they are described in J.S. 
Mill’s On Liberty and then as they are promoted by the character-system of 
Middlemarch.  
II. Liberal Evaluation in Mill’s Philosophy 
 
In his 1859 essay On Liberty, J.S. Mill endorses strong evaluative stances when 
he celebrates the human capacity to select practical commitments on the basis of 
reflective judgment: 
The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, 
mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a 
choice. …He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan 
of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of 
imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his 
faculties. …He must use …discrimination to decide, and when he has 
decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. (pp. 
105, 106) 
                                                          
121 For discussions of J.S. Mill’s influence on George Eliot, see Avrom Fleishman’s George Eliot’s 
Intellectual Life, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010): pp. 44-72, 194-6, and Catherine Gallagher’s 
The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction: Social Discourse and Narrative Form, 1832-1867, 





In this passage, Mill describes the human ability to exercise choice through the selection 
of a specific “plan of life.” For Mill, such existential modes of judgment are evaluative 
insofar as they require individuals to choose actions based on their “discriminative 
feeling” and “moral preference.” Such judgments are what Charles Taylor calls “strong” 
insofar as any commitment adhered to with “firmness and self-control” necessarily 
precludes equal commitment to other life plans.122 For instance, a person firmly 
committed to a life plan that prioritizes goods like sensitivity and openness will find in 
practice that they necessarily place a lower priority on antithetical goods like toughness 
and resolve, or vice versa. Conflicts of strong evaluation can also have political 
implications: for example, left-leaning voters firmly committed to the value of caring for 
others may support lessening criminal punishments, and thus neglect competing goods 
such as fairness.123 Taylor’s concept of strong evaluation captures the inevitability of this 
kind of hierarchical prioritization in matters of practical judgment. To the extent that we 
adopt postures of strong evaluation, our acceptance and love of one good affects our 
evaluations of alternative goods, to the point where “we judge them differently and 
perhaps experience them quite differently, to the point of possible indifference and, in 
some cases, rejection” (Taylor p. 70). For Mill and Taylor alike, exercising the human 
capacity for choice requires discrimination among goods that are essential and non-
essential to one’s specific plan of life.  
 The English novelist most innovative in using characters to promote postures of 
strong evaluation in readers is not George Eliot, but her predecessor, Jane Austen. As we 
                                                          
122 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1989): p. 2. 
123 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. 





explored in the previous chapter, Austen’s novels perfected the art of making various 
value-laden perspectives available to readers who could learn from her novels to make 
fine discriminations between goods expressed in competing plans of life. By using 
vivifying contrasts between characters, her novels invite readers to adopt postures of 
strong evaluation: an energetic endorsement of one good (usually expressed by a major 
character) at the expense of indifference or even hostility to competing goods (usually 
expressed by minor characters).  
Although critics of Eliot have not yet invoked notions of strong evaluation or the 
character-system to describe Middlemarch, these concepts are implicit in existing 
readings of Eliot’s fiction.124 Many scholars acknowledge the way in which 
Middlemarch’s rhetorical emphasis on the sympathy expressed by Dorothea Brooke 
comes at the expense of goods expressed by secondary characters: Nina Auerbach, 
Jeremy Tambling, and others have observed the extent to which Middlemarch asks 
readers to feel a forcible contrast between the sympathy that Dorothea Brooke exhibits 
and the comparative deficiencies in sympathy exhibited by the practices of other 
characters.125 Insofar as Middlemarch carefully juxtaposes the generous sympathy 
expressed by the novel’s protagonist with the comparatively egoistic behaviors of 
secondary characters such as Rosamond Vincy, Fred Vincy, and Edward Casaubon, one 
could say that the novel asks readers to perceive the lives of its characters through a lens 
of strong evaluation: a perspective that energetically endorses the good of Dorothea’s 
                                                          
124 For a reading of Eliot’s Romola that invokes Alex Woloch’s idea of the character-system to analyze 
the privilege the novel accords to sympathy see Jacob Jewusiak’s "Large-Scale Sympathy and Simultaneity 
in George Eliot's Romola," SEL Studies in English Literature 1500-1900 54, 4 (2014): 855-858. 
125 See Nina Auerbach’s “Dorothea’s Lost Dog,” Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Karen 
Chase (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006): pp. 87-107, and Tambling, Jeremy, “Middlemarch, Realism 





sympathetic belief while inviting indifferent or antipathetic views toward competing 
goods such as Rosamond’s social respectability, Fred’s optimistic spontaneity, or 
Casaubon’s scholarly research.126 Through practical contrasts among characters like 
these, Middlemarch invites readers to endorse the mode of sympathy expressed in 
Dorothea’s plan of life with the kind of firmness and conviction privileged by J.S. Mill. 
Although Victorians are often associated with the earnest and narrow convictions 
of strong evaluative stances, mid-century Victorian intellectuals recognized that postures 
of strong evaluation could have a deleterious effect on social solidarity if left 
unchallenged. For liberal intellectuals like J.S. Mill and Matthew Arnold, habits of 
earnest conviction championed by figures like John Wesley and Thomas Arnold required 
the addition of more open-minded habits of thought to help avoid social division and 
partisan thinking.127 Beginning in the late 1850s in Britain and continuing through the 
1870s, liberal intellectuals including Mill, Arnold, and Walter Bagehot supplemented 
defenses of strong practical conviction with defenses of reflective detachment.128 In On 
Liberty, Mill calls this reflective capacity “many-sidedness”: a disposition to consider 
multiple and possibly conflicting evaluations of human practices (p. 83). Rather than one-
sidedly perceiving a single kind of good expressed by a given life plan, a Millian liberal 
also seeks to perceive other goods that tend to be excluded by any given set of 
commitments. Mill recommends, for example, that persons who tend to value the version 
                                                          
126 Middlemarch invites readers to adopt postures of strong evaluation favoring sympathy when 
comparing Dorothea’s behavior with various egoistic preoccupations of other characters, including the 
narrow scholarly obsessions that prevent Edward Casaubon from attunement to the feelings of his young 
wife, the optimistic self-absorption that prevents Fred Vincy from considering the needs of a hard-working 
family, and the concern for nice furniture that prevents Rosamond Vincy from supporting her husband 
when his medical practice is embroiled in scandal. 
127 For a discussion of Victorian rigidity, see Walter Houghton’s The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-
1870, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957): pp. 161-175 





of the good life expressed in “democracy” also consider defenses of “aristocracy,” and 
likewise for any number of other practically opposed goods, such as “co-operation and 
…competition,” “luxury and … abstinence,” “sociality and individuality,” “liberty and 
discipline” (p. 86). The process of liberal opinion formation, for Mill, requires this mode 
of dialectical perception that perceives goods in tension with one’s own favored practical 
commitments. 
III. Many-Sided Evaluations in Middlemarch  
 
Written ten years after the publication of On Liberty, Eliot’s Middlemarch depicts 
its characters in a manner closely aligned with the liberal habits of evaluation Mill 
defends. Middlemarch’s use of characters to promote many-sided thinking is particularly 
noticeable in the novel’s favorable juxtaposition of characters who enact an ethos of 
spontaneous enjoyment alongside more disciplined characters like Dorothea who do not. 
Such juxtapositions, I argue, do not just invite one-sided appreciation for Dorothea’s self-
abnegating sympathy, but a many-sided appreciation for antithetical practices of 
impulsive spontaneity.129   
To describe the positive contrast Middlemarch draws between the spontaneous 
ethos expressed by characters like Fred Vincy and Will Ladislaw, and the disciplined 
ethos expressed by characters like Dorothea, I invoke Michel de Certeau’s distinction 
between “tactics,” or spontaneous practices that resist authority, and “strategies,” or 
                                                          
129 My focus on many-sided judgment in Middlemarch extends the work of scholars who have already 
emphasized the difficulty Eliot’s novels present to readers seeking to take ethically-weighted contrasts 
between characters at face value. See J. Hillis Miller’s “Narrative and History,” ELH (1974): 455–73, 
David Lodge’s “Middlemarch and the Idea of the Classic Realist Text,” Middlemarch: George Eliot, ed. 
John Peck (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1992): 45-64, Elizabeth Ermarth’s “Negotiating Middlemarch,” 
Middlemarch in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Karen Chase, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006): pp. 





deliberate practices that impose authority.130 De Certeau conceives of tactics as modes of 
practical resistance to the modern regimes of discipline described by Michel Foucault. 
Rather than submitting to modes of bureaucratic, institutional, and cultural authority, 
tacticians seek out relative liberation from controlling discourses through practices 
characterized by spontaneity, impulsiveness, and purposelessness. For de Certeau, 
tactical practitioners of “everyday arts” such as cooking, sewing, and speaking resist 
controlling imperatives of rationality in favor of spontaneous impulsivity; that is, they 
accept the possibilities experience offers in the present rather than seeking to control 
future experience through planning, discipline, and judgment. Although de Certeau’s 
concepts of tactics and strategy are most commonly used to explain resistance to power in 
urban settings under late capitalism, these concepts can also be used to analyze resistance 
to a wide variety of hegemonic regimes throughout history: from industrial practices of 
organization in twentieth-century Paris or London to religious practices of self-regulation 
in nineteenth-century English villages.131  
To perceive Middlemarch’s appreciation for tactical practices of resistance to 
discipline, I begin by examining the novel’s critical treatment of its more disciplined 
characters. Through a combination of ironic discourse, revealing dialogue and action, and 
                                                          
130 See Michel de Certeau “The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall, (Oakland: Univ. of 
California Press, 1988). Although I am not aware of previous scholarship that uses de Certeau’s philosophy 
to analyze Eliot’s fiction, my focus practices of resistance to power in Eliot’s fiction supplements the work 
of Jeffrey Nunokawa, who has used Irving Goffman’s work to analyze other practices that Eliot’s 
characters use to resist the coercive pressure of regulatory norms. See “Eros and Isolation: The Antisocial 
George Eliot,” ELH 69, 4 (2002): 835–60.  
131 The narrator of Middlemarch calls attention to the importance of resistance to evangelical influence 
in its description of the Vincy family: “The Vincys had the readiness to enjoy, the rejection of all anxiety, 
and the belief in life as a merry lot, which made a house exceptional in most county towns at that time, 
when Evangelicalism had cast a certain suspicion as of plague-infection over the few amusements which 
survived in the provinces” (152). For more on Eliot’s complicated relationship to ascetic evangelicalism, 





character juxtaposition, the novel works to elicit dissatisfaction with strategic modes of 
thought and behavior in its implied reader. The novel’s ironic treatment of Rosamond 
Vincy, to take our first example, invites readers to view her practice as a negative foil not 
only to Dorothea Brooke’s sympathy but also to her brother Fred’s tactics. For the 
discerning reader, Rosamond’s quest for the good things in life appears less as a 
spontaneous improvisation that seizes upon the impulses of the moment, than as a 
strategic self-presentation designed to achieve calculated aims. In Rosamond’s first 
introduction to Lydgate, the narrator of Middlemarch draws attention to the calculated 
self-regulation Rosamond exhibits through a constantly maintained awareness of others: 
“Every nerve and muscle in Rosamond was adjusted to the consciousness that she was 
being looked at. She was by nature an actress of parts that entered into her physique: she 
even acted her own character, and so well, that she did not know it to be precisely her 
own” (p. 119). By describing Rosamond as an actress, the narrator emphasizes the way in 
which her continuing consciousness of others’ expectations creates distance between 
natural feelings prompted by her “own character” and the artificial self-presentation she 
reveals to others.  
The censorship of feeling involved in such theatrical self-presentation is further 
emphasized in the narrator’s description of Rosamond’s ensuing flirtations with Lydgate. 
By observing that Rosamond answers questions in a calculated, knowledgeable way that 
“a more naïve girl” would not, the narrator calls attention to the thought and artifice that 
guide Rosamond’s interactions (p. 151). The narrator makes use of similarly detached 
rhetoric to describe Rosamond’s effort to conceal her feelings later in the novel when 





“Rosamond, made nervous by her struggle between mortification and the wish not to 
betray it, dropped her chain as if startled, and rose too, mechanically” (p. 259). By telling 
the reader that Rosamond drops the chain “as if startled” rather than out of genuine 
surprise, the narrator invites scrutiny of the potential artifice of this action as well.132 
Even though this moment of design is immediately followed by the eruption of genuine 
tears—glossed by the narrator as a brief “moment of naturalness”—the narrator’s earlier 
use of the imperfect subjunctive emphasizes Rosamond’s prevailing tendency, even at her 
least self-controlled, to rely on what Lydgate sees as her “most perfect management of 
self-contended grace” (p. 259). Such scenes invite the implied reader to view 
Rosamond’s habitual management as the opposite of tactical work that is “free, creative, 
and precisely not directed toward profit” (de Certeau p. 25). Instead of purposeless work 
with no further aim than creative self-expression, Rosamond’s theatrical self-presentation 
appears to carry the strategic aim of facilitating her goals, or adding to what the narrator 
of Middlemarch calls “her elegant accomplishments” (p. 235). 
If readers are invited to take distance from Rosamond’s calculated interactions 
with others, they are also invited to take distance from her tendency to promote 
conformity with socially approved standards. In response to her brother Fred’s assertion 
that “all choice of words is slang …mark[ing] a class,” Rosamond asserts that “there is 
correct English”—a view which both normalizes and reifies speech patterns associated 
with a dominant social group (p. 105). Rosamond’s investment in preserving markers of 
class distinction is made particularly conspicuous through the ironized free indirect 
discourse used to describe her reasons for marrying Lydgate: an outcome she finds 
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desirable for the prospect it presents “of rising in rank and getting a little nearer to that 
celestial condition on earth in which she would have nothing to do with vulgar people” 
(p. 156). The disjunction here between Rosamond’s small-minded aspirations for class 
advancement and the exaggerated phrase “celestial condition on earth” betray the 
presence of an implied author who takes ironic distance from such class-bound desires; 
for informed readers, the distance between Rosamond’s view of people she deems 
“vulgar” and those of the author who speaks in Chapter 17 of Adam Bede is significant, 
indeed.133 Rosamond’s expressed desire to avoid any association with vulgarity is 
consistent with her attempts elsewhere in the novel to regulate what she sees as abnormal 
behavior: another habit that the novel subjects to ironic scrutiny. A product of Mrs. 
Lemon’s finishing school for young ladies, Rosamond carefully avoids unbecoming 
behavior herself and politely corrects her mother and brother for what she sees as their 
vulgar expressions (pp. 105, 107). Rosamond is equally quick to enforce conformity with 
conventional gender roles, both affirming her own embrace of traditionally feminine 
behaviors (“you will never hear me speak in an unladylike way”) and criticizing the 
effeminate implications of Fred’s flute playing (“a man looks very silly playing the flute” 
[pp. 104, 108]). If readers of Middlemarch are invited to be amused by the weight 
Rosamond places on the maintenance of class and gender roles in such trivial matters, 
they are also invited to speculate as to why it may be important for characters like her 
brother to resist the terms of her discourse. Rosamond gives voice to a leveling strategic 
                                                          
133 “These fellow-mortals, every one, must be accepted as they are: you can neither straighten their 
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life is passed — that it is needful you should tolerate, pity, and love: it is these more or less ugly, stupid, 
inconsistent people whose movements of goodness you should be able to admire — for whom you should 





rationality insofar as she readily endorses standards that replace the eccentric and unique 
with what conforms to the approval of accepted social conventions.  
Even if she is the most conspicuous strategist in the novel, Rosamond is not the 
only character in Middlemarch whose attitudes and behaviors are subjected to critical 
scrutiny. Middlemarch’s depiction of Rosamond’s suitor and eventual husband, Tertius 
Lydgate, invites readers to adopt similarly critical views of strategic desires for control 
and status. The negative implications of Lydgate’s ethos are expertly clarified and 
defamiliarized in a telling conversation with the minister Farebrother. After Farebrother 
advises Lydgate of the need for patience and politeness when seeking to implement 
medical reforms in the provincial Middlemarch community, Lydgate responds:  
“Don't you think men overrate the necessity for humoring everybody's 
nonsense, till they get despised by the very fools they humor?” said 
Lydgate, moving to Mr. Farebrother's side, and looking rather absently at 
the insects ranged in fine gradation, with names subscribed in exquisite 
writing. “The shortest way is to make your value felt, so that people must 
put up with you whether you flatter them or not.” (p. 162) 
Just as Rosamond attempts to distinguish herself from “vulgar” people through marriage, 
Lydgate seeks to “make [his] value felt” through professional success. And no less than 
Rosamond’s class aspirations, Lydgate’s sharp distinction between “fools” and men like 
himself who do work of “value,” is immediately subjected to ironic scrutiny by the 
novel’s attention to the image he views while speaking. The picture of “insects ranged in 
fine gradation” on Farebrother’s wall can be taken as a metaphor for Lydgate’s 





Middlemarch is led to understand as more petty and small-minded, or plagued with more 
“spots of commonness,” than might first appear (144). The questionable nature of 
Lydgate’s desire to be recognized in Middlemarch also manifests in his self-presentation, 
which the narrator explicitly evaluates as “a little too self-confident and disdainful” 
(143). Although Lydgate’s ethos expresses a different kind of controlling rationality than 
Rosamond’s, Middlemarch nevertheless invites critical scrutiny of his strategic desire to 
maintain a hierarchical view of his social world—a desire that includes “its being known 
(without his telling it) that he was better born than other country surgeons” (144). Instead 
of preferring tactical spaces of darkness and ambiguity that disrupt hierarchies and allow 
play within the foundations of power, Lydgate articulates a preference for maintaining 
order and distinction in the social world—a preference that, in passages like these, the 
implied author of Middlemarch does not appear to share.134 
If Middlemarch reveals strategic costs in the practices of Rosamond and Lydgate, 
it also reveals such costs in the practice of its most privileged character, Dorothea. A 
sequence near the novel’s conclusion, even as it attempts to emphasize sympathy’s 
advantages, also points to troubling strategic implications of Dorothea’s practice: a 
practice which depends upon a form of strenuous self-policing directly at odds with a 
tactical reliance on impulse and play. The sequence in question begins when Dorothea, 
who loves Will Ladislaw, pays a visit to Rosamond. She finds Will and Rosamond 
speaking together in an emotional situation, seemingly confirming the rumor that they are 
having an affair. Keeping her emotions in check, Dorothea leaves silently and weeps 
alone as her darkest fears are confirmed. The next morning, she attempts to suppress an 
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“outleap of jealous indignation and disgust” by thinking of Rosamond’s husband, 
Lydgate:  
All the active thought with which she had before been representing to 
herself the trials of Lydgate’s lot, and this young marriage union which, 
like her own, seemed to have its hidden as well as evident troubles—all 
this vivid sympathetic experience returned to her now as a power: it 
asserted itself as acquired knowledge asserts itself and will not let us see 
as we saw in the day of our ignorance. (p. 605) 
Here, Dorothea’s “vivid sympathetic experience,” is presented as a kind of energizing 
“power” that provides her with resolve and courage, but at a price. Dorothea’s expression 
of sympathy is made possible only by first stifling the powerful feelings implicit in the 
“outleap of jealous indignation and disgust” she instinctively feels. While Dorothea’s 
sympathetic exercise makes her interpretations of the emotions of others refined and 
precise, like “an acquired knowledge,” the passage invites readers to see the way in 
which this sympathetic power also negates personal emotions—those experienced in “the 
day of ...ignorance” she must now leave behind. Like Dorothea’s conscientious qualms 
over accepting her mother’s jewelry or her desire to renounce the pleasurable activity of 
horseback riding, Dorothea’s exercise of sympathy is associated here with self-
abnegation—a kind of “coercion” that results from the “intensity of her religious 
disposition” (p. 51).  
The suppression of personal impulses required by Dorothea’s exercise of 
sympathy is more directly emphasized soon after when Dorothea speaks to Rosamond of 





hatred” between her and Rosamond, but, worried that jealousy might dictate her 
response, exerts strenuous effort to control her emotions:  
She was beginning to fear that she should not be able to suppress herself 
enough to the end of this meeting ...She tried to master herself with the 
thought that this might be a turning-point in three lives— not in her own; 
no, there the irrevocable had happened, but— in those three lives which 
were touching hers with the solemn neighborhood of danger and distress. 
(p. 611) 
Here, Dorothea’s self-policing in the service of the ideal of sympathy appears to readers 
as demanding as any of de Certeau’s strategies. The words “fear,” “suppress,” and 
“master” signify the weight of the constraint Dorothea imposes upon herself. This 
“solemn” effort at self-mastery realizes a rigorous model of virtue at the expense of 
expressing human emotion. Instead of giving free play to spontaneous impulse, Dorothea 
instead directs her will in accordance with a kind of religious or “scriptural” obligation—
one “that seek[s] to create ...conformity with abstract models” of behavior (de Certeau p. 
29). Censoring her impulses of personal feeling until they conform to an idealized 
standard, here, as elsewhere in the novel, Dorothea is “habitually controlled by 
…thoughtfulness for others” (p. 179).  
If Middlemarch uses Dorothea’s exchange with Rosamond to suggest that 
sympathetic regulation comes at the cost of emotional spontaneity, the novel also uses 
this scene to reveal the way in which sympathy instantiates a moral hierarchy. After 
witnessing the “self-forgetful ardor” Dorothea displays when offering to assist Lydgate, 





superior” (p. 610). This perceived sense of moral inferiority manifests as a sense of moral 
coercion: Rosamond finds herself “urged by a mysterious necessity to free herself from 
something that oppressed her as if it were blood guiltiness” (p. 613). As in the previous 
scene, the narrator’s choice of rhetoric once again places emphasis on the constraining 
effects of Dorothea’s actions: Rosamond immediately feels “oppressed” rather than 
liberated by Dorothea’s act of moral superiority. The novel’s emphasis on the 
hierarchical implications of Dorothea’s sympathetic practice are not limited to this scene 
alone: Celia is hurt by the “assumption of superiority” implicit in Dorothea’s resistance to 
accepting their mother’s jewels, and Casaubon is offended by the pity Dorothea feels for 
him when his heart condition worsens (pp. 38, 349-50).  
Along with Rosamond’s theatricality and Lydgate’s science, Dorothea’s 
sympathy is presented through ironizing rhetoric, revealing dialogue, and character 
juxtapositions that all invite readers to take critical distance from its strategic 
implications. As different as the practices of these characters are, they are all shown to 
rely on techniques of emotional regulation which result in hierarchical understandings of 
their social world.135 I now want to explore Middlemarch’s depiction of characters whose 
practices are valorized by the novel’s implied author precisely for their expressions of 
tactical resistance to such processes. 
Middlemarch offers generous depictions of several characters who enact an ethos 
of enjoyment at odds with the strategic ethos enacted by characters like Rosamond, 
Lydgate, and Dorothea. In the novel’s opening scene Celia Brooke’s common sense is 
                                                          
135 For more on connections between sympathy and repression in Eliot’s fiction see John Kucich’s 
Repression in Victorian Fiction: Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, and Charles Dickens, (Oakland: Univ. of 





favorably juxtaposed with her sister Dorothea’s self-abnegation as they dispute the extent 
to which Christian women are permitted to wear jewelry: by defending the legitimacy of 
worldly pleasure against the intrusion of religious regulation, Celia expresses her own 
version of tactical resistance to Puritanic discipline. The reverend Camden Farebrother is 
another character whose embrace of spontaneity is favorably contrasted with modes of 
discipline enacted by other characters. A foil to more strategic characters such as 
Nicholas Bulstrode and Tertius Lydgate, Farebrother displays minimal concern for how 
he is perceived by others and equally little interest in regulating others’ perceptions of his 
behavior: his conversations with Lydgate display “a desire to do with as little pretence as 
possible,” and he frequents whist tables even though this makes him appear “too lax for a 
clergyman” (pp. 170-1). The most conspicuous foil to the mode of discipline embraced 
by Dorothea is neither Celia nor Farebrother, however, but Will Ladislaw. Will describes 
the sense of responsibility Dorothea feels for the well-being all people as a “fanaticism of 
sympathy” and he defends an antithetical ethos of carefree enjoyment by arguing that 
“the world is being taken care of when you feel delight” (p. 200). Ladislaw’s amateur 
excursions into painting early in the novel express this ethos of enjoyment particularly 
well. Painting because he takes pleasure in it rather than out of a desire to add to his 
accomplishments, Ladislaw’s dilletantism enacts a comparatively liberated alternative to 
the more strategic labors of characters such as Rosamond Vincy and Tertius Lydgate.  
While all these characters enact alternatives to the modes of discipline criticized 
by the novel, none of these characters fully succeeds in avoiding complicity with strategic 
thought and behavior: Celia’s careful concern for social conventions, Farebrother’s 





degrees of strategic self-regulation. Given the concern of these other characters to adhere 
to various forms of social and moral authority, the character who enacts the clearest 
positive alternative to strategic modes of discipline is the idle young gentleman, Fred 
Vincy. 
IV. The Tactician of Middlemarch 
 
The adolescent Fred Vincy might seem an unlikely candidate for playing a serious 
role in the novel’s overall ethical scheme: indeed, Fred’s own comedic narrative 
trajectory from playful idleness to disciplined roles of responsible farmer and devoted 
husband might suggest that the novel’s implied author cares little about the ethical 
investments of his youth. However, the novel’s attentive presentation of the playful ethos 
Fred enacts as a young man suggests that this ethos has a possibly greater significance 
within the novel’s overall ethical scheme. By resisting strategic practices and 
perspectives of other characters in the novel, the young Fred Vincy allows readers to 
perceive a relatively liberated and non-judgmental alternative to repressive and 
hierarchical modes of behavior criticized in the novel. 
The most notable feature of Fred’s behavior early in the novel and the ethos it 
expresses, is that it is easy. Rather than straining under the weight of distant purposes or 
grand aspirations, Fred’s practice is less regulated and controlled than that of the novel’s 
other characters. The narrator describes Fred variously as: “of a hopeful disposition”; as 
“a spirited young fellow, with a good appetite for the best of everything”; and as being 
“so good-tempered that if he looked glum under scolding, it was chiefly for propriety’s 
sake” (pp. 131, 121, 206). The terms emphasized here, “disposition,” “appetite,” and 





Like de Certeau’s tactics, Fred’s practice is “habitual and nonreflective”—not an art of 
conscious intentions and settled purposes, but “of manipulating and enjoying” which 
embraces a “mobility of goals and desires” that offer themselves in the moment (de 
Certeau p. xxii). The novel’s presentation of Fred’s ethical approach in such moments 
make it visible as a more impulsive and less deliberate alternative to the strenuous forms 
of self-control that we’ve seen exhibited in Rosamond’s theatrical artifice and Dorothea’s 
self-abnegating sympathy. 
Given that Fred’s egoism is presented as instinctive, it might be easy for informed 
readers to group Fred along with Eliot’s other memorable egoists who are controlled by 
their wayward desires, such as Hetty Sorrell in Adam Bede. In sharp contrast to Eliot’s 
depiction of Hetty, though, Fred is presented to Eliot’s readers as a character who 
possesses a coherent and principled commitment to a specific plan of life. Just as readers 
of Middlemarch are invited to understand Lydgate’s aspiration to become a hero of 
science or Dorothea’s aspiration to achieve spiritual perfection, they are invited to 
understand Fred’s aspiration to enjoy life’s pleasures: “usually bright and careless,” 
Fred’s eyes convey a readiness “to give attention to anything that held out a promise of 
amusement” (p. 526). Middlemarch presents Fred’s pursuit of amusement not as just 
something he happens to like, but as something he aspires to like. We are told that Fred 
thinks of himself as a “man …of pleasure,” and that he implicitly views himself as having 
a “right to be free from anything disagreeable” (pp. 525, 206). Such passages create a 
picture of Fred as a reflective being, committed to a distinctive ethos of strong evaluation 
that readers can learn to understand and potentially appreciate. Although several of these 





subjects his beliefs to ironizing scrutiny,136 one notable exception occurs in the narrator’s 
favorable description of the Vincy family, which adheres to an ethos that Fred best 
expresses: “The Vincys had the readiness to enjoy, the rejection of all anxiety, and the 
belief in life as a merry lot, which made a house exceptional in most county towns at that 
time, when Evangelicalism had cast a certain suspicion as of plague-infection over the 
few amusements which survived in the provinces” (p. 152). In contrast to the narrow-
minded asceticism of Evangelicalism, (which associates harmless “amusements” with the 
dangers of “plague-infection”), the Vincy family, and Fred in particular, embrace an 
ethos that rejects anxiety in favor of a “readiness to enjoy.”  
The word Eliot’s narrator applies to Fred’s love of enjoyment, which includes an 
affection for gambling at dice, is “hopefulness”: a quality that could be associated with 
the excitement of improvisation, or the pleasure involved “in making a throw of any 
kind” (p. 209). The novel’s appreciation for Fred’s ethos of purposeless spontaneity is not 
just conveyed through charitable descriptions of his carefree attitude, but through 
carefully selected dialogue through which Fred offers articulate criticisms of strategic 
behaviors. For example, it is not difficult to intuit that the implied author of Middlemarch 
shares Fred’s distaste for the “finicking notions” of Rosamond’s finishing school which 
are incompatible with Fred’s taste for improvisation (p. 106). And given the narrator’s 
own critical evaluation of Lydgate’s “disdainful” attitude, Fred’s criticism of Lydgate for 
being a “prig…[who] is always making you a present of his opinions” hits the mark with 
similar force (pp. 106, 107). For the implied reader, Fred’s justified criticisms of 
characters whose behaviors and judgments seek to regulate behavior and preserve status 
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lend indirect legitimacy to the contrasting ethical approach he embodies. In addition to 
his conscious embrace of experiences of enjoyment, Fred’s ethical approach also involves 
a stance of non-judgmental tolerance. Fred articulates this relaxed approach to matters of 
value judgment in an explanation to Farebrother of why he is not prepared to argue 
against the doctrines of his clerical school: “I think it would be rather ridiculous in me to 
urge scruples of that sort, as if I were a judge” (p. 413). By juxtaposing the pride implicit 
in Rosamond and Lydgate’s approach to matters of judgment with the simple humility 
and tolerance of Fred’s approach, the implied author of Middlemarch makes the latter 
stance appear more attractive. The rhetorical effect of this contrast is to invite readers of 
Middlemarch to resist strategic discourses of “transparency” and “totality” that adjudicate 
between acceptable and unacceptable modes of behavior in favor of tactical approaches 
like Fred’s—approaches that occur within “spaces of darkness,” or uncertainty, and thus 
allow for flexibility and mobility (de Certeau p. 18). 
Insofar as Fred successfully expresses a tactical plan of life that other characters 
do not, his depiction makes visible the ethical complexity in Eliot’s treatment of 
secondary characters. Fred Vincy’s practice, like the that of Celia Brooke, Will Ladislaw, 
and Camden Farebrother, successfully expresses values of enjoyment, mobility, 
impulsiveness, and tolerance that contrast favorably with the comparatively repressed, 
disciplined, and hierarchical practices of more strategic characters. Rather than 
functioning only to reinforce a one-sided evaluative distinction between sympathy and 
egoism, the juxtaposition of Fred and Dorothea also privileges Fred’s tactical spontaneity 







Eliot’s depiction of peripheral characters like Fred who exceed the terms of her 
novels’ ostensible moral schemes is not just an accident of the creative process but a self-
conscious intention of her fictional practice. The much-discussed description of the pier 
glass in chapter twenty-seven of Middlemarch explicitly describes the kind of conflicting 
evaluative modes that we’ve seen exhibited in the novel’s character-system. Eliot’s 
narrator uses the metaphor of a candle to describe the function of individual perspectives 
in arranging and ordering personal experience while also suggesting that any given 
arrangement is only one of many possibilities: 
Your pier-glass or extensive surface of polished steel made to be rubbed 
by a housemaid, will be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all 
directions; but place now against it a lighted candle as a centre of 
illumination, and lo! the scratches will seem to arrange themselves in a 
fine series of concentric circles round that little sun. It is demonstrable that 
the scratches are going everywhere impartially and it is only your candle 
which produces the flattering illusion of a concentric arrangement, its light 
falling with an exclusive optical selection. These things are a parable. The 
scratches are events, and the candle is the egoism of any person now 
absent. (p. 232) 
The narrator’s description of the way that a candle’s light supplies an ordered view of 
scratches in the pier glass—illuminating “concentric circles” that appear as satellites in 
relation to a “little sun”—can be viewed as a metaphor for strong evaluative perspectives 
that privilege goods like “sympathy” or “tactics” at the expense of other goods. From 





sun, and the view from which that sun is illuminated determines the way in which the 
actions of oneself and others, the scratches on the pier glass, are interpreted. The candle’s 
illumination is akin to the clarity afforded by what Eliot’s narrator here calls “egoism,” or 
what I’ve been calling “strong evaluation”: that is, a perspective that interprets human 
behavior in light of a single good of primary importance while allowing alternative goods 
to be seen dimly or left in darkness. 
Although I began this paper by describing strong evaluative contrasts in 
Middlemarch’s character-system that illuminate the central “sun” of Dorothea’s 
sympathy, I have also explored the extent to which relations between characters make 
visible a different tactical perspective, from whence “the lights and shadows …fall with a 
certain difference” (Middlemarch p. 193). The novel’s depictions of characters like Fred, 
Will, Dorothea, and Lydgate are “many-sided” in this way: less like a candle narrowly 
illuminating a single meaning than a prism susceptible to illumination in light of multiple 
meanings.  
Although Eliot’s use of the character juxtapositions borrows from older literary 
predecessors and traditions, her use of many-sided character juxtapositions in novels like 
The Mill on the Floss (1860), Middlemarch (1874), and Daniel Deronda (1876) gave 
distinct expression to ideals of mid-century Victorian liberal philosophy.137 Along with 
other Victorian novels such as Anthony Trollope’s The Way We Live Now (1875) and 
George Gissing’s The Odd Women (1893), Eliot’s Middlemarch employs systematic 
                                                          
137 As a formal technique, Eliot’s use of antithetical character foils is anticipated by Sophocles’s 
juxtaposition of Antigone’s familial piety with Creon’s rational statescraft in Antigone (441 BC), Miguel de 
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oppositions between characters to promote flexible habits of evaluation in readers. 
Insofar as novels like Middlemarch use character contrasts not only to invite strong 
commitment to particular plans of life but also to invite critical reflection on such plans, 
such novels ask readers to adopt liberal habits of mind. To fully understand and evaluate 







Chapter 5: Henry James at the Ethical Turn: Imagination and 




In The Great Tradition, F.R. Leavis suggests that The Ambassadors “doesn't 
belong …with the other late 'great' novels.” Leavis is not alone in in viewing The 
Ambassadors as distant from a Victorian realist tradition that involves readers in “moral 
discrimination and judgment of relative human value” (23). An influential tradition of 
ethical criticism has praised James’s novels less for its discriminating judgment than for 
its refusal of judgment. This chapter begins by reviewing the work of Levinasian, 
deconstructive, and even Aristotelian critics who associate James’s fiction, and the 
ethical import of reading literature more broadly, with an array of related values 
including particularity, impulsiveness, and indeterminacy. I argue here that The 
Ambassadors invites readers to adopt a more cognitively oriented approach to the novel: 
one that does not refuse judgment for feeling but rather subjects feeling to the labor of the 
concept. To this end, I emphasize the debt of The Ambassadors to an expressive realist 
aesthetic whose techniques of characterization depend upon abstraction, analysis, and 
understanding. Attending in particular to the novel’s opposition between Lambert 
Strether’s imagination and Maria Gostrey’s discrimination, I show that The Ambassadors 
uses its character-system to both clarify and test the views of its characters, and by 
extension, its readers. By building dialectical oppositions like these into The 
Ambassadors, James does not disrupt structures of thought with immediate feeling, so 





Maria’s practice of discriminating judgment functions as a logical antithesis to Strether’s 
impulsive imagination that readers can grasp the full significance of each practice. By 
emphasizing how James’s fiction facilitates thoughts which attend to the whole, rather 
than just provoking feelings which attend to the particular, this chapter aims to expand 
both received understandings of James’s fiction and of ethical approaches to literary 
criticism more broadly.138 
II. Henry James at the Ethical Turn 
If the insights of the ethical turn have been changing literary studies over the past 
three decades, attention to Henry James’s fiction has played a significant role in that 
change.139 For many influential ethical critics, including Judith Butler, Adam Zachary 
Newton, J. Hillis Miller, and Martha Nussbaum, James has figured prominently. Not only 
does James’s fiction offer a site where ethical criticism can be practiced, but it also helps 
some of these critics articulate what Dorothy Hale describes as a “surprisingly unified” 
                                                          
138 If Lambert Strether’s imagination is the subject of The Ambassadors, James’s construction of 
characters who oppose Strether’s imagination exemplifies the kind of reflective treatment J.S. Mill 
recommends in On Liberty: “The only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing 
the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and 
studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind” (Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, 
fourth edition, (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869), p. 39). My argument is that Maria 
Gostrey’s perspective supplies a different “character of mind” which contributes to The Ambassadors’s 
systematic and reflective project—the project of helping readers “approach …knowing the whole” of 
James’s central subject.  
139 For summaries of the ethical turn in literary studies see Buell, Lawrence. “Introduction: In Pursuit 
of Ethics.”  PMLA, 114.1 (1999), 7-19; Eskin, Michael. “Introduction: The Double ‘Turn’ to Ethics and 
Literature?” Poetics Today 25.4 (2004), 557–572; Phelan, James. Living to Tell about It: A Rhetoric and 
Ethics of Character Narration. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 21; and Fessenbecker, 
Patrick. “In Defense of Paraphrase.” New Literary History 44.1 (2013), 118-19. Critics cited by all four 
who draw extensively on James’s fiction include Wayne Booth, J. Hillis Miller, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Adam Zachary Newton.  
For examples of other ethically inflected criticism which attends to Jamesian form also see Hale, 
Dorothy J. Social Formalism: The Novel in Theory from Henry James to the Present. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), Pippin, Robert B. Henry James and Modern Moral Life. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), and Butler, Judith. “Values of Difficulty” in Just Being Difficult?: Academic 






account of the ethical effects of reading literature.140 The value of Jamesian form, 
according to Hale’s meta-analysis, depends upon its capacity to offer a “knowledge that 
is beyond reason, that is of the emotions, and that is so intuitive as to seem a bodily 
knowing” (“Aesthetics and the New Ethics,” p. 903).  
One significant figure in this argument about Jamesian form is Judith Butler, 
whose primary engagement with the ethical turn emphasizes the importance of 
Levinas.141 For Butler, the ethical invitation of Jamesian fiction lies in the suspensions of 
judgment it requires of its readers. As Butler sees it, the refusal of a novel like 
Washington Square to explain Catherine Sloper’s decision to reject Morris Townsend 
provokes us to “understand the limits of judgment and to cease judging, paradoxically, in 
the name of ethics, to cease judging in a way that assumes we already know in advance 
what there is to be known.”142 Through this process, according to Butler, “we learn 
something about the limits of our ways of knowing; and in this way we experience as 
well the anxiety and the promise of what is different, what is possible, what is waiting for 
us if we do not foreclose it in advance” (“The Values of Difficulty,” p. 209). 
Although Adam Zachary Newton views the representative dimension of Jamesian 
narrative, especially as discussed in his prefaces, to be at odds with the kind of 
Levinasian ethos Butler sees in James, Newton has also emphasized the way in which 
James’s fiction opens spaces for encounters with alterity.143 By focusing on stories like 
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141 See Butler, Judith. “Ethical Ambivalence.” The Turn to Ethics. ed. Marjorie Garber, Beatrice 
Hanssen, and Rebecca L. Walkowitz. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 15-29. 
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143 Newton’s argument about the ethical effects of Jamesian representation is made primarily through 
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“The Real Thing,” The Aspern Papers, and In the Cage, where James foregrounds ethical 
limitations and challenges to his own aesthetics, Newton presents Jamesian narrative as 
offering self-conscious resistance to the principles of its construction. Newton attends to 
moments in James’s fiction, like the narrator’s encounter with Juliana in The Aspern 
Papers, where artistic interpretation encounters the resistance of the Levinasian face 
which “will not dissimulate its forms, will not disclose itself” and “remains defiantly 
‘impenetrable’” (Narrative Ethics, 149-150). Like Judith Butler, Newton thus draws 
attention to the interest of James’s fiction in the “hard facts of distance, separation, and 
alterity” that cause its meanings to remain opaque to readers (Narrative Ethics p. 129). 
J. Hillis Miller’s focus on speech acts in Henry James coheres closely with Butler 
and Newton’s focus on alterity.144 For Miller, too, the interest and import of engaging 
with Jamesian narrative does not lie in its capacity to promote understanding of persons 
or events, but in its dramatization of a potentially bewildering responsibility to judge in 
the wake of “the impossibility of knowing and possessing” the objects a narrative depicts 
(Literature as Conduct, p. 19). The “complex integument of performative utterances, 
gestures, and even thoughts” Miller sees in James reveals indeterminacy and courts 
ambiguity (Literature as Conduct, p. 64). For Miller, moments like Isobel’s decision to 
return to Osmond in Portrait of a Lady invite antithetical explanations that render “the 
reading situation ‘undecidable’” (Literature as Conduct, p. 75). Miller uses such 
moments to suggest that the ethical effects of Jamesian fiction do not involve offers of 
understanding to the reader, but encounters with the difficulty, and perhaps even 
impossibility of understanding. Both Levinasian and deconstructive ethical approaches to 
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James, then, for all their differences, emphasize the capacity of his fiction to trouble, or 
overturn the possibility of informed judgment. For these approaches, Jamesian narrative 
has this ethical effect by a twofold movement: it invites responsibility for making moral 
judgments while simultaneously staging confrontations—either with alterity or with the 
“performative efficacy” of language—that render such responsibility problematic or 
unfulfillable (Literature as Conduct, p. 8). 
Like Butler and Newton’s emphasis on alterity or Miller’s emphasis on language, 
Leo Bersani’s emphasis on desire in Henry James has also foregrounded moments of 
indeterminacy and opacity that have made Henry James’s fiction of interest to the ethical 
turn. For Bersani, moments of unintelligibility in James—including Isobel Archer’s 
return to Osmond—set James at odds with a tradition of nineteenth-century realism 
devoted to revealing “governing pattern[s] of significance” which give coherent form to 
behavior.145 On this reading, James’s fiction commands attention insofar as it distances 
itself from the realist “commitment to intelligible, 'full' characters” and instead depicts 
“the stimulating improbabilities of behavior which would resist being ‘placed’ and 
interpreted in a general psychological or formal structure” (A Future for Astyanax, p. 67).  
Bersani’s characterization of anti-realist tendencies in James’s fiction poses an 
interesting question for the use of James’s fiction by ethical critics. It may strike us as 
odd that, in outlining James’s contribution to the ethical turn, critics have focused almost 
exclusively on those aspects of his work that place it at the greatest distance from a realist 
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tradition deeply invested in ethical thought. Insofar as nineteenth-century realism, 
particularly as practiced by novelists like George Eliot and Elizabeth Gaskell, was a 
literary tradition partisan with and reflective about ethical norms, it is worth wondering 
how the ethical value of Jamesian literature has come to be associated with its distance 
from nineteenth-century realist practice. 
Even Martha Nussbaum’s Aristotelian approach to literature has presented 
James’s fiction in a way that aligns it with what we might view as its anti-realist 
tendencies toward impulsiveness, indeterminacy, and particularity, rather than its realist 
tendencies toward analysis, understanding, and abstraction. For Nussbaum, James’s 
fiction contributes to the moral life of readers by emphasizing “the complexity, the 
indeterminacy, the sheer difficulty of moral choice …the refusal of life involved in fixing 
everything in advance according to some system of inviolable rules.”146 By emphasizing 
values like “complexity,” “indeterminacy,” and “difficulty,” rather than clarity, 
signification, and resolution, Nussbaum’s account of James portrays his work less as 
offering a realist interpretation of experience’s significance, than as eliciting a modernist 
collage of experience’s ambiguities. Is the wealth of ethical thought in nineteenth-century 
literature and philosophy doomed to remain a matter of indifference for current ethical 
approaches to Henry James in particular, and to literary study in general? 
If realist impulses to analysis, systematization, and judgment are an important part 
of the ethical reflection that literature can facilitate, critics of the ethical turn have yet to 
theorize the full import of these tendencies for ethical readers. As a supplement to 
predominant characterizations of literary value within the ethical turn, the primary 
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impulse I want to explore in The Ambassadors is a Hegelian impulse to holistic 
understanding: an impulse which begins from the axiom that an informed judgment of a 
perspective depends on perceiving its fit with others, or its placement within the whole.147 
More than merely advancing an understanding of Jamesian narrative that places it 
squarely within traditions of nineteenth-century realism and philosophy, I want to suggest 
that it is precisely due to the fact that Jamesian narrative is an ordered and structured 
whole, and just in spite of that fact, that it can have some of its most significant effects on 
the ethical judgments of readers. 
To make a case that the shaping, selecting, and systematizing aspects of Jamesian 
narrative have ethical effects which have been overlooked by contributors to the ethical 
turn, I focus on James’s distinctive use of the character-system in The Ambassadors, 
which employs the rhetorical techniques of vivification and ironization.  
III. Vivification and Ironization in The Ambassadors 
The concepts of vivification and ironization I describe in chapter 1 are implicit in 
existing criticism of The Ambassadors. Critics have long recognized the vivifying 
element of Lambert Strether’s relation to Mrs. Newsome. As Ross Posnock has shown, 
Strether’s “unrestrained receptivity and curiosity,” facilitates a “process of diffusion, an 
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opening to otherness” antithetical to Mrs. Newsome’s administrative efficiency.148 For 
Posnock, Strether’s opposition to Mrs. Newsome is essential to the symbolic architecture 
of the novel: Mrs. Newsome’s “cold thought,” and “moral pressure” embody a sterility 
that places Strether’s comparative fecundity into clearer relief.149 While most critical 
readings cohere with the generalization that Strether’s relationship to Mrs. Newsome is a 
vivifying one, critical accounts are more divided regarding the significance of Strether’s 
relationship to Chad.150 Philip Weinstein’s analysis deftly elucidates reasons for this 
division. On the one hand, Chad’s practice of “intimacy and experience,” particularly 
with Madame de Vionnet, ironizes the life of imagination by foregrounding Strether’s 
comparative failure to “live.”151 But on the other hand, insofar as Chad’s practice of 
living depends upon insensitivity and self-absorption, juxtaposition between Chad and 
Strether also vivifies Strether’s point of view. Weinstein persuasively makes the case that 
Chad’s comparative hardness and self-possession provide contrasting emphasis to the life 
the novel cherishes most: the life of intensity, appreciation, responsiveness, and 
imagination.  
Thus, existing criticism implicitly recognizes the dialectical significance of 
Strether’s relations to Mrs. Newsome (vivifying) and Chad (vivifying and ironizing). 
However, the case for seeing The Ambassadors in dialectical terms is perhaps most 
                                                          
148 Posnock, Ross. The Trial of Curiosity: Henry James, William James, and the Challenge of 
Modernity. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 228, 224. 
149 James, Henry. The Ambassadors, second edition, ed. S P. Rosenbaum. (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 1994), 298, 278.  
150 Martha Nussbaum’s account of Strether’s relation to Mrs. Newsome offers an interesting exception 
to the critical trend that sees Mrs. Newsome as simply a vivifying foil. For Nussbaum, “it is because Mrs. 
Newsome is no mere caricature, but a brilliantly comic rendering of some of the deepest and most 
appealing features of Kantian morality, that the novel has the balance and power that it does” (Love’s 
Knowledge, p. 179). 
151 Weinstein, Philip M. Henry James and the Requirements of the Imagination, first edition, 





effectively revealed through a relationship in the novel critics have largely 
misunderstood.152 Unlike both Chad’s and Mrs. Newsome’s practices in this respect, 
Maria Gostrey’s practice does not just clarify a dialectical contrast with Strether’s 
imagination; it also expresses values associated with dialectical thought. In the preface, 
James suggests that the novel’s central subject will be Strether, the man of “imagination 
galore” (The Ambassadors, p. 3); but he also suggests that the novel will offer a “drama 
of discrimination” (The Ambassadors, p. 7). My argument finds it most useful to think of 
Strether as demonstrating the novel’s practice of imagination and Gostrey as 
                                                          
152 In order for Maria to aid the reader in understanding the novel’s treatment of Strether, it’s crucial 
that she be understood as opposing, rather than just enabling, Strether’s imaginative flights. To put this 
point in the language of James’s preface, to serve as a “ficelle” for the reader, Maria’s practice must be 
emphasized on its own terms; Maria needs to achieve “something of the dignity of a prime idea” herself to 
facilitate the reader’s accurate evaluation of Strether’s practice (Henry James, “Preface to the New York 
Edition” [1909], in The Ambassadors, p. 13). 
Despite the preface’s suggestion that Maria represents a distinct idea crucial to The Ambassadors’s 
construction, most critics who account for Gostrey’s function in the novel do not view it as opposed to 
Strether’s; on the predominant view, Gostrey’s practice either enables Strether’s or is equivalent to it. See 
F.O. Matthiesen: “[Maria] exists only as a confidante for Strether, only as a means of letting him comment 
on his experience” (Henry James: The Major Phase. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1944], p. 38). 
Sallie Sears: “Miss Gostrey’s “concept of ‘personal types’ becomes the keynote of Europe for Strether, part 
of whose growth of experience consists in his increasing ability to recognize them” (The Negative 
Imagination: Form and Perspective in the Novels of Henry James. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968], 
111-112). Laurence Holland: “Miss Gostrey opens up ‘freedom’ for Strether, the expensive service she has 
begun to perform by freeing him from the past” (The Expense of Vision: Essays on the Craft of Henry 
James. [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964], p. 257). R.P. Hoople: “It is through Maria 
that Strether awakens to type and by implication to typology” (“Iconological Characterization in James’s 
The Ambassadors.” American Literature, 60.3 [1988], 424). Millicent Bell: “Maria …become[s] 
…representative of Strether's new life” (Meaning in Henry James. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993], 329, 330). Maud Ellman: “James polarizes the rigid Mrs. Newsome to the morally flexible Miss 
Gostrey …Strether undergoes an analysis in Paris, with Miss Gostrey acting as his primary analyst.” (The 
Nets of Modernism: Henry James, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, and Sigmund Freud, first edition, 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 47, 60). 
Walsh’s 1987 article—titled from a statement Maria makes to Strether (‘Things must have a basis”)—
offers the nearest precedent to my reading of the significance of Maria’s vision. However, instead of 
conflating Maria’s practice with Strether’s, as most critics do, I view Walsh as conflating Strether’s with 
Maria’s. Walsh reads Strether as coming to demonstrate the same epistemic maturity as Maria without 
acknowledging the blind spots to which Strether’s opposed form of vision lends itself. See Walsh, K. 
“‘Things Must Have a Basis’: Verification in The Ambassadors, The Wings of the Dove, and The Golden 
Bowl.” South Atlantic Review 52.2 (1987), 51–64. The critical view of Strether’s and Maria’s relationship 
that comes closest to matching the one I lay out here is that advanced by Barbara DeMille, who views 
Maria’s “seductive, …confining ‘selected’ aesthetic categories” as obscuring Strether’s receptivity to 
“differentiation, variation, uncertainty, and flux” (“Lambert Strether and the Tiger: Categories, Surfaces, 





demonstrating the practice of discrimination.153 The novel’s depiction of Strether and 
Gostrey is dialectical insofar as it suggests that the determinate practice necessary to 
achieve Strether’s goals (novelty, surprise, pleasure) forecloses the achievement of 
Gostrey’s goals (accuracy, explanation, communication). By building dialectical 
oppositions between perspectives like this into his fiction, James leads readers to a more 
self-conscious understanding of the values which his subjects express. Analyzing the way 
The Ambassadors opposes these perspectives in greater detail places us in a better 
position to understand a distinctive ethical effect James’s fiction is designed to produce. 
IV. Maria Gostrey’s Discrimination 
 
Critics are often tempted to view Maria’s function in the novel as complementary 
to Strether’s since their relation as characters is both friendly and pedagogical.154 
However, the novel invites a sharper opposition between the values that motivate Strether 
and Maria’s behavior than the harmonious tone of their intercourse would suggest. 
Strether senses the opposed force of Maria’s taxonomic categorizations from the moment 
he feels her eyes upon him: 
They had taken hold of him straightway measuring him up and down as if 
they knew how; as if he were human material they had already in some 
sort handled. Their possessor was in truth, it may be communicated, the 
mistress of a hundred cases or categories, receptacles of the mind, 
subdivisions for convenience, in which, from a full experience, she 
pigeon-holed her fellow mortals with a hand as free as that of a 
compositor scattering type. She was as equipped in this particular as 
Strether was the reverse, and it made an opposition between them which 
                                                          
153 My choice to affiliate Gostrey with discrimination goes against the grain of James’s intentions 
insofar as James’s preface affiliates Strether with discrimination and not Gostrey. The term fits Strether 
insofar as his imagination, freed from Maria’s types and categories, is even more susceptible to nuances in 
experience; indeed, Strether attends to differences in feeling that other characters might easily neglect. 
However, James’s choice to associate discrimination with Strether is misleading insofar as the word implies 
the achievement of accurate judgment. This paper’s treatment of Miss Gostrey emphasizes that informed 
judgment does not just require the susceptibility to differences as such, but a sense of how differences fit 
within a broader structure. 





he might well have shrunk from submitting to if he had fully suspected it. 
(The Ambassadors, p. 21) 
 
Although the passage begins situated to Strether, James’s narrator steps in to emphasize 
significant aspects of Maria that Strether has not yet sensed (“Their possessor was in truth 
…”). The narrator notes a fundamental “opposition” between Miss Gostrey’s and 
Strether’s practice of perception, which Strether “might well have shrunk from 
submitting to if he had fully suspected it.” While Gostrey’s categorizations cause Strether 
to feel “pigeon-holed,” they are also presented as an object of admiration: Miss Gostrey’s 
facility in judging people implies that she is “equipped” in a way that Strether—who 
possesses Gostrey’s equipment exactly “in reverse”—is not. 
The ironizing effect that Maria’s categorizations have on Strether’s imagination is 
easily obscured by the fact that Strether’s consciousness is the only one to which the 
narration offers access. However, Maria’s perspective is often close at hand, making 
itself felt in skeptical questions and qualifications that pull the reader back from 
absorption into Strether’s imaginative flights. During an early conversation, when 
Strether asserts the blunt conclusion that Chad is “a wretched boy,” Gostrey’s response 
presses him to employ more of the fine-grained categories readily available to her: “Of 
what type and temper is he?” she asks (45). The question suggests that, from Maria’s 
perspective, Strether’s feeling towards Chad is imprecise insofar as it lacks categories 
capable of fitting its object of investigation. Maria’s distrust of Strether’s vision remains 
as Strether’s judgment changes to equally imprecise affirmation. Soon after, Strether 
gives “reign to his fancy,” becoming swept away by Chad’s transformation—by his 
“changed state, his lovely home, his beautiful things, his easy talk, his very appetite” 





[Chad’s] freedom” (104). However, when Strether raises the “miracle” of Chad’s 
alteration to Miss Gostrey, she counsels him to temper his judgment: “Don't make up 
your mind. There are all sorts of things. You haven't seen him all …He’s not so good as 
you think!” (105, 108). Because Miss Gostrey withholds judgment until she has the data 
necessary to place Chad in her array of categories, Gostrey’s eventual conclusion carries 
more weight than Strether’s provisional speculations.  
Miss Gostrey not only encourages Strether to employ more discriminating 
categories in his perceptions of others, but she also presses him to consider the 
implications that one category might entail for another. Miss Gostrey’s attentiveness to 
the way that perceptions invite or preclude others allows her to intuit the truth of Chad 
and Marie’s relationship. Chad’s newfound urbanity is not an isolated perception for 
Gostrey, existing on its own terms; rather, it is a signal that invites or excludes other 
possibilities. In this case, Chad’s behavior indicates the presence of a woman in his life: 
(“A woman. …It’s one of the things that have to be …don't you see …how she accounts 
for him?” [107]). And if Chad is involved in a sexual relationship with a married woman, 
that in turn would necessarily qualify what Strether would understand as his ‘goodness’ 
(thus, Maria’s warning: “He’s not so good as you think!” [108]).  
The “acuteness” and “quick imagination” Strether demonstrates in this 
conversation allow him to proffer multiple explanations for the significance of Chad’s 
change (107). However, such creativity does not help Strether to equitably consider the 
relation of these new possibilities to each other. Despite Maria’s “warning,” Strether 
finds himself unwilling to acknowledge observations that might qualify or refine his 





consciousness everything but itself” (108). Because Strether does not integrate his new 
perceptions of Chad with other relevant perceptions, his judgment is prone to sudden and 
arbitrary shifts, such as the moment he revises his morally-laden view of Chad’s 
irresponsible affair: “it seemed somehow as if [Chad] couldn't but be as good from the 
moment he wasn’t as bad” (108, emphasis in original). Although it’s exciting for Strether 
to have exchanged his previous conventional wisdom for a new view of Chad, passages 
like these suggest Strether’s new view is not necessarily more accurate than the old. 
Strether’s caprice manifests in his rapidly shifting judgments: either Chad is a gentleman 
or a pagan, either his attachment is virtuous or base, either he is free or he is entangled, 
and so on.  
If Strether’s provisional speculations are vulnerable to dramatic oscillation, they 
are also easily hijacked by subjective interest. Multiple passages speak to the motivated 
nature of Strether’s thought process: “He wanted to be able to like his specimen with a 
clear good conscience…”; “Strether found a certain freedom on his own side in defining 
it…”; “This description …had a sound that gratified his mental ear…”; “Occupied with 
another side of the matter … [he took] refuge verily in that side” (83, 97, 99, 345, 
emphasis mine). Such passages emphasize Strether’s tendency to endorse judgments that 
are convenient, interesting, or novel as opposed to endorsing judgments that cohere 
within a broader explanatory framework. The gentle satire of Strether’s observation 
throughout the novel, performed both by Maria’s questioning presence, and by the free-
indirect narration, reveals that Strether does not judge disinterestedly. Rather, Strether 
uses judgment to clear his conscience, to feel liberated, to gratify his aesthetic 





The “opposition” Strether feels in Maria’s eyes does not just arise from Strether’s 
discomfort in feeling “placed” within Maria’s array of human types, then, but from 
Strether’s sense that his vision fails to measure up to her standards. When Strether finally 
discovers that Chad and Marie’s relationship is not ‘virtuous’ as he previously thought, 
he anticipates the subjection to Maria’s exacting standards that tends to occur in their 
discussions: “He foresaw that Miss Gostrey would come again into requisition on the 
morrow …it wasn’t to be denied that he was already a little afraid of her ‘What on earth 
…had you then supposed?’” (315). Strether’s fears are confirmed in the ensuing meeting 
when Maria draws attention to Strether’s almost willfully inattentive belief in the ‘virtue’ 
of Chad and Madame de Vionnet’s relationship:  
“What I see, what I saw,” Maria returned, “is that you dressed up even the 
virtue. You were wonderful—you were beautiful, as I’ve had the honour 
of telling you before; but, if you wish really to know,” she sadly 
confessed, “I never quite knew where you were. There were moments,” 
she explained, “when you struck me as grandly cynical; there were others 
when you struck me as grandly vague.” 
Her friend considered. “I had phases. I had flights.” 
“Yes, but things must have a basis.” (332) 
 
Maria does not hesitate to serve the “requisition” that Strether has been dreading. She 
accuses him of having “dressed up” the nature of Chad and Marie’s relationship by 
willfully assuming its non-sexual nature. In response, Strether accurately describes his 
propensity for “phases” and “flights,” for intuitive leaps and creative speculations—a 
capacity that positively distinguishes him in Gostrey’s eyes. However, if Strether’s 
speculations are “wonderful” and “beautiful,” they are also “grandly vague” to Gostrey: 
unconstrained, imbalanced by consideration of their relation to other perceptions that 
Strether has bracketed or ignored. In contrast to Maria’s habit of proceeding “as always, 





incomplete (296). (“You’ve got no facts at all?” Maria asks, incredulous, after Strether’s 
first visit to Chad in Paris. “Well, he has a lovely home,” Strether responds [81]). 
Whereas Strether’s unhinged speculations attend to the imaginative possibilities his 
perceptions afford, Maria’s discrimination adheres to a conflicting imperative that “things 
must have a basis” (332). It is thus not just Mrs. Newsome, with her “cold thought,” but 
also Miss Gostrey, “with all her science,” whose sober and disinterested perception of the 
social world opposes Strether’s motivated perception (298, 90). Attending to inaccuracies 
of Strether’s perception allows us to see why Maria views herself as Strether’s 
pedagogue, guiding Strether in his perceptions until he can “toddle alone” (192). A 
tolerant but exacting pedagogue in the style of Matthew Arnold, Maria nudges Strether 
away from an subjective absorption in aesthetic experience to impersonal assessment of 
its implications. 
V. Lambert Strether’s Imagination 
 
Thus far, the paper has only accounted for the ironizing dimension of Gostrey’s 
relation to Strether; it has described Strether’s imaginative vision from the outside, from 
the perspective of Maria’s discrimination. But understanding the novel’s depiction of the 
dialectical opposition between the two requires attention to the way that Strether’s 
imaginative practice is not just ironized, but vivified, by its opposition to Maria’s 
discrimination.  
In truth, it is precisely when the novel reveals Strether’s failing to pursue Maria’s 
injunction to uncover the “basis” of his perceptions that the novel also communicates 
their value. An early conversation with Chad about his relationship to Marie de Vionnet 





“hitch” in leaving Europe is his mistress, who is “too good a friend” (142). Strether’s 
response, “It will be a sacrifice, then?”—prompts Chad to remark that leaving her “will 
be the greatest loss [he has] ever suffered” (142). Strether takes Chad at the depth of his 
word, here; he does not consider whether accepting a view of Chad in this light of tragic 
romance has the “basis” in the facts that Maria requires. In fact, Chad will turn out to be 
quite capable of abandoning Madame de Vionnet at the novel’s conclusion—Chad’s 
description of her as a “good …friend” may even provide Strether with a hint that his 
romantic ardor is cooling (142). As is typical, though, Strether ignores perceptions that 
conflict with the interpretation he prefers. Having attended to the evidence that supports 
his expectations, he concludes that the “mystery” of Chad’s relation to Marie has been 
“clear[ed] up” (142). Insofar as this scene is constructed to reveal distance between 
Strether’s naïve understanding of Chad’s relationship with Marie and their actual 
relationship, it presents Strether’s perspective in a critical light.  
But while the scene invites judgment of Strether’s view of Chad and Marie, it 
would be a mistake to overlook the extent to which the scene also invites appreciation of 
that view. As Strether imagines Chad afflicted by the loss of Marie de Vionnet, the 
moment takes on an “intensity” for Strether; it becomes “flagrantly and publicly—
interesting” (142). The narrator’s attentiveness to Strether’s enthusiasm and curiosity 
moves readers’ attention away from external factual errors toward internal imaginative 
possibilities. Naiveté about the motivations of others appears a small price to pay for 
Strether’s perspective toward relationships: a belief that they invite elevating 
transformation, that they require profound “sacrifice,” and that they are upheld by 





acutely perceives the limitations of the ethos his protagonist expresses. But of course, 
readers of both authors are still capable of perceiving the affection that these novels 
solicit for their protagonists who each possess a capacity to imagine human interaction in 
a world of beauty, nobility, and intensity. Strether’s “suppositions and divinations”— 
“exciting,” “sudden,” and “odd”—are their own justification (319). Strether’s perceptions 
do not require the basis in facts prized by Maria; they need “no warrant but their 
intensity” (319). 
If Maria’s skeptical statements and questions invite ironizing attention to 
Strether’s imagination, Strether’s internal monologues also invite ironizing attention to 
Maria’s discrimination. Narration situated to Strether describes the kind of explanation 
Maria practices in slanted terms in order to communicate the costs that such analysis has 
from his perspective: 
His heart always sank when the clouds of explanation gathered. His 
highest ingenuity was in keeping the sky of life clear of them. Whether or 
no he had a grand idea of the lucid, he held that nothing ever was in fact—
for any one else—explained. One went through the vain motions, but it 
was mostly a waste of life. …A personal relation was a relation only so 
long as people either perfectly understood or, better still, didn't care if they 
didn't. From the moment they cared if they didn't it was living by the 
sweat of one's brow. (92) 
In this passage, “explanation” is explicitly described as “vain,” and as “a waste”; and it is 
connected both to “sweat” and to “clouds.” The metaphoric association of explanation 





the rhetoric explicitly celebrates the strategies Strether uses to avoid it (this is “his highest 
ingenuity”). From Strether’s perspective, explanation is not just an emotional burden, but 
a fruitless epistemic endeavor: “he held that nothing ever was in fact …explained.” The 
feelings that guide Strether’s “personal relation[s]” are simply too nuanced and 
idiosyncratic to be easily simplified into understandable communications. From 
Strether’s perspective, Miss Gostrey’s competing ideal of discrimination, with its interest 
in analysis and categorization, can only appear as a block and a weight. Maria’s habit of 
aiming “as always, for clearness,” is just what would invite the explanatory clouds that 
obscure Strether’s alternative ideal (296). Being forced to explain oneself and others, or 
to fit people into convenient “categories, receptacles of the mind,” does not allow for the 
free play of feeling Strether cherishes (21). Instead of inviting unconstrained personal 
relations, where people either understand each other perfectly or don’t care if they don’t, 
Maria’s discrimination involves detailed analysis of the motives of others. From 
Strether’s perspective, both the “cold thought” of Mrs. Newsome and the “science” of 
Miss Gostrey can only appear as obstructions, as “clouds” obscuring the imaginative 
practice that the rhetoric works to illuminate. Critics have used passages like these to 
draw attention to the way in which the novel depicts Strether as purposefully neglecting 
ideals of selection, system, and explanation in order to enact his own ideals.155 That the 
presence of this tension between values has been noted by multiple readers of The 
                                                          
155  McWhirter, Posnock, DeMille, and Hutchinson have all described Strether’s practice in terms that 
clarify the values it must relinquish in order to preserve the values that define it. While none of these critics 
focus explicitly on Maria’s vision as a dialectical foil to Strether’s, their analyses do suggest that Strether 
purposefully neglects ideals of selection, system, and explanation in order to enact his own ideals. See 
McWhirter, David. Desire and Love in Henry James: A Study of the Late Novels, first edition, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 65; Posnock, Ross. The Trial of Curiosity, p. 228; DeMille, Barbara. 
“Lambert Strether and the Tiger,” p. 77; and Hutchison, Hazel. Seeing and Believing: Henry James and the 





Ambassadors should be no surprise if we suspect that James uses the novel’s character-
system in a Hegelian way, to communicate information about the fit between mutually 
antithetical value schemas. 
Turning to the novel’s final conversation between Strether and Gostrey gives us a 
chance to consider the novel’s closing emphasis on the irreconcilable tension between 
Strether and Gostrey’s views. In the novel’s final scene Maria makes an offer to Strether 
that he rejects. Why Strether makes this decision is not immediately intuitive; a woman 
whom he finds attractive makes him an offer and the novel ends with Strether refusing it. 
The ambiguity of this scene, however, is importantly different from those ambiguities 
noted by critics like Butler, Newton, and Bersani. Strether’s decision is not puzzling 
because the narrative pulls back from Strether and refuses to allow readers to see his 
justification for making the decision, but from something like the opposite: by attending 
to Strether’s analysis of these decisions in such detail, the narrative ends up offering 
multiple and conflicting explanations for his choice. Rather than stepping back from a 
realist commitment to analyzing and judging behavior, the final scene of Strether’s 
conversation with Maria reveals analysis and judgment at a high degree of intensity. 
Before we begin to pry apart some of the various competing values that inform 
Strether’s final decision, a review of the context in which he makes this decision is in 
order. By the time of Strether’s final conversation with Maria, his ambassadorial mission 
for Mrs. Newsome, his fiancé, is apparently complete: her son, Chad will be returning 
home from Europe to take on his responsibilities and run the family business. But 
Strether has admitted that he is now “different” for Mrs. Newsome, and that now he 





do you go home to?” thus wonders if returning makes sense given Strether’s changed 
state and, in particular, all that she and Strether have experienced together in Europe 
(345). Strether intuits this to be an “offer” from Maria, who tells Strether soon after that 
there is “nothing …in the world” she wouldn’t do for him (346).  
Why does Strether refuse Maria’s offer if he admits that things are over with Mrs. 
Newsome? According to the interpretation advanced by most critics, Strether assumes 
that Maria’s offer comprises a relationship with her, and the key moment of Strether’s 
rationale is the assertion that receiving Maria for his ambassadorial efforts would make 
him “wrong” (347).156 To have gone to Europe at the behest of Mrs. Newsome and to 
have found a different love interest does not match up with Strether’s hope “not …to 
have got anything for myself” out of his mission (346). According to Strether’s idealistic 
logic, accepting a relationship with Maria would entail that he had used Mrs. Newsome 
for his own purposes, akin to the way that Chad uses and then abandons Madame de 
Vionnet. This self-abnegating aspect of Strether’s rationale for refusing Maria is 
supported by the dialectical contrast the novel develops between Strether’s idealistic 
approach to relationships and Chad Newsome’s more pragmatic approach.157 Strether’s 
final decision effectively reveals trade-offs between these two perspectives: refusing 
Maria expresses values associated with Strether’s imagination like generosity, sensitivity, 
and reflectiveness at the expense of expressing values associated with Chad’s urbanity 
                                                          
156 Fessenbecker and Pippin offer slightly different accounts of Strether’s reasons for rejecting Maria’s 
offer than the predominant critical view. Fessenbecker views Strether’s decision as involving a conflict 
between ethics and happiness which is made arbitrary by the absence of a sense of selfhood stable enough 
to ground either choice (“Freedom, Self-Obligation, and Selfhood in Henry James.” Nineteenth-Century 
Literature, 66.1 [2011], 92). And Pippin suggests that Strether’s refusal expresses a scrupulous concern that 
his evaluations of Chad’s experience in Europe appear disinterested both to himself and others, rather than 
tainted by self-justification (Henry James and Modern Moral Life, 166-68). 
157 For an analysis that associates Strether’s decision with a refusal of values associated with Chad, see 





like self-possession, hardness, and experience (Weinstein, Henry James and the 
Requirements of the Imagination, 152-54). Read in this way, Strether’s refusal of Maria’s 
offer is a rejection of the practice of Chad’s approach to intimacy: an approach which 
enables one to “live” with an array of rich experiences, but at the cost of foregoing the 
depths and nuances of Strether’s imaginative engagements with others (132). 
 While Strether’s final decision can be read as clarifying a dialectical opposition 
between Strether and Chad’s perspectives, then, it is also possible to read that decision as 
clarifying a dialectical opposition between Strether and Maria’s perspectives. On this 
reading, not logically incompatible with the first, Strether’s refusal of Maria’s “offer” is 
not just a refusal of Maria the woman, but a refusal of Maria’s perspective of 
discrimination. Strether interprets Maria’s final “offer” as one “of exquisite service, of 
lightened care”—as one “that might well have tempted” (346). But to the extent that 
Strether associates this offer with Maria’s discrimination, (rather than with Maria 
herself), this offer would not just appear comforting, but stifling. By protecting Strether 
from the errors of idiosyncrasy and offering the promise of shared understanding, Maria’s 
discrimination comes at the expense of insulating Strether from the imaginative ideal he 
seeks: “[Maria’s offer] built him softly round, it roofed him warmly over, it rested, all so 
firm, on selection. And what ruled selection was beauty and knowledge. It was awkward, 
it was almost stupid, not to seem to prize such things; yet, none the less, so far as they 
made his opportunity they made it only for a moment” (346). Strether views Maria’s 
offer as a live opportunity “only for a moment” before dismissing it. For Maria’s 
principle of “selection”—her attendance only to those perceptions that fit within a 





not prize “knowledge,” if it comes at the cost of unfettered expansion; he cannot prize 
“beauty” if it comes at the cost of sublimity.  
If Strether has enough confidence in his own ideal to entertain Maria’s offer “only 
for a moment,” he nevertheless recognizes that her ideal of discrimination confronts his 
own imaginative ideal with limitations. The judicious and attentive discrimination that 
allows Maria to understand and appreciate Strether’s perspective also enacts a competing 
standard to it. As we have seen, the opposition between the two is indicated from the 
moment Strether feels Maria’s eyes upon him and is further manifested in Maria’s 
responses. Maria speaks to Strether as one “who could afford a concession,” and she 
describes herself as a parent instructing a child how to “toddle alone” (223, 192). Indeed, 
Strether feels childish in deciding to reject her. Although Strether resolves to maintain his 
own standard, his decision is compatible with finding it “awkward” and “almost stupid” 
not to prize Maria’s as well (346). As Strether’s commitments have been tested through 
juxtaposition against competing commitments expressed within the novel’s character-
system, he has become aware of their limitations. By perceiving the relation of Maria’s 
perspective to his own, Strether has clarified the values he must give up to express his 
imaginative ideal. To the extent that Strether’s unbounded “phases” and “flights” 
dispense with Maria’s “selection,” they must come at the cost of “knowledge” and 
“beauty” (332, 346). By allowing readers to follow Strether’s increasingly self-conscious 
assessment of relations between values in this way, The Ambassadors informs ethical 








If this examination of ironization and vivification in The Ambassadors has been 
successful, existing theorizations of James’s significance to the ethical turn deserve 
reconsideration. I began by summarizing what ethical critics have rightly observed about 
Jamesian narrative: the way in which it often invites suspension of judgment, either by 
pulling back entirely from the realist interpretation of character or by attending to ways 
that particular situations render ethical judgment out of place or indeterminate. This 
analysis has suggested, though, that dialectical oppositions within The Ambassadors’ 
character-system do not just suspend judgment but provide context that directs and 
shapes judgment.  
Rather than presenting fictional characters with a Levinasian immediacy of 
contact which refuses conceptual understanding, James’s narrative has instead presented 
both Maria and Strether in an intelligible way that makes it possible to extract meaning 
from their actions. The basis of this extraction has been the narrative’s scrupulous 
articulation of the values that govern their behavior: observations like Maria’s statement 
that “things must have a basis” or characterizations of Strether’s “phases,” “flights,” and 
“sudden gusts of fancy” convey distinctive ethos associated with each character to 
readers (332, 319). The novel also facilitates ethical thinking about these values through 
enactment, by constructing a narrative in which these abstract commitments are 
expressed through the concrete actions and speech of the characters: for instance, through 
Maria’s astute speculation that there is a woman in Chad’s life or through Strether’s 
initial wonder at Chad’s transformation. By making connections like these between the 
articulation and enactment the narrative provides information relevant to practical 





about values associated with these perspectives: for instance, that a discriminating 
approach may help a person intuit the motivations of others, or that an imaginative 
approach may use others as a basis for vivid internal journeys. 
In addition to developing Aristotelian phronesis by considering relations between 
value schemas and situations, we have seen here that The Ambassadors also promotes 
Hegelian self-consciousness by inviting readers to consider relations of value schemas to 
one another. To consider both the vivification and ironization of Strether’s perspective is 
to be moved from narrowly dismissive or overly indulgent views of Strether’s 
imagination toward a more holistic view that locates Strether’s expressive practice in 
relation to relevant alternatives. By constructing dialectical oppositions to characters like 
Maria Gostrey and Chad Newsome, the character system of The Ambassadors does not 
promote indeterminate emotional knowledge that is beyond reason; it would be more 
precise to say that it does the reverse—that it subjects emotional knowledge to reason by 
facilitating systematic comparison necessary to locate subjective perspectives in a 
broader context. Perhaps The Ambassadors has puzzled ethical critics in part because the 
novel’s formal structure conflicts with its thematic content. If I’ve shown that the novel’s 
character-system exhibits the many-sided judgment of mid-century Victorian liberalism, 
I’ve also suggested that novel’s central character exhibits the imaginative intensities of 
late Victorian aestheticism. No less than the ethical modes of Maria’s liberal 
discrimination and Strether’s aestheticist imagination, the artistic styles of expressive 





history allowed for competing currents, it would eventually lean towards the modernist 
successors of aestheticism and to the decline of expressive realism.158 
To this point, Hegelian contributions to the ethical turn have been relatively few, 
and the major contributors have been philosophers rather than literary critics.159 And 
although Mikhail Bakhtin and Richard Rorty have affiliated the ethical value of novels 
with their juxtaposition of antithetical vocabularies of value, neither has offered 
substantive analysis of how novels actually facilitate such juxtaposition, or of the kind of 
novels, if any, that do this more effectively than others.160 While this book’s 
identification of ironization and vivification in Victorian novels is a step in the direction 
                                                          
158  First of all, congratulations if you made it to this footnote. I’m taking this opportunity to note that 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway is not a modernist text by the standards I employed in that last sentence. 
Does this mean that I’ve arbitrarily expanded the expressive realist aesthetic to encompass all the novels I 
love the most? Difficult to say. 
159  Despite describing the ethical turn as constituted predominantly by “neo-Aristotelian moral 
philosophers and Levinasian poststructuralists,” Fessenbecker has also cited the philosophers Richard 
Rorty and Charles Taylor as key figures in a less prominent Hegelian strand of the ethical turn (“In Defense 
of Paraphrase,” p. 119). Robert Pippin’s Henry James and Modern Moral Life could also be mentioned as a 
contributor to this Hegelian direction in the ethical turn. Although Pippin’s Henry James and Modern 
Moral Life engages substantively with James’s novels, Pippin’s reading of The Ambassadors, for instance, 
does not analyze the ethical implications of dialectical relations between characters but the way in which 
Strether enacts a meta-ethical sensibility expressed by all of James’s fiction—a sensibility that assumes 
right action in modernity depends upon its capacity to be recognizable in Hegel’s sense of the term [Henry 
James and Modern Moral Life, p. 6]). 
160 In “Discourse and the Novel” Bakhtin describes the novel’s capacity to depict “specific world 
views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and values” which may be juxtaposed against each 
other in contradictory, supplementary, or dialogical ways (Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination: 
Four Essays. ed. Michael Holquist. Trans Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. [Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1981 (1935)], 291-2). However, Bakhtin does not offer an examples from specific novels to 
clarify how these various juxtapositions work. Although Bakhtin does discuss passages from Eugene 
Onegin in “The Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse,” Bakhtin’s analysis of the way that Lensky’s poetic 
language is dialogized through placement in Pushkin’s novel is arguably insufficient to clarify the ethical 
ramifications of juxtaposing contradictory world views. See “The Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse,” in 
The Dialogic Imagination, 43-49. 
Richard Rorty has suggested that novels and works of philosophy help readers shape and expand their 
own vocabularies of value in a loosely dialectical way. See especially Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 80, in which Rorty discusses the possibility that literary 
works can facilitate the “redescription” of ethical vocabularies. Rorty also offers a helpful footnote that 
provides some examples of the kinds of works that he thinks are useful for this purpose—see Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity, p. 143. However, like Bakhtin, Rorty does not analyze how a literary work could 
depict tensions between more than one vocabulary of value, nor does he specify what exactly it is about any 





of such analysis, there is more work that could be done: antithetical value schemas play 
an essential role in many other literary traditions. A heightened attention to the dialectical 
elements of narrative is necessary if critics are to avoid missing a sophisticated practice 
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